Being ignored and excluded is a painful experience that impacts crucial higher-order cognitive processes. We report two experiments examining the effect of ostracism on risk-related decision-making, peer conformity, and the moderating role of individual differences in rejection sensitivity. In Experiment 1, participants recalled being ostracized or included before completing a health risk-perception peer-influence task. Ostracized participants showed a significant decrease in risk perception but conformed more to risk-averse peers. In Experiment 2, participants completed a social gambling task, with ostracized participants exhibiting riskier behavior than included participants. Unlike Experiment 1, ostracized participants were more influenced by peers displaying moderately risky behaviors, rather than highly risk-averse ones. These effects were moderated by participants’ level of sensitivity to rejection. Together, these findings provide further evidence that ostracism alters risky decision-making and offers insight into how the peer environment shapes risk-taking.

The affect heuristic suggests that emotional responses significantly influence perceptions of risk and benefit. We extend this model to test how recalling ostracism affects these perceptions across financial, health, and social domains, and test how time pressure moderates these effects. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: recalling either a time they were ostracized (ostracism condition) or included (inclusion condition), followed by evaluating risk and benefit scenarios under time pressure or no time pressure. While a growing body of evidence has linked ostracism to increases in risky decision-making, we found that recalling ostracism led to domain-specific, bi-directional changes in risk and benefit perception. Ostracized individuals perceived lower risk in financial and health domains but higher risk in social contexts. Time pressure further intensified these effects, strengthening the inverse relationship between risk and benefit perceptions. Under time pressure, ostracized participants reported greater perceived benefits of financial risks and lower perceived benefits of social risks. These findings support the hypothesis that ostracism shapes risk and benefit perceptions in a domain-specific way, with time pressure amplifying these effects through heightened affective responses.

The experience of meaning has been found to be mapped onto spatial proximity whereby coherent—in contrast to incoherent—elements in a set are mentally represented as closer together in physical space. In a series of four experiments, we show that spatial representation of coherence is malleable and can employ other meaningful concrete dimensions of space that are made salient. When given task instructions cueing verticality, participants represented coherence in the upper vertical location when making judgements about the logical validity of realistic (Experiments 1 and 4) and unrealistic syllogistic scenarios (Experiment 3). When the task instruction made the spatial proximity between the stimuli materials and the participant salient (subjective proximity), participants represented coherence as spatially close to themselves (Experiment 2). We also found that being accurate in judging the validity of syllogisms was associated with representing coherence in the upper visual field or close to oneself. Overall, our findings show that identifying semantic links between an abstract concept and a given spatial dimension involves using that dimension to create spatial metaphoric mappings of the concept.

People in states of mild depression have difficulties in reasoning tasks that demand the flexible integration of piecemeal information into mental representations. Previous research found inferior performance levels in depressed participants compared to nondepressed controls when constructing mental models of linear orders (LOC task). The present research investigates whether depressed individuals show evidence for reduced functionality of spatial processes during LOC execution. We tested three groups of participants in an LOC task: Nondepressed controls, mildly depressed, and episodically sad controls (via mood manipulation). We found spatial processes to be involved in model construction for the control group, in a magnitude as previously reported for similar tasks. However, both depressed and sad groups showed evidence for the absence of spatial processes being part of their reasoning in this task. These results are discussed in the context of cognitive and neurophysiological theories about depressed participants’ performance impairments when it comes to reason spatially, reliably construct mental representations from piecemeal information and flexibly reason on the basis of them. We also relate the results in the episodically sad group within the context of parallel cognitive marker symptoms in sadness and mild depression.

