Around 5.5–6.5 months of age, infants first attend to object size and perceive its mass cues in simple collision events. Infants attend to the size of the moving object and expect a greater displacement following a collision with a large object and stationary object, and lesser displacement following a collision with a small object and stationary object. It has been proposed that infants of 6-to-7 months of age can differentiate between sizes of moving objects but do not perceive the size and mass relationships in simple collision events. The present two investigations aimed to investigate whether infants 10-to-11 months of age (N = 16) could perceive this relationship (experiment 1) and the reverse of this relationship (experiment 2) utilising the looking time paradigm. The reverse of this relationship entailed the circumstances in which the moving object size was kept constant, but the stationary object size varied (small or large). Results from these experiments revealed that infants did not differ in their looking times for size congruent and size incongruent distances in both conditions. Infants did not look longer at the incongruent test events that violated expectation. For that reason, we conclude infants of 10-to-11 months of age were unable to perceive size and mass associations in collision events in either direction (moving object or stationary object size).

Hundreds of sustainability programs have emerged at universities and colleges around the world over the past 2 decades. A prime question for employers, students, educators, and program administrators is what competencies these programs develop in students. This study explores convergence on competencies for sustainability programs. We conducted a Delphi study with 14 international experts in sustainability education on the framework of key competencies in sustainability by Wiek et al. (Sustain Sci 6: 203–218, 2011), the most frequently cited framework to date. While experts generally agreed with the framework, they propose two additional competencies, suggest a hierarchy of competencies, and specify learning objectives for students interested in a career as sustainability researcher. The refined framework can inform program development, implementation, and evaluation to enhance employability of graduates and facilitate comparison of sustainability programs worldwide.

Cross-sensory correspondences can reflect crosstalk between aligned conceptual feature dimensions, though uncertainty remains regarding the identities of all the dimensions involved. It is unclear, for example, if heaviness contributes to correspondences separately from size. Taking steps to dissociate variations in heaviness from variations in size, the question was asked if a heaviness-brightness correspondence will induce a congruity effect during the speeded brightness classification of simple visual stimuli. Participants classified the stimuli according to whether they were brighter or darker than the mid-gray background against which they appeared. They registered their speeded decisions by manipulating (e.g., tapping) the object they were holding in either their left or right hand (e.g., left for bright, right for dark). With these two otherwise identical objects contrasting in their weight, stimuli were classified more quickly when the relative heaviness of the object needing to be manipulated corresponded with the brightness of the stimulus being classified (e.g., the heavier object for a darker stimulus). This novel congruity effect, in the guise of a stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility effect, was induced when heaviness was isolated as an enduring feature of the object needing to be manipulated. It was also undiminished when participants completed a concurrent verbal memory load task, countering claims that the heaviness-brightness correspondence is verbally mediated. Heaviness, alongside size, appears to contribute to cross-sensory correspondences in its own right and in a manner confirming the far-reaching influence of correspondences, extending here to the fluency with which people communicate simple ideas by manipulating a hand-held object.

In sound symbolism, a word's sound induces expectations about the nature of a salient aspect of the word's referent. P. Walker (2016a) proposed that cross-sensory correspondences can be the source of these expectations, and the present study assessed three implications flowing from this proposal. First, sound symbolism will embrace a wide range of referent features, including heaviness. Second, any feature of a word's sound able to symbolize one aspect of the word's referent will also be able to symbolize corresponding aspects of the referent (e.g., a sound feature symbolizing visual pointiness will also symbolize lightness in weight). Third, sound symbolism will be independent of the sensory modality through which a word's referent is encoded (e.g., whether heaviness is felt or seen). Adults judged which of two contrasting novel words was most appropriate as a name for the heavier or lighter of two otherwise identical hidden novel objects they were holding in their hands. The alternative words contrasted in their vowels and/or consonants, one or both of which were known to symbolize visual pointiness. Although the plosive or continuant nature of the consonants did not influence the judged appropriateness of a word to symbolize the heaviness of its referent, back/open vowels, compared to front/close vowels, were judged to symbolize felt heaviness. The symbolic potential of back/open vowels to represent felt heaviness, predicted on the basis of their symbolism of visual roundedness, supports the proposal that cross-sensory correspondences contribute to sound symbolism.

