Elias Moser (2021) takes on a challenging task. He aims to show that we can derive from Robert Nozick's natural rights theory, and its associated contractarianism, a justification for the lockdowns that governments have used to contain the current pandemic. Lockdowns have been controversial. They have provoked loud and vigorous complaints from some quarters that they deprive people, unnecessarily and unjustifiably, of several of their fundamental liberties and Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), with its defence of the minimal state, is just the sort of text to which we might expect the protestors to turn for support. Showing that lockdowns can find a defence in the foundations of Nozick's libertarianism is therefore no mean task. A commentator on Moser's argument might begin by challenging the Nozickian premises on which it depends. That is not a path I shall take. Nozick's thinking is highly controversial but, even if we dissent from it, there is much we can learn from his penetrating and intricate analysis of the issues we confront when we strive to reconcile people's liberties with the threats and insecurities they may face. He presents his analysis as part of hypothetical history that plots the way in which individuals might move out of a state of nature and into a minimal state while suffering no violation of their natural rights; in truth, however, much that he has to say in Part I of Anarchy, State, and Utopia has a much larger compass. It can be exploited for its relevance.

Of the many questions Cecile Laborde addresses in her magisterial Liberalism's Religion, several relate to what she describes as 'the puzzle of exemptions'. I examine some of the issues raised by her efforts to solve that puzzle: whether her ideal of moral integrity squares with the nature of religious belief; whether we should find the case for collective religious exemptions in freedom of association and the 'coherence interests' of associations; how much significance we should give to the 'competence interests' of organised religions; and by which criteria we should assess individual claims to religious exemption.

I focus on some controversial features of Peter Balint's stimulating and provocative reassessment of the place of toleration in contemporary diverse societies. First, I question his argument that we must enlarge the concept of toleration to include indifference and approval if toleration is to be compatible with state neutrality. Secondly, I suggest that his idea of active neutrality of intent risks encountering the same difficulties as neutrality of outcome, although these will be mitigated the more the state's neutrality takes a 'hands-off' form. Thirdly, while accepting his claim that exemptions depart from neutrality insofar as they attribute a significance to religious and conscientious convictions that they deny to mere preferences, I argue that that departure is not arbitrary and remains within the spirit of neutrality of intent.

This chapter examines how the space for toleration in contemporary societies depends upon our conception of the plurality that characterises them. Toleration, traditionally understood, entails objecting to but not preventing whatever it is that we tolerate. Toleration amongst those who hold different and conflicting religious beliefs has always been the paradigm case, but the traditional idea of toleration comports equally well with conflicts of moral, political, and intellectual belief. The plurality that characterises contemporary societies is, however, often conceived in other terms. Contemporary populations are said to be marked more conspicuously by difference than disagreement and the most salient differences are differences of identity, such as gender, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity. Even religious differences are frequently accounted more significant as differences of identity than belief. Thus a switch from belief to identity radically shrinks the space within which toleration is appropriate. That conclusion requires a major qualification arising from the different meanings given to 'being tolerant' nowadays. Whereas traditionally toleration has connoted not impeding the objectionable, the tolerant individual and the tolerant community are now often understood as tolerant insofar as they abstain from disapproval or dislike. Others may disapprove or dislike differences; the tolerant person simply accepts them. Unlike toleration, 'tolerance' so understood can occupy the same space as identity. In our untidy world, the claims of belief and identity, and the associated claims of toleration and tolerance, jostle together and compete for pre-eminence in shared spaces. The final part of the chapter examines how those claims differ and compete in two types of case: (1) the issue of how we should deal with challenges to religion, such as the Danish cartoons and (2) the issue of how we should respond to demands that a society should make special efforts to accommodate the religious differences present in its population.