The "good is up" metaphor, which links valence and verticality was found to influence affective judgement and to direct attention, but its effects on memory remain unclear with contradictory research findings. To provide a more accurate assessment of memory components involved in recognition, such as item memory and source-guessing biases, a standard source monitoring paradigm was applied in this research. A series of three experiments provided a conceptual replication and extension of Experiment 2 by Crawford et al., (2014) and yielded a consistent result pattern suggesting that the "good is up" metaphor biases participants' guessing of source location. That is, when source memory failed, participants were more inclined to guess the "up" location versus "down" location for positive items (and vice versa for negative items). It did, however, not affect source memory or item memory for valenced stimuli learned from metaphor-congruent versus incongruent locations (i.e., no metaphor-(in)congruent effects in memory). We suggest that the "good is up" metaphor may affect cognitive processes in a more subtle way than originally suggested.

With mental models based on relational information, the present research shows that the semantics expressed by the relation can determine the structural properties of the constructed model. In particular, we demonstrate a reversal of the classical, well-replicated symbolic distance effect (SDE), as a function of relational semantics. The classical SDE shows that responses are more accurate, and faster, the wider the distance between queried elements on a mentally constructed rank order. We replicate this effect in a study using a relation that expresses a rank hierarchy (“older than,” Experiment 4). In contrast, we obtain a clear reversal of the same effect for accuracy data when the relation expresses a number of equivalence classes (“is from the same city,” Experiments 1–3). In Experiment 3, we find clear evidence of a reversed SDE for accuracy and latency in the above standard condition, and flat curves of means, across pair distances, for accuracy and latency in a condition that makes equivalence classes salient from the beginning. We discuss these findings in the context of a process model of equivalence class formation based on learned piecemeal information.

The present research examined the role of heightened perceived control as a strategy to cope with uncertainty in need for closure (NFC). We assume that in the situation of uncertainty, NFC is associated with using strategies that heighten perceived control. To test this assumption we run two studies using a causal learning paradigm wherein participants' goal was to find out whether clicking a button had any effect on a triangle lighting up with no specific instructions on how to approach the task. Two within-subject factors, i.e., certainty schedules and type of interval, were introduced to vary the uncertainty experienced in the task. In Study 1 (N = 45) we demonstrated that the task indeed induced varying degrees of uncertainty depending on these factors and that NFC related to more presses (i.e., effortful means). In Study 2 (N = 94) we demonstrated also that high NFC was associated with more presses which was linked to heightened perceived control.

People can support abstract reasoning by using mental models with spatial simulations. Such models are employed when people represent elements in terms of ordered dimensions (e.g. who is oldest, Tom, Dick, or Harry). We test and find that the process of forming and using such mental models can influence the liking of its elements (e.g. Tom, Dick, or Harry). The presumed internal structure of such models (linear-transitive array of elements), generates variations in processing ease (fluency) when using the model in working memory (see the Symbolic Distance Effect, SDE). Specifically, processing of pairs where elements have larger distances along the order should be easier compared to pairs with smaller distances. Elements from easier pairs should be liked more than elements from difficult pairs (fluency being hedonically positive). Experiment 1 shows that unfamiliar ideographs are liked more when at wider distances and therefore easier to process. Experiment 2 replicates this effect with non-words. Experiment 3 rules out a non-spatial explanation of the effect while Experiments 4 offers a high-powered replication. Experiment 5 shows that the spatial effect spontaneously emerges after learning, even without a task that explicitly focuses on fluency. Experiment 6 employed a shorter array, but yielded no significant results.

The present contribution argues that transitive reasoning, as exemplified in paradigms of linear order construction in mental space, is associated with spatial effects. Starting from robust findings from the early 70s, research so far has widely discussed the symbolic distance effect (SDE). This effect shows that after studying pairs of relations, e.g., “A > B,” “B > C,” and “D > E,” participants are more correct, and faster in correct responding, the wider the “distance” between two elements within the chain A > B > C > D > E. The SDE has often been given spatial interpretations, but alternatively, non-spatial models of the effect are also viable on the empirical basis so far, which means the question about spatial contributions to the construction of analog representations of rank orders is still open. We suggest here that laterality effects can add the necessary additional information to support the idea of spatial processes. We introduce anchoring effects in terms of showing response advantages for congruent versus incongruent pairings of presentation location on a screen on the one hand, and the hypothetical spatial arrangement of the order in mental space, on the other hand. We report pertinent findings and discuss anchoring paradigms with respect to their internal validity as well as their being rooted in basic mechanisms of trained reading/writing direction.

