This study examines academic dishonesty among university students, focusing on peer influence, detection risk, effort, and sanctions in proctored online and offline exams. Drawing on 259 survey responses collected from German universities after the COVID-19-driven transition to online formats, it applies a utility-based framework, combined with Probit and Logit regressions. The findings robustly demonstrate that perceived peer cheating is the most significant determinant, significantly elevating individual cheating likelihood by reducing perceived detection risks, thereby normalizing dishonest behavior. Although self-reported cheating is more common in online settings, the analysis shows that it is weak enforcement and lower monitoring, rather than the exam format itself, that elevate misconduct. Students who dedicate substantial preparation time or hold strong ethical convictions are less likely to cheat, while sanctions prove ineffective unless coupled with a credible probability of detection. By quantifying these drivers in a controlled academic setting, this study provides fresh insights into how peer contagion, detection risk, and contextual factors interact to shape dishonest behavior. The results underscore the need for robust proctoring, clear sanction policies, and efforts to strengthen social norms, particularly as online and hybrid assessments continue to expand.

The aim of auditing is to protect active and potential investors from accounting fraud. Nevertheless, as many auditing scandals have demonstrated, auditing has a dark side. Correct auditing is a public good provided by private auditing firms, but these firms are paid by the enterprise being audited. Therefore, audit firms may be dubbed as agents of two principals, the audited firm and the public. Reputation theory conjectures that auditors are disincentivized from performing shallow and fraudulent auditing because of reputational concerns and associated reputational costs. However, empirical evidence does not support this claim. While it may be irrational for a large audit firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its reputational capital for a single client by doing superficial audits (such as WorldCom), it may be quite rational for the auditing firm’s engagement partners to do so. The result might be a conspiracy against the public and investors. Because of an inelastic supply of experienced auditors and a highly concentrated market of big auditing firms, reputational losses due to auditing scandals for the audit firms’ local partners and staff seem to be rather small. With a game theoretic model, we argue here that neither higher transparency nor higher fines for auditing failures may prevent such conspiracies. Therefore, legal regulations and court rulings can only change the expected fines for audit fraud, but they cannot solve the general problems arising from the symbiotic relationship between auditors and their client firms. As auditing firms may use the so-called expectation gap to protect themselves against legal claims of wrongdoing, avenues more suitable to deterring conspiracies by auditors and their client firms might include whistleblowing, short-selling investors and investigative journalism.

Unter Nutzung des Skill-Paradoxons zeigen wir, dass durch die Ausweitung der universitären Ausbildung auf Nichttarget-Universitäten und steigende Ausbildungsqualität dieser Universitäten die Chancen von Bewerbern mit sozial schwächerer Herkunft bei der Besetzung von Spitzenpositionen in Unternehmen nicht notwendigerweise verbessert werden; sie können sich möglicherweise sogar verschlechtern. Diese Hypothese wird mit kostentheoretischen Überlegungen zur Personalauswahl unterstützt. Daran anschließend werden empirische Ergebnisse für das Investmentbanking in Großbritannien präsentiert.

Nowadays, individuals increasingly derive income from working online. Particularly relevant is the work on user-generated content platforms. To maximize user attention, these platforms require their contributors to grant users free access to their content. Professional contributors can therefore only monetize their content subsequently, with their income potential being highly dependent on the user attention they receive. To study the competitive behavior of professional contributors, we utilize data from the live video streaming platform Twitch. Without price competition, contributors (streamers) strategies rely mainly on their content type (what) and timing (when). Furthermore, streamers have complete information on their competitors’ moves and can adapt in a timely manner, whereas viewers face relatively low switching costs. Our empirical results illustrate that streamers tend to adopt temporary clustering strategies when choosing timing and content, similar to the basic ideas of the Hotelling model. However, not all components of these strategies actually increase audience size.

In this paper, we explain the stability of top university ranks and discuss attempts to create top national universities. Firstly, it is shown theoretically that in a world with differently-gifted poor and rich students, a three-tier university system may become very stable, with a super league of the best research universities that attract the best students, whether rich or poor. Secondly, it is empirically demonstrated that half of the highest ranked universities enjoy very stable competitive advantages. Thirdly, we examine attempts of China, France and Germany to overcome these disadvantages and to get into this super league. The recent attempt of China to create such super league universities shows the financial and societal costs of these attempts. France demonstrates how the concentration of financial resources on two newly built universities that complement the forces of existing ones—either real or only by labelling—may succeed. Despite the complexly designed and competitive German Excellence Initiative, ongoing since 2004, no German university was among the top 50 in the Shanghai ranking in 2021 (compared to one university in 2004). The mixed results of all these worldwide attempts may reflect the problem that late market entry into the super league may be too costly, given that the classical university business model is in the mature phase of its life cycle.

