Western democracies are suffering from populism, verging on fascism, because of the erosion of truth. This book argues that truth can grow out of citizenship education in how science really works, allied with an explicit culture of truth among politicians. While science operates outside the timescale of politics, it can serve as an object lesson for political decision-making under democracy. Using the examples of disease prevention and climate change, Harry Collins and Robert Evans show why citizens would be wise to trust the substantive findings of science as well as its moral culture. They also present demarcation criteria for distinguishing between real expertise and populist claims and also for distinguishing between real science and contenders for that title that do not deserve the moniker. For example, they argue that the discipline of economics, as currently constituted, does not deserve the title of science because it does not seek correspondence truth but instead works in a circular way within its own models without concern for how those models with their assumptions actually map onto reality. The solution the authors propose – veritocracy, a democracy with truth at its heart – is incompatible with either left or right totalitarianism and with meaningless slogans. To establish veritocracies we must start with a new approach to science education.

Summary Replication and its converse, falsification, are rightly seen as important parts of scientific practice, but neither is straightforward. The agreement needed to categorize an experiment as a successful replication or a decisive falsification depends on a wide range of contextual—that is, non-epistemic—factors. Chief among these is tacit knowledge, which refers to knowledge held by scientists that is not articulated explicitly and can be gained only through social interaction. In scientific disputes, the crucial elements of tacit knowledge are the somatic (i.e., embodied) tacit knowledge needed to build or manipulate the experimental equipment and the collective (i.e., social or cultural) tacit knowledge needed to make judgments about the skill and trustworthiness of other scientists. Collective tacit knowledge (CTK) is particularly important in novel research, as judgments about the competency of experimenters are the only way to distinguish between conflicting results. Once a sufficiently widespread agreement is reached, all aspects of the controversy—which is the correct theory, which experiments are to be relied upon, and which scientists have the necessary skills—are resolved simultaneously; up until this point, everything remains in flux. Determining whether the outcome of an experiment is a successful replication is an example of the much more general problem of induction. Emphasizing the role of tacit knowledge, and CTK in its resolution, reveals that it is a sociological problem as much as an epistemological one. Not only does solving the problem require a social judgment to be made, but it also creates a new, shared agreement about how the world is to be understood and interpreted from that point on. Recognizing that science routinely solves the problem of induction gives rise to a new way of understanding its role in democratic societies. Traditionally, science was seen as providing the facts upon which public debate and policy could be built. While this remains an important contribution, the rise of increasingly authoritarian forms of populism within what were once called the “Western democracies” has highlighted a new, more vital role for science as a source of values. Populist regimes need to undermine the checks and balances of democracy, and a crucial part of this is portraying the leader as the sole source of authority on matters of truth, even when this is contradictory to or inconsistent with the evidence. In these circumstances, the value of science is not that it provides “better truth” but that it embodies and defends the idea of truth itself. Without this as an aspiration, democracy and justice—themselves also aspirations—will be lost.

This paper builds on an earlier paper in this journal (Collins’s, 2024, ‘Why artificial intelligence needs sociology of knowledge …’). In that paper, an attempt was made to explain why LLMs had no moral compass. Here, we first explain more carefully where humans get their knowledge from and fill out the problems of LLMs by comparing them with humans. We then provide a new classification of different ways in which LLMs fail. There is one main cause, which is to do with sources of information, and there are three sub-categories. The first is to do with failures of reflexivity and has three sub-divisions; the second relates to the way LLMs interact with humans and has four sub-divisions; the third is to do with simple technical mistakes and has six sub-divisions. Each of the 13 kinds of problem is illustrated with an example of failure. We hope this new classification is exhaustive, but invite additions if it is not.

There are widespread calls for increased demographic diversity in science, often linked to the epistemic claim that including more perspectives will improve the quality of the knowledge produced. By distinguishing between demographic and epistemic diversity, we show that this is only true some of the time. There are cases where increasing demographic diversity will not bring about the necessary epistemic diversity and cases where failing to exclude some voices reduces the quality of the scientific debate. We seek to resolve these tensions with an analysis that turns on the way the experience-based expertise of non-scientists can be absorbed into mainstream science. Mostly it has to be done via what we call ‘virtual diversity’, in which scientists take responsibility for acquiring interactional expertise in the non-scientific expertise-based domains which they consider provide knowledge valuable to the science. We argue that virtual diversity represents the only feasible option in most scenarios, with cases where demographic diversity or full cultural mergers provide the solution being the exception rather than the rule. This analysis is an exercise in the sociology of knowledge, which is considered as being continuous with philosophy. The paper is prescriptive as well as descriptive, and the moral, cultural, political, and educational implications of the argument are drawn out. A main conclusion is that the acquisition of virtual diversity should be a new norm for science, allowing the voices of experienced non-scientist citizens to be heard but without eroding the institution of science, which continues to be a vital foundation of truth in democracy.