Spatial configurations amongst stimuli can influence magnitude attributions. Someone's acquired reading and writing direction (RWD) can provide a spatial schema of primacy extending from left (maximum) to right (minimum) for Westerners and opposite for leftward RWD languages. Primacy information can be transformed into a magnitude attribution regarding a feature quality, perceiving an object as having "more" of a certain quality for Westerners when positioned left amongst two similar objects, likewise when positioned right for people with a right-to-left RWD. Results showed that native English speakers tended to attribute greater magnitude of a given feature in fictitious products displayed left within a pair, indicating which of two products was "most" representative of a certain quality (Experiment 1a) but they would randomly choose when asked which product represented "least" of the quality (Experiment 1b). A similar, but reversed pattern of effects was obtained for Farsi participants only familiar with Farsi (Experiment 2).

Investigates the hypothesis that spatial processes are involved in judgments on membership in a category. It is argued that membership versus nonmembership of an object or a concept, in a category, is spatially simulated in mental space by a minimal continuum with 2 levels, left for membership and right for nonmembership. In analogy to other embodied dimensions (e.g., time line or number line), the orientation of membership levels on the mental dimension is assumed to follow the acquired reading/writing schema, with procedural primacy implying dominance, hence leftward positioning of dominant elements. This rationale is tested in 7 experiments. A recognition memory paradigm (modified 2AFC paradigm, Experiment 1) revealed that participants were faster indicating the location of an old word on the screen when displayed left within a pair of words, indicating a spatial representation of category membership ("member" = left, "nonmember" = right). For category discrimination (Experiment 2) we found faster and more accurate performance when a target word is presented left as compared with right. This pattern is replicated in Experiments 4a and 4b, with different response alternatives. Discriminating categories in a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm (Experiment 3), participants were faster making correct responses with their left hand than with their right hand in target category trials. In contrast, no differences were found for distractor trials. Experiments 5a and 5b address the spatial bias in spontaneous sorting situations. Overall, this pattern of results across the 7 experiments provides evidence in support of a spatial simulation of category assignment.

The robustness of effects indicating a spatial component associated with abstract reasoning is tested. Judgements regarding hierarchical orderings tend to be faster and more accurate when the dominant element in any pair from the order (e.g., the older, richer) is presented on the left of the screen as compared with the right (left-anchoring effect). This signature effect is investigated in three conditions (Experiment 1), each implementing a different timing regime for the elements in each pair, during learning. Thereby, the construction of a mental representation of the ordering was exposed to a potentially competing spatial simulation, that is, the well-known "mental timeline" with orientation from left (present) to right (future). First, the left-anchoring effect for order representations remained significant when timeline information was congruent with the presumed left-anchoring process, that is, the dominant element in a pair was always presented first. Second, the same effect remained also significant when the timeline-related information was random, that is, the dominant element being presented either first or second. Third, the same effect was found to be still significant, when the timeline-related information was contrary to the left-anchoring process, that is, the dominant element being presented always second. Experiment 2 replicates the target effect under random timeline information, controlling for colour as a stimulus feature. The results are discussed in the context of a theoretical model that integrates basic assumptions about acquired reading/writing habits as a scaffold for spatial simulation and primacy/dominance representation within such spatial simulations.

