This paper explores a case of public contention against the censoring of a feature article about a COVID-19 whistleblower on the Chinese social media, WeChat. Moving beyond the normative theory of the public sphere and publics, we draw on Kavada and Poell's theory of 'contentious publicness' which is flexible enough to capture the complexity, diversity and hybridity of digital contention in the context of China. Through a combination of textual analysis and participatory observation, this article analyses how citizens challenged the censorship system and attempted to keep Dr Fen's story online through what we call 'relay activism'. Informed by the three dimensions of 'contentious publicness', we analyse the materiality of the communication infrastructure of WeChat and the temporal and spatial relations of the public contention (focusing primarily on WeChat and GitHub). In doing this, the paper contributes a more comprehensive approach to examining the social, structural and participatory characteristics of the contestation of censorship in China.

Using semi-structured interviews with Chinese data journalists across party and commercial media, this article assesses the structure and practice of data journalism in China. In doing this, it responds to calls for further studies of data journalism in non-western contexts. It finds that Chinese data journalists face some of the same pressures and challenges that have been documented in other countries, including limited access to data and the constraints imposed by the screen-size of smartphones. However, these were often exacerbated through a combination of social and systemic factors - to the point that their impact is qualitatively and quantitatively different. Simultaneously, however, we find that in some cases Chinese data journalists, at least amongst party media, were protected from pressures such as audience demand, and encouraged to focus on state-of-the-art work. We conclude that what has emerged is a form of 'data journalism with Chinese characteristics', and that these characteristics emerge from the interactions between systemic, newsroom and social factors.

Nearly six years after the term 'fake news' rose to public prominence, concerns persist about its meaning, its impact and responses to it. Concerns include leaks by a Meta whistle-blower who alleged that the world's most popular social media site, Facebook, was hardwired to spread online falsehoods; meanwhile numerous Commissions and reports have aired fears about fake news' consequences for democratic health, both in Australia and globally. Australia has responded by adopting a self-regulatory Code of Conduct into misinformation and disinformation for digital platforms in 2021; while some neighbouring counties such as Singapore and Indonesia have introduced tough anti-fake news laws. This symposium of five articles aims to shed light on the latest global debates and findings about the relationship between fake news and democracy with a focus on how it is best defined, its impacts on the public, and responses to it in Australia and the region.

This article explores the strategic use of 'fake news' discourses in nondemocratic contexts using a mixed-methods approach grounded in social network analysis and discourse theory. In contexts such as Russia and Iran, where the opposition generally does not have unrestricted access to the political public sphere, social media platforms serve to influence discourses. Given the prevalence of fake news discourses, previous studies have already focused extensively on the political elite and their use of this discourse within Western or Anglo-American contexts, and on the typologies of 'fake news'. Our findings address this research gap and suggest that ordinary users in non-Western and non-democratic settings do not differentiate between 'fake news' types. Rather, they employ the discourse as a means to strategically delegitimise and discredit their opponents.

This article longitudinally analyses how Australian politicians engage with, and attack, journalists and the media more generally on Twitter from 2011–2018. The article finds that attacks on journalists have increased significantly since 2016 when Trump came to power, but this is largely the preserve of populist and far-right politicians. These politicians rarely call the media fake, instead alleging bias or questioning the veracity or standards of reporting and production. Many politicians have a functional relationship with the media, rarely criticising the media. Attacks are largely focused on the national public service broadcaster, the ABC, with limited attacks on commercial media.

Encompassed by the disputed term ‘fake news’, a variety of overtly or covertly biased, skewed, or falsified reports claiming to present factual information are now seen to constitute a critical challenge to the effective dissemination of news and information across established and emerging democratic societies. Such content – variously also classifiable as propaganda, selective reporting, conspiracy theory, inadvertent misinformation, and deliberate disinformation – in itself is not new; however, contemporary digital and social media networks enable its global dissemination and amplification, by human and algorithmic actors (Woolley & Howard 2017), ordinary users and professional agents, outside of, in opposition to, or sometimes also in collusion with, the mainstream media (Shao et al. 2017; Vargo et al. 2017). Various political, commercial, and state actors are suspected to have exploited this ‘fake news’ ecosystem to influence public opinion, in major votes ranging from the Brexit referendum to national elections, and/or to utilise discourse around ‘fake news’ to generally undermine trust in media, political, and state institutions. This panel brings together a number of perspectives that combine systematic, large-scale, mixed-methods analysis of the empirical evidence for the global dissemination of, engagement with, and visibility of problematic information in public debate with the study of the public discourse about ‘fake news’, and the operationalisation of this concept by politicians and other societal actors to downplay inconvenient facts or reject critical questions. In combination, its five papers present a substantive collection of innovative approaches to the ‘fake news’ concept, exploring the dissemination of problematic information itself at larger and smaller scales as well as examining the operationalisation of the idea of ‘fake news’ in pursuit of specific ideological aims. This produces a new and more comprehensive picture of the overall impact of ‘fake news’, in all its forms, on contemporary societies.

This article presents an analysis of broadcast election night coverage, contemporaneous social media data, and semi-structured interviews focused on the 2018 Victorian state election to assess the extent and nature of media hybridity that occurred. This work contributes to the field by providing the first analysis of the hybrid media system using a case study event in Australia, the first study of a second-order election, and by focusing in detail on how journalistic processes and decisions shape hybridity and how these are, themselves, shaped by hybrid logics. It finds some evidence of hybrid norms and actions, but in other ways coverage followed traditional media logics.

