Subnational variations in political culture and policy attitudes are a hallmark feature of multilevel systems of government, yet we know comparatively little about how and why citizens of these systems subjectively perceive regional differences in political values. Using data from a specially commissioned survey under the auspices of the Provincial Diversity Project, this article analyses subjective perceptions of difference across provinces in Canada. It shows that individuals believe their regions have distinct political values, but also that they systematically overestimate that difference. In their estimations of regional distinctiveness, individuals are informed by the value profiles of the regions in which they live, but also by their own policy preferences. The findings clarify the salience of internal boundaries within multilevel or federal states, and enable us to understand how myths of distinctiveness flourish, but also provide an important extension on debates about misperceptions in politics.

Numerous studies demonstrate that immigrant and ethnic minority populations' sense of belonging to the political communities in which they reside depends in part on the welcoming context: the constellation of policies, discourses, identities and prevailing attitudes relating to ethnocultural diversity in those political communities. However, while these studies typically focus on national belonging, in multilevel political communities belonging may be expressed at the national and subnational levels. Relying on a survey of ethnic minority group members in Canada, this study compares national and subnational belonging in three provinces where subnational and national welcoming contexts are very similar, to one case, Quebec, where the subnational welcoming context is significantly different from the national one. The results show a distinctive set of dynamics in Quebec, where ethnic minorities who feel excluded are more likely than those in other provinces to hold the subnational community responsible for their exclusion.

Research shows that the longer immigrants have been in their settlement country, the more likely they are to vote. This study examines whether when immigrants arrived, rather than how long they have resided, is the critical determinant of their electoral participation. Using Canadian data covering a 45-year time span, this study demonstrates that the apparent relationship between immigrants' length of residence and their propensity to vote in elections is a result of the enduring influence of the historical period in which immigrants arrived in Canada. The results have implications for how researchers interpret immigrant adaptation to new political settings.

Does living in communities with others from the same racialized minority background help or hinder political engagement? What role does social interaction with members of the same racialized minority group (intragroup contact) play? This paper addresses these questions with a systematic empirical investigation of political engagement in a large sample of racialized Canadians. Prior research assumes greater residential concentration of racialized group members leads to intragroup contact, but there is disagreement about whether the consequence is higher or lower levels of political engagement among members of racialized minority groups. We find no evidence that the residential concentration of Canadians from racialized groups has any independent effect on the political attitudes of racialized Canadians from the same groups. However, there is strong evidence of a more complex, conditional dynamic: if racialized minorities exhibit substantial intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations of people from the same racial background leads to greater levels of political engagement among racialized minorities; however, if racialized minorities exhibit weak intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations of people from the same racial background results in lower levels of political engagement among racialized minorities. Moreover, we find that, in part, this dynamic may be an indirect consequence of the ways in which non-racialized populations respond to local racial diversity. The findings may help to account for the incongruent results of previous studies of the effects of residential concentration on the political engagement of members of racialized minority groups.

In a context of backlash against diversity in many countries, we know little about how ethnic minorities respond politically when they personally experience discrimination. Moving beyond the study of electoral participation, this research investigates whether experiences of discrimination push ethnic minorities toward an alternate political pathway for those who feel sidelined by the political community: protest activity. The study also examines whether the context of discrimination (i.e. public or private sphere) has different consequences for protest participation, and whether intragroup contact enhances the effects of discrimination on protest participation. Relying on a survey of 1647 respondents from racialized backgrounds in Canada, our findings indicate that discriminatory experiences increase participation in protest activities irrespective of its context, and that the positive relationship between discriminatory experiences and protest activity is stronger among respondents with greater intragroup contact.

Close relations with Europe, especially but not only with the United Kingdom, have long been a consensual tenet of Canadian foreign policy, which has supported European integration since the 1970s. The UK's withdrawal from the European Union threatens to upset this consensus. While Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has consistently cast Brexit in a negative light, Conservative leaders Andrew Scheer and Erin O'Toole have commented positively on the UK's leaving the EU. Did their polarized views resonate in the population? To answer this question, this article analyzes the results of an original survey of voting-age Canadians. Findings show a strong degree of correspondence between positions expressed in party discourse and preferences in the Canadian population. This raises the possibility that the difference between two models of transatlantic relations, which we call Eurosphere and Anglosphere, could emerge as a new fault line in Canadian foreign policy.

It is well documented that the strength of national attachment relates to attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity, and that the direction of the relationship varies across national contexts. Yet, little attention has been given to the fact that attachments may not be expressed solely at the national level. In federal and multinational states, individuals can express attachment to the country and to its territorial units. This study investigates the relationship between (national and provincial) attachments and attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity in the Canadian federation. Our findings indicate that stronger attachments to Canada lead to more positive attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity in all provinces. They also demonstrate that provincial attachments relate to attitudes toward ethnocultural diversity both in a minority nation provincial context (Quebec) and in other provinces (Alberta and Saskatchewan), but that the direction of this relationship can be of opposite direction than that for attachment to Canada.

Immigrants' sense of belonging to their host communities is viewed as a core condition for their successful inclusion, but there is no consensus on which attributes of belonging are most relevant to understanding inclusion, nor is there agreement on how the sense of belonging ought to be measured empirically. This study examines how two related but independent dimensions of belonging help to better understand the political inclusion of visible minority immigrants in Canada. More specifically, it examines the role of feeling attached (immigrants' feeling toward the host community) and the role of feeling accepted (immigrants' sense of how their host communities feel about them). We assess the relationship between attachment, acceptance and political inclusion for both first- and second-generation visible minority Canadians; the results suggest there is analytical value in utilising separate measures of attachment and acceptance: political inclusion is more likely when both are stronger.