One of the most constructive critiques of the Daubert admissibility regime is Professor Cheng’s recent proposal for a new “consensus” rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rejecting the notion that judges and juries have the capacity to evaluate scientific expertise, Cheng’s proposal would eliminate Daubert hearings (and judicial gatekeeping concerning expert testimony), and require judges and juries, in their verdicts, to follow consensus in the relevant scientific community. Significantly, Cheng argues that judges and juries would have an easier time identifying consensus than they have in deciding between experts who disagree. We find Cheng’s emphasis on consensus compelling, and we support it. Furthermore, we agree that judges and juries are typically not capable of making technical decisions based on conflicting scientific testimony; Cheng’s proposal leaves that expert decision in the hands of the appropriate community of experts, the scientific community rather than the legal community. However, we remain skeptical that consensus would be easy for lay jurors to identify. Because identifying consensus in a scientific field is based in the everyday, ubiquitous expertise of lay persons—it is a social decision, not a technical decision—it is admittedly easier for non-specialists than discerning the scientific truth in a specialized field. However, scientists often do not agree on what counts as the consensus, and just as juries do not possess the type of expertise that would allow them to act as peer-reviewers of scientific experts, they do not have the experience needed easily to discern what counts as consensus where experts disagree. We believe, however, that a consensus regime would succeed if it put more of the responsibility in the hands of judges. Judges have more experience than lay juries in dealing with experts and the communities they represent. Jurors are always novices, whereas judges, with their trial experiences before they became judges, as well as some judicial training, are continually gaining experience in exercising their craft. While judges may not have the deep understanding that experts in a specialist field have regarding consensus in their field, their experience likely enables most judges to enhance their ubiquitous expertise in judging people. Through repeated experience with expert witnesses, they learn to identify reliable expert informants on the issue of consensus. Indeed, we identify numerous examples of courts already emphasizing the importance of consensus in their evaluation of experts. Consequently, we recommend that in cases involving scientific or other technical issues, a pre-trial, Daubert-style hearing should be retained (alongside a new consensus rule), during which a judge would hear arguments about any existing consensus (or no consensus) in the relevant field.

Over the last decade or so, the rate of growth of academic publications involving discussion of ‘citizen science’ and ‘community science’, and similar variants, has risen exponentially. These fluid terms, with no fixed definition, cover a continuum of public participation within a range of scientific activities. It is, therefore, apposite and timely to examine the evolving typologies of citizen science and community science and to ask how particular disciplinary actors are shaping content and usage. Do certain approaches to citizen science and community science activity remain siloed within specific disciplines or do some approaches resonate more widely? In this study, we use mixed methods—bibliometric and textual analysis—to chart the changing academic interpretations of this scientific activity over time. We then ask what these analyses mean for the future direction of academic research into citizen science and community science. The results suggest that, while certain disciplinary-based interpretations have been particularly influential in the past, a more epistemically mixed array of academic interests than was previously evident are currently determining expectations of what citizen science and community science should look like and what they can be expected to deliver.

Planning disputes are sites of contestation in which science-based regulations come into conflict with the place-based knowledge of local communities. The procedural and often technical nature of these regulations means that these controversies are marked by an asymmetry of resources that is often experienced by community groups as an asymmetry in credibility. In short, the expertise of developers is generally accepted as such, whilst the knowledge claimed by citizens is dismissed as ‘anecdotal’ or ‘NIMBYism’. In this article, we make the argument that the asymmetries of expertise are less stark than the current system typically allows and that recognising and accommodating this would improve the planning system by enhancing the representation and inclusion of community voices. We explore this position by using a case study of the construction of a Energy-from-Biomass plant in South Wales. Drawing from 30 qualitative interviews, we maintain that the planning process has the potential to function as one of a network of ‘trading zones’ in which different communities enact their rights and have their claims to knowledge and expertise recognised. Crucial to this argument is understanding that the levels and kinds of expertise that different parties bring to the interactions are more than just matters of attribution: community groups can have genuine expertise.

