In The Siskina, the House of Lords propounded the view that a right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action and is dependent upon a pre-existing cause of action against the party enjoined. Although the decision engaged a narrow point of construction, this pronouncement has been adopted as a general prescription for granting interlocutory injunctions. This fails to recognise the fundamental distinction between jurisdiction to grant an injunction and discretion or power to do so. The Siskina falls in the latter category. The court's jurisdiction is largely unconstrained and in most cases the principal issue is not whether an injunction can be granted, but whether, on the particular facts, it should. In this setting The Siskina has a limited function in contributing to a body of principles which guide the court's power to grant interlocutory injunctions. The diverse circumstances in which injunctive relief is sought are not susceptible to a single formula. This is evident in recent judgments, which have renounced The Siskina's restrictive doctrine as being inconsistent with the inherent nature of discretionary relief.

A principal’s claim for forfeiture of an agent’s commission following the latter’s default can be explained from both an equitable and common law perspective. In equity, the threshold for forfeiture is imprecise and reflects the vagaries of fiduciary obligations. At common law, forfeiture can be claimed in proceedings for money had and received. However, the principal’s claim may be subject to counter-restitution in respect of the agent’s services. It is argued that the common law provides an effective means of reconciling the parties’ interests and that an approach based on failure of consideration would provide a more coherent and principled outcome in equity.

SUPPOSE a trustee misapplies trust funds to purchase property for his own benefit. If the acquired property increases in value, what is the nature of the beneficiaries’ claim in respect of those gains? This was recently considered by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Tang v Tang [2017] HKCFA 3. In 2003 the administrator of an estate (the defendant) purchased property (the “Property”). The purchase was partly funded by the unauthorised use of HK $11.48 m from the estate. Shortly afterwards, the defendant executed a declaration of trust over the Property in favour of his corporate vehicle, Tri-Strong Investment Ltd. The Property was subsequently transferred to this company. Seven months after acquiring the Property, the defendant paid the estate the full amount that had been withdrawn together with interest. In 2005 the estate beneficiaries discovered the defendant's misuse of estate money and commenced proceedings alleging breach of fiduciary duty. By the time the matter was heard, the Property had increased significantly in value.

Public law need no longer be bound by the traditional fields of constitutional and administrative law. In a contemporary context, it has the scope to encompass statutory construction, human rights, state sovereignty, electoral law, legal philosophy, and the rule of law amongst others. In short, an expanded conceptualization of public law speaks to government power. While public law’s horizon is expanding, so too is academic practice. No longer the domain of discrete enterprises of teaching, research and engagement, academic practice can now be conceptualized as a coherent scholarly enterprise mediated by digital technologies. This article first articulates the meaning of an expanded public law and integrated scholarly practice. It then explores how the digitally literate public law academic can put this into practice. Through the use of two case studies, it describes how democratizing digital media offer a context for and means of community engagement and education in public law issues while they are in the public eye. As academic practice, the teaching moment of contemporary public law in action offers an opportunity for broadening both academic and student horizons.

In Novoship (UK) Ltd. v Nikitin, a unanimous Court of Appeal held that an account of profits can be granted against a third party who dishonestly assists a breach of fiduciary duty. This raises fundamental questions as to the status of gain-based relief in relation to secondary wrongs. An account of profits reflects the imperatives of fiduciary duty and it is questionable whether the remedy should be extended to a stranger to that relationship. This article will analyse the spectrum of secondary liability and suggest an appropriate demarcation of compensation and disgorgement.

It is settled law that a fiduciary is precluded by virtue of his office from making personal gains. This is part of the wider principle that those who assume the role of a fiduciary must be disinterested in any benefits or opportunities that are inconsistent with their duties to the principal. However, controversy surrounds the appropriate remedial response where an employee receives unauthorised gains in the form of bribes and secret commissions to subvert the employee's duty to his employer. The classic authority of Lister and Co v Stubbs provides a restrictive answer. The principal is confined to a personal claim against the delinquent fiduciary. The bribe money is deemed the property of the recipient and although he is liable to account for this sum, the resultant obligation is only a debt.

The tertiary sector is operating in an increasingly market-driven environment. Teaching standards are under intense scrutiny as universities strive to meet the expectations of students exercising consumer choices. Continuing professional development programmes have a pivotal role in supporting and shaping best practice in modern law schools. Early career academics in both the New Zealand and British university systems share similar teaching and learning objectives. However, the respective professional development programmes have different compliance regimes. The United Kingdom has adopted a scheme of formal training and teaching accreditation, supported by the UK Professional Standards Framework. In New Zealand mandatory training requirements are more limited. It is submitted that New Zealand universities should similarly require probationary academics to undertake a formal programme which promotes an understanding of the scholarship of teaching. It is further argued that programmes in both jurisdictions should emphasise subject-specific pedagogical knowledge to expose law teachers to the distinct academic and vocational aspects of their discipline.

(2010). Pecuniary Remedies for Breach of Confidence. King's Law Journal: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 355-370.