We examined whether people can simultaneously apply 2 cognitive strategies in social categorizations. Specifically, we tested whether stereotypes concerning social power of gender categories interact with metaphoric power-space links. Based on the conceptual blending perspective suggesting that semantically consistent concepts acquire each other's properties, we predicted the following: Given that stereotypes create expectations linking gender with power, and metaphorically power is linked with vertical space, the conceptual blend of gender-power-space would invoke representations of male targets at the top vertical position when categorizing them as powerful, while female targets at the bottom when categorizing them as powerless. Across 6 studies, we show that the concept of gender is simulated spatially when people attribute power to male, but not female, targets. The predicted power-gender blending involved simulations of men judged as powerful when presented in upper location as opposed to women judged as powerful in upper location and men judged as powerful in lower location. Our hypothesis was further corroborated using pupillometry to assess preconscious processing, whereby stereotypically inconsistent orientations of gender and power evoked pupillary markers indicative of surprise. Our studies suggest that gender-power stereotypic expectations interact with the power-space metaphor in social categorizations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Author Note Correspondence should be addressed to Ulrich von Hecker, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Tower Building, Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3AT, United Kingdom. Electronic mail may be sent to vonheckeru@cardiff.ac.uk. We would like to thank Dr. Rainer Leonhart for technical help as well as Sascha Topolinski and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier version. We also thank the Editor Dirk Wentura for helpful suggestions. This research was preregistered with Open Science Framework, see https://osf.io/emauf and https://osf.io/6sznj/.

Three studies examined the role of need for affect (NFA) and need for cognition (NFC) in intergroup perception. We hypothesized that NFA predicts a preference for stereotypically warm groups over stereotypically cold groups, whereas NFC predicts a preference for stereotypically competent groups over stereotypically incompetent groups. Study 1 supported these hypotheses for attitudes toward stereotypically ambivalent groups, which are stereotyped as high on one of the trait dimensions (e.g., high warmth) and low on the other (e.g., low competence), but not for stereotypically univalent groups, which are seen as high or low on both dimensions. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this pattern for stereotypically ambivalent groups, and yielded provocative evidence regarding several putative mechanisms underlying these associations. Together, these findings help integrate and extend past evidence on attitude-relevant individual differences with research on intergroup perception.

The Indian caste system is a complex social structure wherein social roles like one's profession became 'hereditary,' resulting in restricted social mobility and fixed status hierarchies. Furthermore, we argue that the inherent property of caste heightens group identification with one's caste. Highly identified group members would protect the identity of the group in situations when group norms are violated. In this paper, we were interested in examining the consequence of caste norm violation and how an individual's status is mentally represented. High caste norms are associated with moral values while the lower caste norms are associated with immorality. We predicted a 'black sheep effect,' that is, when high caste individuals' group identity (caste norm violation condition) is threatened their salient high caste identity would increase, thereby resulting in devaluing the status of their fellow in-group member if the latter is perceived as perpetrator. We presented participants with a social conflict situation of a victim and a perpetrator that is 'Caste norm consistent' (Lower caste individual as a perpetrator and higher caste individual as a victim) and vice versa 'Caste norm inconsistent' condition (higher caste individual as perpetrator and lower caste individual as a victim). Then, participants had to choose from nine pictorial depictions representing the protagonists in the story on a vertical line, with varying degrees of status distance. Results showed evidence for the black sheep effect and, furthermore, revealed that no other identity (religious, national, and regional) resulted in devaluing the status of fellow in-group member. These results help us understand the 'black sheep' effect in the context of moral norms and status representation and are discussed in the framework of the Indian society.

Three studies examined the role of Need for Affect (NFA) and Need for Cognition (NFC) in intergroup perception. We hypothesized that NFA predicts a preference for stereotypically warm groups over stereotypically cold groups, whereas NFC predicts a preference for stereotypically competent groups over stereotypically incompetent groups. Study 1 supported these hypothese for attitudes toward stereotypically ambivalent groups, which are stereotyped as high on one of the trait dimensions (e.g., high warmth) and low on the other (e.g., low competence), but not for stereotypically univalent groups, which are seen as high or low on both dimensions. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this pattern for stereotypically ambivalent groups, and yielded provocative evidence regarding several putative mechanisms underlying these associations. Together, these findings help integrate and extend past evidence on attitude-relevant individual differences with research on intergroup perception.