Learning a language involves learning how to map specific forms onto their associated meanings. Such mappings can utilise arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness, yet, our understanding of how these two systems operate at different stages of vocabulary development is still not fully understood. The Sound-Symbolism Bootstrapping Hypothesis (SSBH) proposes that sound-symbolism is essential for word learning to commence, but empirical evidence of exactly how sound symbolism influences language learning is still sparse. It may be the case that sound-symbolism supports acquisition of categories of meaning, or that it enables acquisition of individualized word meanings. In two Experiments where participants learned form-meaning mappings from either sound-symbolic or arbitrary languages, we demonstrate the changing roles of sound-symbolism and arbitrariness for different vocabulary sizes, showing that sound-symbolism provides an advantage for learning of broad categories, which may then transfer to support learning individual words, whereas an arbitrary language impedes acquisition of categories of sound to meaning.

Natural language contains many examples of sound-symbolism, where the form of the word carries information about its meaning. Such systematicity is more prevalent in the words children acquire first, but arbitrariness dominates during later vocabulary development. Furthermore, systematicity appears to promote learning category distinctions, which may become more important as the vocabulary grows. In this study, we tested the relative costs and benefits of sound-symbolism for word learning as vocabulary size varies. Participants learned form-meaning mappings for words which were either congruent or incongruent with regard to sound-symbolic relations. For the smaller vocabulary, sound-symbolism facilitated learning individual words, whereas for larger vocabularies sound-symbolism supported learning category distinctions. The changing properties of form-meaning mappings according to vocabulary size may reflect the different ways in which language is learned at different stages of development.

Lexical sound symbolism in language appears to exploit the feature associations embedded in cross-sensory correspondences. For example, words incorporating relatively high acoustic frequencies (i.e., front/close rather than back/open vowels) are deemed more appropriate as names for concepts associated with brightness, lightness in weight, sharpness, smallness, speed, and thinness, because higher pitched sounds appear to have these cross-sensory features. Correspondences also support prosodic sound symbolism. For example, speakers might raise the fundamental frequency of their voice to emphasize the smallness of the concept they are naming. The conceptual nature of correspondences and their functional bidirectionality indicate they should also support other types of symbolism, including a visual equivalent of prosodic sound symbolism. For example, the correspondence between auditory pitch and visual thinness predicts that a typeface with relatively thin letter strokes will reinforce a word's reference to a relatively high pitch sound (e.g., squeal). An initial rating study confirms that the thinness-thickness of a typeface's letter strokes accesses the same cross-sensory correspondences observed elsewhere. A series of speeded word classification experiments then confirms that the thinness-thickness of letter strokes can facilitate a reader's comprehension of the pitch of a sound named by a word (thinner letter strokes being appropriate for higher pitch sounds), as can the brightness of the text (e.g., white-on-gray text being appropriate for the names of higher pitch sounds). It is proposed that the elementary visual features of text are represented in the same conceptual system as word meaning, allowing cross-sensory correspondences to support visual symbolism in language. (PsycINFO Database Record

Each of our senses is 'blind' to some features of objects and events (e.g., hearing can tell us little or nothing about the shape, colour, and weight of an object, or about how it might taste or smell). When we listen to sounds without support from other sensory modalities, such as when listening to recorded music, how do will fill-in these blind spots? Evidence identifying a core set of cross-sensory correspondences among basic stimulus features is reviewed, and it is proposed that they offer a potential basis for the filling-in of information that is missing when one or more sensory systems is not available. An emerging theoretical framework for understanding correspondences and their impact on behaviour is presented. Evidence pertaining to key features of the framework is reviewed, including that cross-sensory correspondences are based on cross-talk among conceptual representations of aligned feature dimensions, are bi-directional in their effects, obey transitivity in the feature associations they support, involve the relative (context-sensitive) coding of stimulus features, and can be accessed through the verbal specification of feature values. After illustrating how cross-sensory correspondences are able to embrace basic features of bodily actions, gestures, and vocalisations, their potential for exploitation in the communication of ideas is explained. The relevance of cross-sensory correspondences to musical sounds, and their potential to enhance the composition, performance, and appreciation of music, are discussed.

Optimal imaging quality has to be described with reference to the performance of imaging tasks by human observers when deciding on the efficacy of an imaging system. This study is designed to determine how far images can be blurred by removing high frequency information before diagnostic performance is affected. A test bank was created using wavelet packet transform to progressively remove high spatial frequency information from chest radiographs with and without lung nodules. Observers with no experience of interpreting chest x-rays, and those with nearly three years’ experience as diagnostic radiography students were tested. Performance was measured using receiver operating characteristic analysis (ROC) and response time. Performance was maintained for the radiography students for all but the most blurred image. Observers with no experience of medical images could not do the task. These findings are relevant for those circumstances where undersampled data could be used or images need to be viewed on mobile devices, and indicate that for those with some expertise with specific types of images diagnostic performance may not be affected.