Environmental planning disputes often combine questions of regulation and legislation with distinctive, place-based epistemic issues that lend themselves to citizen science approaches. Whilst these citizen science activities often concern the enforcement of regulations, here we describe the attempts of a local community group to prevent the start-up of a new biomass incineration plant by showing that it fails to comply with the relevant regulations and/or that the associated legislation has not been applied correctly. Through documentary sources and in-depth interviews, we examine the ways in which the group’s work has parallels with aspects of regulatory science. In describing this work, and thinking about how to categorise it, we argue that conceptions of citizen science need to be broadened to include a wider range of activities than the traditional focus on primary data collection.

Abstract“Hypernormal science” has minimal potential for contestation on matters of principle and practice so that information exchange can be unproblematic. Sciences comprise hypernormal domains and more contestable “normal” domains where knowledge diffusion, like acquiring linguistic fluency, depends on face-to-face interaction. Hypernormal domains belonging to molecular biology are contrasted with normal domains in gravitational wave detection physics. Sciences as a whole should not be confused with their typical domains. The analysis has immediate implications for proposed transitions out of the Covid-19 lockdown, proposed solutions to the replication crisis, and, perhaps, our understanding of the early development of social studies of science.

The Imitation Game is a new method and, as such, it is important to show that its results are plausible and replicable. We tested this by conducting Imitation Games on religion in a range of European countries, returning approximately 12 months later to repeat the research. The idea was that non-Christian members of strongly Christian countries would find it easy to pass as members of the practicing majority because Christian beliefs and practices would be ubiquitous. In more secular countries, the expectation was that non-Christians would find it harder to pass as Christian because religious practices are less visible. We show that, despite some anomalous results, the data are consistent with expectations derived from survey data and that the claim to have replicated the results can be supported. We also suggest that our experiences show that questions of replication in the social sciences cannot be resolved by statistical meta-analysis alone.

Abstract This chapter draws on the Third Wave of Science Studies to argue that science is needed to resist the rise of populism in modern democracies. Wave Three of science studies focuses on expertise and values to characterize science as “craftwork with integrity” and justify science’s centrality in modern societies. This contrasts with Wave One, which treated science as an epistemically superior way of creating true knowledge, and Wave Two, which showed that science was neither certain nor independent of social context and hence put too much emphasis on public involvement. By focusing on values, not truth, Wave Three shows that there is no necessary conflict between science, however esoteric, and democracy and that science can play a leadership role in democracy as an object lesson in decision-making with integrity and as a check and balance on populism. Promulgating this new understanding of science is important as neither democracy nor science will endure unless citizens understand them sufficiently to reject populist leaders for violating its norms and values. The chapter concludes by calling for a program of civic education teaching the nature of democracy and the role of science within it.

The internet is changing the way that knowledge is made and shared. Knowledge-making in face-to-face settings is being replaced by information gathering from remote sources, whose origins may be concealed but which can create an illusion of intimacy. Though remote communication is beneficial in many ways – modern societies would fail without it -- and though the tight boundaries of the face-to-face can be used for evil purposes such as criminal conspiracy, if the overall trend to remote communication continues unchecked, it could be disastrous for the future of democracy and the very idea of truth itself. Too much reliance on remote communication threatens the core institutions of democratic societies. We explain the change in technical detail, from a systematic analysis of the workings of the face-to-face to a high level setting-out of its dangerous political implications. The analysis includes field studies, reflexive examination, drawing on the wide experience of the authors, of the stickiness of the face-to-face in our own work and other institutions, and network analysis which explains the illusion of intimacy that can be generated inadvertently or maliciously. We look at the apparent effectiveness of techniques such as blockchain and the limits of their domain. New information is provided about the malicious use of disinformation by foreign powers. We dramatise the dangers to Western pluralist democracy through a personal accounting of the 2020 American election. By drawing out the special features of face-to-face interaction and its constitutive role in creating societies, with science as the icon, the book sets out an agenda for civic education that can protect democratic institutions from the erosion of pluralism and the facile abandonment of trustworthy expertise. The authors conclude by returning to the themes set out at the start of the book, namely the crucial role played by trust in modern societies and the importance of face-to-face interactions in reproducing that trust, and the democratic institutions in which it should be invested.