The nuclear hormone receptor retinoic acid receptor-related orphan C2 (RORC2, also known as RORγt) is a promising target for the treatment of autoimmune diseases. A small molecule, inverse agonist of the receptor is anticipated to reduce production of IL-17, a key proinflammatory cytokine. Through a high-throughput screening approach, we identified a molecule displaying promising binding affinity for RORC2, inhibition of IL-17 production in Th17 cells, and selectivity against the related RORA and RORB receptor isoforms. Lead optimization to improve the potency and metabolic stability of this hit focused on two key design strategies, namely, iterative optimization driven by increasing lipophilic efficiency and structure-guided conformational restriction to achieve optimal ground state energetics and maximize receptor residence time. This approach successfully identified 3-cyano-N-(3-(1-isobutyrylpiperidin-4-yl)-1-methyl-4-(trifluoromethyl)-1H-pyrrolo[2,3-b]pyridin-5-yl)benzamide as a potent and selective RORC2 inverse agonist, demonstrating good metabolic stability, oral bioavailability, and the ability to reduce IL-17 levels and skin inflammation in a preclinical in vivo animal model upon oral administration.

One of John Horton’s most original and significant contributions to political theory is his development and exploration of the political theory of modus vivendi (MV). I examine what Horton understands a MV to be, what sort of theory he intends the political theory of MV to be, and why he believes a MV to be the best we can reasonably hope for. I consider how far his notion of MV matches the reality of contemporary political systems and whether ‘liberal moralism’ is quite as divorced from reality or as devoid of practical consequence as his political theory of MV would have us believe.

By use of a structure-based computational method for identification of structurally novel Janus kinase (JAK) inhibitors predicted to bind beyond the ATP binding site, a potent series of indazoles was identified as selective pan-JAK inhibitors with a type 1.5 binding mode. Optimization of the series for potency and increased duration of action commensurate with inhaled or topical delivery resulted in potent pan-JAK inhibitor 2 (PF-06263276), which was advanced into clinical studies.

With some qualifications, this article endorses Brian Leiter's argument that religious accommodation should not shift burdens from believers to non-believers. It argues that religious believers should take responsibility for their beliefs and for meeting the demands of their beliefs. It then examines the implications of that argument for British law on indirect discrimination (disparate impact) as it relates to religion or belief: burden-shifting from believers to employers and providers of goods and services should be deemed acceptable only insofar as the burden incurred by the employer or provider is 'insignificant'. Legal exemptions should satisfy a similar test. Why should there be religious accommodation at all, even if it entails no significant burden-shifting? The author agrees with Leiter in finding the most plausible answer in the claims of conscience rather than in general theories of equality or features special to religion. Those claims can reasonably be made in respect of liberty of conscience but also when conscience is merely disadvantaged.

Religious Pluralism and Values in the Public Sphere Lenn E Goodman Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, viii + 221 pp (hardback £54.99) ISBN: 978-1-107-05213-0; (paperback £19.99) ISBN: 978-1-107-65805-9 - Volume 19 Issue 1

A tolerant attitude combined with a pragmatic approach would seem to be the ideal strategy to be pursued in politics today. They would oppose the increasingly sectarian reactions of politicians and members of the public, and would temper the fanatism with which certain principles and values are often pursued. Toleration allows a person to accept other practices than the ones with which she is accustomed, although these are practices to which she objects. Pragmatism enables parties in conflict to co-exist even when the accepted framework for their co-existence is not regarded as entirely just, but perhaps as a second-best, a modus vivendi. Underlying these qualities, there seems to be a realist perspective on politics, a perspective which puts emphasis on the observation of the particular, the preservation of relevant differences and the significance of the contingent circumstances of the concrete situation in which we find ourselves.

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This article examines the relationship between compromise and fairness, and considers in particular why, if a fair outcome to a conflict is available, the conflict should still be subject to compromise. It sets out the defining features of compromise and explains how fair compromise differs from both principled and pragmatic compromise. The fairness relating to compromise can be of two types: procedural or end-state. It is the coherence of end-state fairness with compromise that proves the more puzzling case. We offer reasons why people should be allowed to resolve conflicting or competing claims through compromise, even if compromise comes at the expense of end-state fairness, but we resist the suggestion that the primary rationale for compromise is to be found in non-ideal circumstances.