A role for conceptual representations in cross-sensory correspondences has been linked to the relative (context-sensitive) mapping of feature values, whereas a role for sensory-perceptual representations has been linked to their absolute (context-insensitive) mapping. Demonstrating the relative nature of the automatic mapping underlying a cross-sensory correspondence therefore offers one way of confirming its conceptual basis. After identifying several prerequisites for relative and absolute mappings, we provide the first compelling demonstration that an automatically induced congruity effect based on a cross-sensory correspondence (i.e., that between haptic size and visual brightness) can be largely contingent on the relative mapping of the 2 features, thereby implying a conceptual basis for the correspondence. Participants in a speeded classification task were faster to classify a visual stimulus as brighter or darker when this required them to press a hidden response key that, incidentally, was relatively small or big, respectively. Importantly, the same levels of brightness (Experiment 1) and key size (Experiment 2) at different times corresponded to contrasting levels of the other feature depending on the context provided by the alternative stimuli with which they appeared. For example, the same medium key was congruent with a brighter stimulus when paired with a bigger key, but was congruent with a darker stimulus when paired with a smaller key. Reflecting on the broader implications of this finding, it is noted that the involvement of cross-sensory correspondences in some forms of sound symbolism in language also requires the relative coding of stimulus features.

The same core set of cross-sensory correspondences connecting stimulus features across different sensory channels are observed, regardless of the modality of the stimulus with which the correspondences are probed. This observation suggests that correspondences involve modality-independent representations of aligned conceptual feature dimensions and predicts a size-brightness correspondence in which smaller is aligned with brighter. This suggestion accommodates cross-sensory congruity effects where contrasting feature values are specified verbally rather than perceptually (e.g., where the words WHITE and BLACK interact with the classification of high- and low-pitch sounds). Experiment 1 brings these two issues together in assessing a conceptual basis for correspondences. The names of bright/white and dark/black substances were presented in a speeded brightness classification task, in which the two alternative response keys differed in size. A size-brightness congruity effect was confirmed, with substance names classified more quickly when the relative size of the response key needing to be pressed was congruent with the brightness of the named substance (e.g., when yoghurt was classified as a bright substance by pressing the smaller of two keys). Experiment 2 assesses the proposed conceptual basis for this congruity effect by requiring the same named substances to be classified according to their edibility (with all of the bright/dark substances having been selected for their edibility/inedibility, respectively). The predicted absence of a size-brightness congruity effect, along with other aspects of the results, supports the proposed conceptual basis for correspondences and speaks against accounts in which modality-specific perceptuomotor representations are entirely responsible for correspondence-induced congruity effects.

What artistic conventions are used to convey the motion of animate and inanimate items in still images, such as drawings and photographs? One graphic convention involves depicting items leaning forward into their movement, with greater leaning conveying greater speed. Though this convention could derive from the natural leaning forward of people and animals as they run, it is also applied to depictions of inanimate objects (eg cars and trains). It is proposed that it is this convention that allows the italicization of text to convey notions of motion and speed. Evidence for this is obtained from three sources: the use of italicization on book covers (in book titles); judgments of typeface connotations; and performance measures during the semantic classification of words appearing in italicized and non-italicized fonts. Inspection of the availability of italic fonts in Hebrew indicates an additional artistic convention for conveying motion, based on a fundamental bias, yet to be confirmed, for people to expect to see, or prefer to see, lateral movement (real or implied) in a left to right direction, rather than a right to left direction. Evidence for such a bias is found in photographs of a range of animate and inanimate items archived on Google Images. Whereas a rightward bias is found for photographs of animate and inanimate items in motion (the more so, the faster the motion being conveyed), either no bias or a leftward bias is found for the same items in static pose. Possible origins of a fundamental left to right bias for visual motion, and future lines of research able to evaluate them, are identified.

