I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolutionary account of human development. I argue that for Epicurus the State of Nature has at least two stages. I model the first stage, where according to Epicurus the adult humans lead mainly solitary lives and are all roughly equally capable of harming each other, as an extension of the Hawk-Dove game where agents can follow a contingency strategy. I argue that at this first stage the individuals are likely to converge to a contingency strategy convention where they generally avoid conflict. I model the second stage, where according to Epicurus families emerge and join to form communities, by introducing heterogeneity with respect to ability to harm into the population engaging in the extended Hawk-Dove game of the first stage. In particular, in some extended Hawk-Dove encounters weak agents who are relatively vulnerable members of some families encounter strong counterpart agents who belong to other families. I argue that this heterogeneity can result in the population converging to an equilibrium corresponding to a State of Nature war. I conclude Epicurus can reach a conclusion similar to Hobbes’ conclusion that war is inevitable in a State of Nature. But Epicurus would arrive at this Hobbesian conclusion by a rather un-Hobbesian route, for the supporting argument relies upon significant inequalities in powers among the residents of the State of Nature.

I propose that Hume understands a market as a coordination regime where exchange is supported by moral rules traders must follow. For Hume a complete description of a market includes the institutions that support honest trade, institutions that come at a cost for the market traders. Hume's conception of a market is a special case of his conventionalist contractarianism, where a social contract is based upon a mutual advantage criterion requiring that all bound by the terms of this contract recognize that one serves one's own interests by abiding by its terms given that the others also abide by its terms. I discuss the contrasting position of David Gauthier, who argues that an ideally competitive market is a morally free zone and who uses such a market as a starting point for his rational choice-based contractarian theory. While Hume's view of a market as a coordination regime reflects actual markets more realistically than Gauthier's view, I argue that Hume can employ an isomorphism argument structurally similar to an isomorphism argument I attribute to Gauthier for the purposes of giving a normative analysis of a market. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing the just conventions of these problems as monotone path solutions. My response to Sugden focuses on how the laws of humanity present in Hume's discussion of vulnerable individuals might be incorporated into my own proposed account of justice as mutual advantage. My response to Gaus focuses on whether or not my account of justice as mutual advantage can incorporate deep differences in values across subgroups of a larger society.

I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing the just conventions of these problems as monotone path solutions. My response to Sugden focuses on how the laws of humanity present in Hume’s discussion of vulnerable individuals might be incorporated into my own proposed account of justice as mutual advantage. My response to Gaus focuses on whether or not my account of justice as mutual advantage can incorporate deep differences in values across subgroups of a larger society.

I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing the just conventions of these problems as monotone path solutions. My response to Sugden focuses on how the laws of humanity present in Hume’s discussion of vulnerable individuals might be incorporated into my own proposed account of justice as mutual advantage. My response to Gaus focuses on whether or not my account of justice as mutual advantage can incorporate deep differences in values across subgroups of a larger society.

I reply to commentaries by Justin Bruner, Robert Sugden and Gerald Gaus. My response to Bruner focuses on conventions of bargaining problems and arguments for characterizing the just conventions of these problems as monotone path solutions. My response to Sugden focuses on how the laws of humanity present in Hume’s discussion of vulnerable individuals might be incorporated into my own proposed account of justice as mutual advantage. My response to Gaus focuses on whether or not my account of justice as mutual advantage can incorporate deep differences in values across subgroups of a larger society.

Analytic PhilosophyVolume 61, Issue 1 p. 70-86 Book Symposium Stability Challenges for Moehler's Second-Level Social Contract Peter Vanderschraaf, Corresponding Author pvanderschraaf@ucmerced.edu University of ArizonaSearch for more papers by this author Peter Vanderschraaf, Corresponding Author pvanderschraaf@ucmerced.edu University of ArizonaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 12 March 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12178Citations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume61, Issue1March 2020Pages 70-86 RelatedInformation

Norms requiring individuals to treat their partners fairly can evolve even in populations that lack well-defined identity groups. The emergence of fairness equilibria in the bargaining problem and in Augmented Stag Hunt is analyzed with inductive and evolutionary learning models applied to populations that are not subdivided into preexisting groups. Inductive learning models applied to the bargaining problem yield distributions of equilibrium solutions centered around the egalitarian solution that corresponds to a norm of equal division of benefits. Inductive and evolutionary learning models applied to the Augmented Stag Hunt yield distributions of equilibrium solutions where each side contributes to a commonly desired good that are supported by costly punishments for noncontributors. These results support the strong reciprocity hypothesis in the social sciences without employing the controversial idea of group selection.

I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

Necessary and sufficient conditions are proposed for characterizing the general theory of justice as mutual advantage. Justice as mutual advantage has a distinguished history, but is thought to be false because according to this theory vulnerable members of society are apparently owed no benefits of justice. A repeated Provider-Recipient game model shows by example that justice as mutual advantage systems can require that the vulnerable receive benefits, refuting the Vulnerability Objection. Conditions for defining the community of inclusion in justice as mutual advantage systems are proposed in terms of salience. A justice as mutual system is defined as a system of conventions for sharing the cooperative surplus generated from compliance with these conventions that is Baseline Consistent or stable with respect to possible renegotiation in case the community experiences certain changes in their circumstances.

This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis of convention, of the thesis that justice consists of systems of distinguished conventions. This thesis has ancient roots but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Given a sufficiently precise and general analysis of convention, the view that justice at bottom consists of conventions provides cogent answers to two perennial questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Why be just? Conventions are analyzed as correlated equilibria of games where the agents involved have available alternative equilibria. This analysis is sufficiently general to summarize social interactions where the interests of the agents diverge, so that a satisfactory resolution incorporates principles of justice. Agents are in circumstances of justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve when all contribute to a cooperative surplus and (ii) each contributor risks being let down if this agent contributes and the others fail to contribute. Necessary and sufficient conditions are proposed for a satisfactory analysis of justice as mutual advantage that characterize justice as a special set of Baseline-Consistent conventions of agents in circumstances of justice. The origins of norms of fairness as the product of salience and inductive learning are explored. The state social contract is analyzed as a self-enforcing governing convention. The Reconciliation Project of demonstrating the compatibility of justice and rational prudence is reevaluated in light of the analysis of convention developed here.

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I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences.

In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes’ main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes’ argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers’ commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume’s discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes’ own treatment of sovereignty.

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