Supply chain failures and supply shortages have always been a matter of high risk. Especially when considering the scope and velocity of modern supply chains, small disturbances can cause immense damage. However, a framework for quantifying supply chain systemic risk is still missing. To address this, we use the principles of the Diebold and Yilmaz connectedness approach, which is based on assessing the decomposition of the forecast error variance of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, and adjust it to supply chains. By doing so, we seek to establish a systemic risk measurement of individual supply chains on different aggregation levels. In detail, we examine the automotive and semiconductor supply chains. Looking at specific firms, we identify vulnerable nodes and hubs of these supply chains and, thus, can measure the risk exposure originated by a certain region or supply chain level. Our results show that for both supply chains, risk spillovers were at their highest levels during the COVID-19 pandemic, and firms facing U.S. trade restrictions experienced particularly strong effects during our sample period. In general, our approach provides convincing results, since companies identified as particularly risky are in line with specific company news that indicate risky spillovers during the study period.

Along with incentive schemes, another well-established way to align the interests of principals and agents and, consequently, to reduce and eliminate biases and errors is the practice of monitoring. Considering the monitoring of experts, we evaluate the introduction of the most recent monitoring technology in football, the virtual assistant referee (VAR). Focusing on the German Bundesliga and the Italian Serie A, we analyse whether VAR has changed referees’ decision-making behaviour and, in particular, whether this led to changes in referees’ well-documented preferential treatment of home teams. By doing so, we use the introduction of VAR as a natural experiment to examine whether VAR can help overcome inefficiencies in referees’ decision-making and whether it exposes any inefficiencies in the referee selection system. Ex ante (in-)efficiency would imply that few (many) changes in referee decisions are seen after the VAR introduction. Our results suggest, generally, that VAR impacts referees’ decision-making. We confirm current research and conclude that prior to the introduction of the VAR, the home team tends to be favoured with respect to awarded penalty kicks, red cards and the amount of added time in games containing either penalty kicks or red cards. However, because the home bias only partially decreased with the introduction of VAR, it seems that the bias emerges more as a result of the advantages of playing in one’s local surroundings than of the referees’ decisions. We further show that VAR interventions do not correlate with referees’ experience levels. Overall, these modest findings and even non-existent differences indicate that home bias occurs for reasons other than referees, suggesting that the process for training, promoting, and selecting referees at the highest league works well. Finally, our findings suggest that the VAR implementation is aimed at purposes other than classic agent monitoring.

Aufgrund der zunehmend dynamischen Struktur des Automobilmarktes ist eine präzise Absatzprognose von zentralerer Bedeutung. Exemplarisch für den VW-Golf-Absatz erstellen wir ein Prognosemodell mit bekannten makroökonomischen Prädiktoren sowie Suchtrenddaten von Google Trends. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass makroökonomische Parameter und Google Trends als geeignete Prädiktoren für den VW-Golf-Absatz eingestuft werden können und sich die Prognose durch den Einbezug der Suchtrenddaten verbessern lässt.

This article investigates the work attitudes of survivors during the ongoing decline of a firm with no prospect of recovery due to external causes. Data from a German firm is used as a case study. In particular, we explore whether transparency is a tool for keeping and regaining trust while decreasing stress and, hence, leads to high and stable employee satisfaction even during adverse times. Analyzing data from both an employee attitude survey and an executive attitude survey with over 25,000 and 1,700 initial responses, we run multiple mediation models and find that transparency is a tool for keeping and regaining trust while decreasing stress and, hence, is associated with increasing satisfaction during a decline. Thus, for both employees and their executives, high levels of transparency and trust seem to be effective in mitigating the negative effects of downsizing. We discuss the results with regard to potential declines in several key industries.

Hubris is a tendency of leaders to hold an overly confident view of their own capabilities and to abuse power for their own selfish goals, sometimes with disastrous consequences for organizations. A major reason for hubris is the rigorous selection process leaders typically undergo. This study proposes a governance mechanism used successfully in history to tackle hubris: partly random selections, which combine competitive selections by competence with lotteries. A frequently voiced concern about the use of lotteries is that it takes no account of the competence of the leader chosen. We propose that partly random selections can mitigate the disadvantages of both competitive selections alone and lotteries alone and reduce hubris in leaders. We conduct a test of this governance mechanism by means of a computerized laboratory experiment. Our results show that partly random selections significantly reduce the hubris of group leaders.