This article presents a preliminary analysis of the advice provided by the UK government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) held between 22 January and 23 March 2020 in response to the emerging coronavirus pandemic. Drawing on the published minutes of the group’s meetings, the article examines what was known and not known, the assumptions and working practices that shaped their work, and how this knowledge was reflected in the decisions made by the government. In doing so, the article critically examines what it means for policy making to be ‘led by the science’ when the best available science is provisional and uncertain. Using ideas of ‘externality’ and ‘evidential significance’, the article argues that the apparent desire for high levels of certainty by both scientists and political decision-makers made early action impossible as the data needed were not, and could not be, available in time. This leads to an argument for changes to the institutions that provide scientific advice based on sociologically informed expectations of science in which expert judgement plays a more significant role.

Biological computer-aided design and manufacturing (bioCAD/CAM) tools facilitate the design and build processes of engineering biological systems using iterative design-build-test-learn (DBTL) cycles. In this book chapter, we highlight some of the bioCAD/CAM tools developed and used at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Joint Genome Institute (JGI), Joint BioEnergy Institute (JBEI), and Agile BioFoundry (ABF). We demonstrate the use of these bioCAD/CAM tools on a common workflow for designing and building a multigene pathway in a hierarchical fashion. Each tool presented in this book chapter is specifically tailored to support one or more specific steps in a workflow, can be integrated with the others into design and build workflows, and can be deployed at academic, government, or commercial entities.

Most classic genetic approaches utilize binary modifications that preclude the identification of key knockdowns for essential genes or other targets that only require moderate modulation. As a complementary approach to these classic genetic methods, we describe a plasmid-based library methodology that affords bidirectional, graded modulation of gene expression enabled by tiling the promoter regions of all 969 genes that comprise the ito977 model of Saccharomyces cerevisiae's metabolic network. When coupled with a CRISPR-dCas9-based modulation and next-generation sequencing, this method affords a library-based, bidirection titration of gene expression across all major metabolic genes. We utilized this approach in two case studies: growth enrichment on alternative sugars, glycerol and galactose, and chemical overproduction of betaxanthins, leading to the identification of unique gene targets. In particular, we identify essential genes and other targets that were missed by classic genetic approaches.

Populism contrasts clearly with pluralist democracy. By treating the result of elections as representing 'the will of the people', populism misrepresents the enumerative face of society as the organic face and defines all opposition to the elected government as traitorous. Minorities, and the institutions and experts upon which the checks and balance of pluralist democracy depend, are, therefore, attacked by populist leaders. Populist leaders claim that their actions, however dictatorial, and however much they favour a specific group in society, are democratic-they represent the will of the people. Because populism, in its championing of the people, is anti-elitist, some commentators consider it can enliven democracy. In today's world, however, the dangers are obvious: attacks on minorities and the control of what counts as expertise.

Societies are distinguished by what their citizens take for granted. In 'Western societies' most citizens agree, among other things, about the need for regular elections with near-universal franchises, how to treat strangers, the poor and the sick. These understandings are sedimented in the course of socialisation and constitute the organic face of societies; there is so much agreement that such things don't usually feature in political manifestos. Citizens record more detailed, varying, and self-conscious choices in elections, giving rise to the enumerative face of societies. Populism deliberately confuses the enumerative face with the organic face. Citizens can make non-democratic leaders accountable only if they know what democracy means; this is the law of conservation of democracy.

According to Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE), expertise is socialisation into an expert domain. Society consists of many expert domains of different extent, some small and esoteric, some, like language, large and ubiquitous. Expert domains overlap and are embedded within each other like a fractal. Citizens possess 'ubiquitous meta-expertise' which enables them to choose domains when seeking expert opinions-such as whether a vaccine is safe. In such cases, citizens must be ready to treat domains of scientific expertise as more valuable than power or celebrity if we are to avoid dystopia and maintain pluralistic democracy with its checks and balances. Democracies depend on their citizens-'the law of conservation of democracy'; this means we need more civic education to safeguard the future.

This book explores the differences between populism and pluralist democracy and their relationship with science. It argues that scientific expertise should be understood, not as an institution that delivers unvarnished truth but as part of a system preventing power being concentrated in one group.