
Two names for ‘true contradiction’ are of common use: ‘dialetheia’ and ‘glut’. They are often used as homonymous. JC Beall has argued that there is a difference, and the former is preferable. The paper does not enter the preferability of one term or the other, it aims to show that the distinction may involve some underrated aspects of the philosophy of inconsistency and of our truth talk in general. More specifically, the‘excessive’ (glut) or ‘double’ (dialetheia) nature of truth.
Wise agents are typically taken to be characteristically unbiased. Yet, the structural reason for this connection remains underexplained. To address this lacuna, I argue for two things in this paper: firstly, that bias undermines wisdom by introducing instability, and secondly, that the distinctive resource by which wisdom resists bias is skilful reflection. I show that biases, even though they may occasionally lead to wise judgments and actions, prevent agents from reliably performing wise actions across varying circumstances. I then develop an account of skilful reflection as a cognitive skill that reliably manifests in knowledge of what considerations are relevant for wise decision making in a given context, and argue that such an account secures the stable characteristic of wisdom. Finally, I demonstrate how my account explains a tension between wisdom and the psychological phenomenon of bias blind spot.
What does it take for a candidate to join a group, and how do current members and official procedures shape this process? This paper addresses these questions, developing an original approach to how candidates join the groups they wish to join – particularly organised ones. Drawing on socio-ontological literature, I highlight what appears to be a prevalent, albeit rarely articulated, focus on official procedures, whereby entry depends on endorsement of, and compliance with, membership terms. I argue that, despite being useful, this approach is partial and oversimplified. I propose distinguishing between two entry mechanisms: formal entry, which involves procedural criteria and membership status attribution; and informal entry, which involves intersubjective dynamics and social integration. I draw attention to the fact that the prevalent focus on formal entry has obscured the relevance of informal member-level dynamics, which can either support or conflict with the implementation of official procedures, when present. The proposed framework aims to offer a novel, more comprehensive descriptive approach, considering entry as a two-fold process and recognising the trade-offs between formal and informal membership acquisition mechanisms. It also outlines a spectrum of group types based on membership types. Normative implications regarding associative group dynamics and related freedoms are then considered.
I argue that, within a bivalent classical framework, absolute nothingness cannot be the target of proper reference if such reference requires a determinate relatum. Here, absolute nothingness is understood through a meta-theoretical limiting specification according to which no object and no distinction obtain. The problem revolves around finding a way for this specification to remain available to thought and discourse without reifying its intended target. To address this issue, I distinguish between specification, attempted reference, and proper reference to show how a specification can govern meaningful inference without thereby securing a determinate relatum. To register the failure of proper reference, I introduce the concept of an exclusion surrogate that records universal non-satisfaction within a theory without supplying the intended referent. This provides a classical alternative to Priest’s dialetheic treatment; that is, under these assumptions, the availability/non-reification tension does not require a contradictory referent that both is and is not an object.
This article discusses progressive Confucianism as a philosophical approach. It examines whether major challenges to progressive Confucianism are successful, and by doing so, innovatively develops a theoretical framework for assessing the extent to which any theory of progressive Confucianism is defensible. This article argues that the defensibility of progressive Confucianism depends on three distinct justificatory burdens: value appropriation, public relevance against value pluralism, and political authority. These burdens are conceptually distinct and fall unevenly on different versions of progressive Confucianism. The validity of progressive Confucianism as a publicly relevant philosophy depends on the offering of accounts of i) how it appropriates values from both inside and outside Confucianism, ii) how it stays publicly relevant under the conditions of value pluralism, and iii) how it provides an acceptable theory of political authority, whose justificatory source may or may not be Confucian.