Based on a longitudinal research design (2006-2017), this article analyses how Guardian journalists engage in "below the line" comment spaces; what factors shape this engagement; and how this has evolved over time. The article combines a large-scale quantitative analysis of the total number of comments made (n = 110,263,661) and a manual content analysis of all comments made by 26 journalists (n = 5448) and their broader writing practices with 18 semi-structured interviews conducted in two phases (13 in 2012 and 5 repeated in 2017-18). The results show that there is considerable interest in comment spaces amongst readers, with exponential growth in user commenting. Furthermore, there has been significant engagement below the line by some Guardian journalists, and this is often in the form of direct and sustained reciprocity. Journalist commenting has waned in recent years due to difficulties coping with the volume of comments; changes in editorial emphasis; concerns over incivility and abuse; and a decrease in perceived journalistic benefits of commenting, alongside the rise in importance of Twitter. When journalists comment, they do so in a variety of ways and their comments are often substantive, significantly adding to the story by, for example, defending and explaining their journalism practice.

This article assesses how social movements make use of media, and how their media practices influence movement outcomes using a case study of the Anti-National Education Movement in Hong Kong. It contributes to the literature on this important protest event and to ongoing debates about changes in the relationship between media and protesters. It is argued that activists adapted to what we call a “hybrid mediation opportunity structure.” The concept of a hybrid mediation opportunity structure is built on a critical engagement with Cammaerts’ mediation opportunity structure and is informed by Chadwick’s hybrid media system theory. We find that old (mainstream) and new (social) media tactics were deployed interdependently in a hybrid, symbiotic process. Old and new media logics fed off each other, in turn producing new logics: hybrid mediation opportunities which enabled activists to simultaneously broaden their connective networks and capture the attention of news media to publicize and legitimize their collective protests.

In the era of networked affordances, misogynistic men's groups have been rapidly growing and have contributed to several physical fatal attacks along with the propagation of gendered online harassment and e-bile. It is thus important to study the organisational structures and communication dynamics of these groups to provide insight into why they have been successful in recruiting members and how they further spread and normalise misogynistic beliefs. One such misogynistic group is MGTOW (Men Going Their Own Way). This study seeks to understand the structure and content of discussion within the forum of the official MGTOW website. To do so, it undertakes a content analysis of comments (n = 1012) inspired by Freelon's (2010, 2015) multi-norm approach to studying online communication, which draws on the liberal individual, communitarian and deliberative models. It also assesses the broader patterns of commenting (n = 628,745) participation amongst users (n = 33,863). The results suggest that debates on the forum combine elements of each communicative approach and that this reflects a contradiction in their underlying ideology of separation and individualism. In addition, it was found that topics of conversation primarily focused on two topics: women (the majority of which unfold in a misogynistic way) and defining MGTOW - both as a collective identity and a personal journey.

Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) are a separatist Manosphere group (digital manifestation of the Men's Liberation Movement) who focus on individualistic, self-empowering actions as opposed to traditional collective actions typical of Men's Rights Activists and Incels. This study investigates how the ideology and rhetoric of MGTOW propagates and normalises misogynistic beliefs through online harassment, using a multi-phased content and thematic analysis of 10,280 tweets from three of the most active MGTOW users on Twitter. The findings document a link between the MGTOW ideology and toxic masculinity, showing that the online harassment generated is deeply misogynistic and polices the boundaries of a heterosexual, hegemonic masculinity. The analysis demonstrates that while the misogyny and violence produced by MGTOW is not extreme in nature, their appeals to rational thinking make it seem like common sense. The article develops new knowledge about the heterogeneous nature of the Manosphere and its constructions of masculinity.

"Fake news" has become a global term since Donald Trump's election as President of the United States. President Trump adopted what we describe as a "discourse of fake news" to attack and discredit news media and political rivals, which is suggested to have been reproduced by politicians in other national contexts. This article investigates whether Australian politicians adopt a fake news discourse. To do so, data are gathered over six months after Trump's election from four political communications fora : parliamentary debates, social media (Facebook and Twitter), press, and politicians' websites. We find fake news discourse is predominantly the domain of conservatives. Frequent users employ fake news discourse to delegitimize primarily the media, but also political opponents. Australian politicians' use of fake news discourse is rare, but it is amplified by news media. Concerningly, it is seldom contested. We argue this has negative consequences for public debate and trust in media and political institutions.

This article analyses the impact of "super-participants" - people who create lots of content, set the agenda, or moderate debates - on everyday online political talk in a non-political online discussion forum - or "third space". The article finds that there was extensive evidence of super-participation in the forum, and that they did impact the nature of political talk.

This article investigates how and why data journalism has evolved in Australia. Using semi-structured interviews with Australian data journalists, we examine how they view their role in news organisations; the structure of Australian data journalism within and beyond Australian newsrooms; and how their practice has changed and the factors that drive this. This study finds that there has been a decline in larger projects and in exploratory dashboards, as well as in the number of active data journalists in Australia. However, there remains a small core of data journalists alongside some moves to normalise data into everyday reporting. This suggests that rather than purely a story of decline, the ways in which data journalism is institutionalised has started to evolve to cope with these changes.

This article assesses how social movement actors strategically use a hybrid mix of social and traditional media to organise political actions in an attempt to influence media and public agendas. Using the case study of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in Taiwan, it investigates how the activists' use of social and mainstream media contributed towards their collective action and mediated visibility. We argue that the effectiveness of social media activism is augmented by the activists' engagement in protest actions and tactics catering to news media logics. Through their hybrid media practices, the activists were able to mobilise local and overseas groups into forms of collective and connective action and amplify the impact of protests.