Minar and Lewkowicz (2013) previously reported their failure to replicate the results of two experiments we published in this journal (Walker et al., 2010), despite using the same stimuli. Their commentary (Lewkowicz & Minar, 2014) now explains that the sound they used differed significantly from ours, and we show here how the nature of their sound critically undermined their attempted replication. They also propose an alternative explanation of our results (though one that remains unsubstantiated). We show how their alternative explanation actually predicts that they also should have observed the results we reported, assumes infants are sensitive to the pitch-height correspondence they are attempting to deny, and is contradicted by the evidence. Lewkowicz and Minar propose that when the pitch and loudness of a sound both rise and fall together, the sound has an internal congruence that attracts attention. Because our sound diminished in loudness as it approached the upper and lower limits of its pitch range (peaking in loudness midpitch), such congruence was present only when the sound was in its lower pitch range (e.g., during the first 1.25 s of the 2.5 s it took to go from lowest to highest pitch). Lewkowicz and Minar speculate that such congruence during the very first moments of an (up to 60 s) animation will induce infants to look longer toward the screen across the remainder of the trial. Because they assume that all our animations began with the ball in its lowest location, or with the morphing shape in its most rounded form, Lewkowicz and Minar reason that the initial internal congruence of our sound was confounded with the audiovisual congruence of the animations. Trials starting with the ball at the upper location, or the morphing shape in its most pointy form, would be expected to reveal a reverse audiovisual-congruity effect because the initial internal congruence of the sound would then be confounded with audiovisual incongruence. We can confirm that though our ball animations always began with the ball in its lowest location, the morphing shape in Experiment 2 always began in its most pointy form. In the latter case, therefore, the initial internal congruence of the sound was confounded with audiovisual incongruity and so should have encouraged longer looking times on audiovisually incongruent trials than on audiovisually congruent trials. The near identical audiovisual-congruity effect observed in both cases thus contradicts Lewkowicz and Minar’s proposal. It is noteworthy that Lewkowicz and Minar’s sounds also were internally incongruent above the midpoint of their pitch range, with pitch changing while loudness remained constant. With their moving-ball animations always beginning with the ball in its lowest location, their own account should have predicted the audiovisualcongruity effect we reported, rather than null results. Lewkowicz and Minar’s proposal that infants are sensitive to the internal pitch-loudness congruity of sounds requires infants to be sensitive to the correspondence between pitch and height. Pitch-loudness congruity cannot arise from the common coding of pitch and loudness on the basis of their magnitude or strength because pitch is not a prothetic dimension (e.g., people do not refer to sounds as having more or less pitch and, in any case, they judge loud to be big and high pitch to be small). Further, although pitch and loudness share terms in 520170 PSSXXX10.1177/0956797613520170Walker et al.Cross-Sensory Correspondences in Infancy research-article2014

Certain correspondences between the sound and meaning of words can be observed in subsets of the vocabulary. These sound-symbolic relationships have been suggested to result in easier language acquisition, but previous studies have explicitly tested effects of sound symbolism on learning category distinctions but not on word learning. In 2 word learning experiments, we varied the extent to which phonological properties related to a rounded-angular shape distinction and we distinguished learning of categories from learning of individual words. We found that sound symbolism resulted in an advantage for learning categories of sound-shape mappings but did not assist in learning individual word meanings. These results are consistent with the limited presence of sound symbolism in natural language. The results also provide a reinterpretation of the role of sound symbolism in language learning and language origins and a greater specification of the conditions under which sound symbolism proves advantageous for learning.

One of the most important crossmodal associations is between vision and sound, and we know that such bimodal information is of great importance in perceptual learning. Many crossmodal relationships are non-arbitrary or ‘natural’, and a particularly important case is object naming. While many object-name relationships are arbitrary, others are not. The clearest examples are known as onomatopoeia — the cuckoo and the kittiwake are named after the sounds they make. And a striking demonstration that such effects extend beyond onomatopoeic naming of familiar objects concerns shapes. When adults are shown two shapes, one angular and one with rounded contours, and given the words ‘Takete’ and ‘Maluma’ they will invariably associate ‘Takete’ with the angular shape, and ‘Maluma’ with the rounded shape. This effect was first described by Kohler in 1947, and there have been recent demonstrations of the effect with adults and young (3-year-old) children. Several researchers have suggested that these non-arbitrary associations may be of great importance in that they may influence and ‘bootstrap’ the infant’s early language development, particularly the learning of words for objects. If this is so, such associations should be present prior to language acquisition, and we describe three experiments which demonstrate such relationships in preverbal, 3–5-month-old infants, using random shapes, such as those in the figure, and angular and rounded face-like stimuli.

Following Karwoski, Odbert, and Osgood (1942, Journal of General Psychology 26 199-222), it is proposed that cross-sensory correspondences can arise from extensive, bi-directional cross-activation between dimensions of connotative meaning. If this account is correct, the same set of cross-sensory correspondences (eg brightness with high pitch, high pitch with sharpness, smallness with brightness) should emerge regardless of the sensory channel (auditory, visual, or tactile) that is probed. To test this prediction, participants rated a range of auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli on a series of rating scales relating to different dimensions of connotative meaning. With only a few minor exceptions, the same set of cross-sensory correspondences emerged from all types of stimulus variation. This supports the suggestion that cross-sensory correspondences can reflect reciprocal interactions between dimensions of connotative meaning, and indicates that Spence's (2011, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 73 971-995) theoretical framework might be usefully extended to include semantically-based correspondences.