Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions. I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.

‘‘The trial is central to the institutional framework of criminal justice.’’ With this very first sentence of the first volume of The Trial on Trial, the editors emphasize the importance of their work and reveal the slight common law predominance of the project. In 2003 this project brought experts from accusatorial and inquisitorial jurisdictions together for a workshop addressing the theme ‘‘Truth and Due Process in Criminal Trial.’’ The topic of the relationship between truth and due process is a basic one, even from a continental law point of view. Yet, in civil law jurisdictions, substantive law is regarded as important for an institutional framework of criminal justice. The first printed outcome of this overall 3-year project covers many different aspects of criminal trials, including changing conceptions in national trials with regard to the law of evidence (namely in Scottish criminal trials, presented by Peter Duff), differences between the adversarial and inquisitorial models of criminal trial (‘‘Ritual, Fairness and Truth’’ by Jenny McEwan), specialities of the jury trial (‘‘Truth and Jury Nullification’’ by Matt Matravers), as well as the conceptual and factual interdependence of ‘‘The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment’’ (Markus D. Dubber), and

Philosophical BooksVolume 32, Issue 1 p. 52-53 Moral Theory and Medical Practice S. E. MARSHALL, S. E. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY OF STIRLINGSearch for more papers by this author S. E. MARSHALL, S. E. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY OF STIRLINGSearch for more papers by this author First published: January 1991 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1991.tb02224.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume32, Issue1January 1991Pages 52-53 RelatedInformation

Marshall examines arguments for and against physicians breaching their duty of confidentiality to persons diagnosed with HIV or AIDS by notifying third parties such as sexual partners or general practitioners who give care unrelated to HIV or AIDS. The arguments presuppose that the confidentiality right is not absolute, but may give way under certain circumstances. A physician's obligations to the larger community, for instance, may outweigh the obligation to keep a diagnosis of AIDS or HIV confidential. Marshall also argues that physicians who incur risks by treating patients with AIDS or HIV have a right to knowledge that will help them protect themselves. A patient with AIDS or HIV may be obliged to reveal this fact to physicians when seeking care for other health problems, or to allow the diagnosing physican to do so. These arguments may have implications for the debate over testing patients for AIDS or HIV without consent.

Philosophical BooksVolume 30, Issue 4 p. 238-240 Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethics Sandra Marshall, Sandra Marshall university of stirlingSearch for more papers by this author Sandra Marshall, Sandra Marshall university of stirlingSearch for more papers by this author First published: October 1989 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1989.tb02200.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume30, Issue4October 1989Pages 238-240 RelatedInformation

Philosophical BooksVolume 28, Issue 3 p. 175-178 Ethical Issues in Psychosurgery S. E. MARSHALL, S. E. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY OF STIRLINGSearch for more papers by this author S. E. MARSHALL, S. E. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY OF STIRLINGSearch for more papers by this author First published: July 1987 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1987.tb01235.xCitations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume28, Issue3July 1987Pages 175-178 RelatedInformation

The trial is central to the institutional framework of criminal justice. It provides the procedural link between crime and punishment, and is the forum in which both guilt and innocence and sentence are determined. Its continuing significance is evidenced by the heated responses drawn by recent government proposals to reform rules of criminal procedure and evidence so as to alter the status of the trial within the criminal justice process and to limit the role of the jury. Yet for all of the attachment to trial by jury and to principles safeguarding the right to a fair trial there has been remarkably little theoretical reflection on the meaning of fairness in the trial and criminal procedure, the relationship between rules of evidence, procedure and substantive law, or the functions and normative foundations of the trial process. There is a need, in other words, to develop a normative understanding of the criminal trial.