Debates over official languages are often intrinsically linked to questions of national identity, prejudice, and intergroup relations. However, official language legislation also has consequences for the day-to-day affairs of many citizens. As such, it also brings to the forefront considerations of costs and benefits, or the ways in which the material interests of individual citizens and their linguistic groups might be affected by these laws. In this study, we explore the possibility of a principle-implementation gap when it comes to official language(s) legislation. While citizens may well support the recognition of a minority language as an "official language," they might oppose specific measures enacted to implement this general principle. Drawing on a survey conducted in Canada, we determine first that such a gap does exist. Second, our analysis shows that symbolic predispositions primarily drive support for the principle of Official Bilingualism, while opposition to its implementation is highest among those whose interests might clash with the imposition of bilingualism requirements for senior federal public servants.

Proponents of restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols in public institutions in Quebec have often framed their support in the language of liberalism, with references to "gender equality", "state neutrality" and "freedom of conscience". However, efforts to account for support for restrictions on minority religious symbols rarely mention liberalism. In this article, we test the hypothesis that holding liberal values might have different attitudinal consequences in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Our findings demonstrate that holding liberal values is associated with support for restrictions on the wearing of minority religious symbols in Quebec, but it is associated with opposition to such restrictions in the rest of Canada. Moreover, this difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada in the relationship between liberal values and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols can explain Quebecers' greater support for restrictions.

Over the last two decades, a number of Westminster parliamentary countries have adopted fixed or partially fixed election dates in response to growing public concerns about the ability of First Ministers to unfairly manipulate the timing of elections. Do First Ministers and their political parties gain an electoral advantage by controlling the timing of elections? Does that advantage disappear after the introduction of legislation constraining opportunistic election timing? We address these questions by analyzing and comparing 37 years of election results in eight Canadian provinces prior and subsequent to the passage of election timing legislation. Our evidence suggests that critics of the election timing power may be justified in calling for limits to this discretionary power.

Abstract In this study, we contend that distinguishing individuals who support bans on minority religious symbols from those who want to ban all religious symbols improves our understanding of the roots of opposition to minority religious symbols in the public sphere. We hypothesize that both groups are likely driven by markedly different motivations and that opposition to the presence of minority religious symbols in the public sphere may be the result of an alliance between “strange bedfellows,” clusters of individuals whose political outlooks usually bring them to opposite sides of political debates. Drawing on a survey conducted in the province of Quebec (Canada), we find that while holding liberal values and low religiosity are key characteristics of those who would ban all religious symbols, feelings of cultural threat and generalized prejudice are central characteristics of those who would only restrict minority religious symbols. Negative attitudes specifically toward Muslims, however, also appear to motivate both groups.

Political socialisation plays a crucial but complex role in determining how immigrants adjust to the political environment of their host country. This study examines the effects of initial political socialisation and resocialisation on immigrants' electoral participation in Canada. It addresses three questions: To what extent does the outlooks that develop from earlier political experiences in the country of origin shape immigrants' subsequent electoral participation in Canada? To what extent, and how, does subsequent experience with politics in Canada affect electoral participation? And finally, how does initial socialisation in the country of origin condition resocialisation in Canada? The results indicate that not only does resocialisation leave a unique and lasting imprint on immigrant electoral participation in the host country, but also that the nature of resocialisation process in the host country is conditioned by the distinctive political outlooks immigrants acquire under different political regimes in their respective countries of origin.

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Generalised trust promotes social interactions and may well be a crucial component of immigrant integration. Recent immigrants in particular are likely to be viewed by themselves and others as outsiders' who are unfamiliar with the expectations and norms that structure day-to-day social interactions in the host country. This study relies on a unique combination of three sources of data all derived from World Values Surveys to examine levels of trust, and its sources, among newcomers in one country with a large immigrant population, Canada. The evidence indicates that recent immigrants to Canada make a clear distinction between trust in other people in general, and trust in Canadians in particular: the former is grounded in pre-migration cultural influences, while the latter is grounded in immigrants' experiences in the new host country. Moreover, the evidence suggests trust in Canadians is a crucial component of immigrant integration.

In an influential 2002 study, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse make the provocative argument that high numbers of Americans seek stealth democracy, that is, processes that discover the will of the people without requiring substantial citizen effort. This article applies the concept in a Canadian province and argues that the stealth democracy measure represents an ambiguous amalgam of attitudes that are only loosely related to one another, and which do not appear to represent a single, underlying concept. We draw on 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study data and find that Saskatchewan responses to the stealth democracy items generally parallel the responses gathered in previous studies conducted in the United States, Finland, Britain, and Australia. We move beyond these studies by examining the components of the stealth democracy index. We conclude by suggesting that the concept of stealth democracy be rebuilt to better distinguish among attitudes toward democracy, politics, and governing.

AbstractThis paper examines public attitudes towards aboriginal policy in Canada, focusing on evidence from two surveys conducted in Saskatchewan, a province with a large and growing Aboriginal population. We show that although non-Aboriginals are collectively divided on Aboriginal public policies, expressing considerable support for some, but strong reservations when it comes to others; the individual-level evidence indicates that there is a single Aboriginal policy agenda in the minds of non-Aboriginal Canadians. Support for, and opposition to, the privileging of Aboriginal claims is structured in part by prejudice toward outgroups but also by non-Aboriginal people's more general position on the role of government in society. Moreover, the impact of positions about the role of government in society on attitudes toward Aboriginal policies is moderated by people's level of political sophistication: the more educated and politically interested they are, the greater the impact of those ideological views.