ZusammenfassungDie Deutsche Bahn musste in den vergangenen sechs Jahren eine Gesamtdividende von 2,85 Mrd. Euro bei einem kumulierten Jahresergebnis von knapp 2,35 Mrd. Euro zahlen. Die DB Netz verfolgte in diesem Zeitraum eine monopolistische Preispolitik für die Verkehrsunternehmen auf den nachgelagerten Wettbewerbsmärkten, die gravierende Folgen sowohl für die eigenen als auch für die konkurrierenden Verkehrsunternehmen hatte. Dieser Beitrag erläutert, warum das Unternehmen wirtschaftlich gezwungen war, genau diese Strategien anzuwenden. Im Koalitionsvertrag heißt es aber, dass „die Erhöhung des Marktanteils der Eisenbahnen“ angestrebt wird, wobei „nicht die Gewinnmaximierung, sondern die sinnvolle Maximierung des Verkehrsaufkommens auf der Schiene im Vordergrund steht“. Es soll also nicht der Gewinn, sondern der Transportoutput auf der Schiene maximiert werden.

In this paper we show, that approaches used to forecast the success of media investments can be challenged on the basis of the efficient markets hypothesis. Moreover, we present new empirical evidence which supports our argumentation in favour of the non-predictability of the success of media investments.

Die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit für eine Karriere im Profifußball der ersten oder zweiten Bundesliga ist gering. Sehr viele junge Spieler versuchen dennoch eine Profikarriere. Neben sportlichen Zielen spielen ökonomische Motive in Form von hohen Gehältern und sozialem Status eine wichtige Rolle. Diesen Verlockungen stehen erhebliche Risiken gegenüber. Letztere scheinen den Jugendlichen und ihren Eltern nicht immer bewusst zu sein. Für Vereine und Spielerberater ist die Konkurrenz unter den Jugendlichen ein lukratives Geschäft.

The distribution of illegal drugs on local markets is closely related to the phenomenon of gang wars. In a simple model of a local monopoly gang it is studied how the simultaneous decision on the number of low-rank gang members and the local retail market drug prices may affect gang wars. The drug distribution technology is described by a concave production function that contains low-rank gang members as a production factor. One key factor is added to a simple model of such a monopoly retail market for drugs: there is a gang membership benefit for low-rank members that makes these members cheap workers. This feature implies that increases of the membership value decrease drug prices by expanding the number of low-rank members.

This special issue focuses on empirical and theoretical papers that help us to better understand the strategy and governance of entrepreneurial networks, such as franchise chains, alliances, and cooperative networks. The following central themes are covered: (I) Which formal governance mechanisms do entrepreneurial networks use in order to reduce transaction cost/agency cost and to increase strategic value? (II) What is the role of relational governance mechanisms (such as information exchange and social ties) for the performance outcomes in franchise chains and cooperatives? (III) Which alliance strategies do entrepreneurial firms pursue to realize a competitive advantage, and what is the impact of resources and capabilities on performance outcomes of entrepreneurial firms. To address these issues, insights from organizational economics (transaction cost theory, agency theory, signaling theory), strategic management perspectives (resource-based, knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theory), entrepreneurship theory and the relational governance view are used.

The Christian churches in Germany face both continual loss of members and of status in society. It is quite difficult for the churches to develop strategies to overcome these challenges. A direct analysis of church activities is difficult due to lack of transparency. Therefore we try to deliver an indirect analysis that assumes specific objectives of the Christian churches and derives their position from a perspective of the economics of religion. The focus of the analysis is both on the optimal size of congregations and on strategic options for churches to confront the problems of their declining market. The result of the analysis shows the churches facing multidimensional problems, without being able to reasonably respond to them in their present form of organization.

Previous literature discussing driving forces in students’ decisions to cheat in examinations has produced conflicting results. Consensus has emerged however, that in very many social situations including academic settings, in particular business administration and economics students tend to behave less socially-oriented than others. Accordingly, building on the “fraud triangle” and economic reasoning, we study cheating among—allegedly pro-social—students of (Protestant and Catholic) theology as well as—allegedly anti-social—students of business, using a sample of 850 such students from a large German university. Our results show that in fact, significant differences in cheating behavior do not exist across subjects (notably, with Catholic theology and business students displaying equally fraudulent tendencies), but rather, the incentives and opportunity costs driving students to cheat diverge: Whereas business students strongly act on incentives, theologists’ choices are driven by costs in terms of sanctions, especially by avoiding social stigma. The findings explain previous contradictory results in the literature by highlighting the underlying economic reasoning in cheating decisions, and help foster, promote, and fine-tune incentive and control schemes in the context of discouraging cheating strategies in academia.