IntroductionA large body of research has established a consensus that racial discrimination in CV screening occurs and persists. Nevertheless, we still know very little about how recruiters look at the CV and how this is connected to the discriminatory patterns. This article examines the way recruiters view and select CVs and how they reason about their CV selection choices, as a first step in unpacking the patterns of hiring discrimination. Specifically, we explore how race and ethnicity signaled through the CV matter, and how recruiters reason about the choices they make.MethodsWe recorded data from 40 respondents (20 pairs) who are real-life recruiters with experiences in recruitment of diverse employees in three large Swedish-based firms in the finance and retail sector in two large cities. The participating firms all value diversity, equity and inclusion in their recruitment. Their task was to individually rate 10 fictious CVs where race (signaled by face image) and ethnicity (signaled by name) were systematically manipulated, select the top three candidates, and then discuss their choices in pairs to decide on a single top candidate. We examined whether respondents’ choices were associated with the parts of the CV they looked at, and how they reasoned and justified their choices through dialog.ResultsOur results show that non-White CVs were rated higher than White CVs. While we do not observe any statistically significant differences in the ratings between different racial groups, we see a statistically significant preference for Chinese over Iraqi names. There were no significant differences in time spent looking at the CV across different racial groups, but respondents looked longer at Polish names compared to Swedish names when presented next to a White face. The dialog data reveal how respondents assess different CVs by making assumptions about the candidates’ job and organizational fit through limited information on the CVs, especially when the qualifications of the candidates are evaluated to be equal.

When crises hit, social theory predicts increased hostility toward immigrants. We exploit the Covid-19 pandemic as a unique exogenous crisis and examine whether discrimination increased in its wake. Repeating a field experiment in the Swiss housing market in 2018 and 2020, we find no evidence of increased discrimination against the most important immigrant groups in Switzerland. Contrarily, when uncertainty dominates the market, proprietors appear to change their selection behavior by substituting signals of ethnicity for other markers of solvency and reliability and, consequently, invitation rates for immigrants increase relative to native house-hunters. We conclude that crises do not necessarily increase discriminatory behavior in market situations.

Persistent hiring discrimination as demonstrated by correspondence experiments incites immigrant job candidates and their descendants to modify their résumé to hide their immigrant status, that is, résumé whitening. To date, we have little to no empirical evidence on how common this is in practice. We test the extent of résumé whitening with a representative survey of immigrants in Switzerland (N = 7659). Around 9% of the immigrants used some résumé whitening. Immigrants appear to use résumé whitening strategically when experiencing or anticipating discrimination. Future correspondence experiments should take this into account to maximize external validity.

We investigate the macroeconomic impact of public expenditure in active labor market policies (ALMPs) and passive labor market policies (PLMPs) on main employment indicators (i.e., unemployment, employment, and labor force participation) for a large and novel panel database of 121 countries (36 developed, 64 emerging and 21 developing economies). Compared to previous studies, we include for the first time evidence from developing and emerging economies and explicitly examine the possible presence of complementarities between active and passive policies. We find that the interaction between interventions is crucial, as the effect of spending in either of the two policies is more favorable the more is spent on the other. Even the detrimental labor market effects of passive policies disappear on the condition that sufficient amounts are spent on active interventions. This complementarity seems even more important for emerging and developing economies.

Due to the prevalence and important consequences of student work, the topic has seen an increased interest in the literature. However, to date the focus has been solely on measuring the effect of student employment on later labour market outcomes, relying on signalling theory to explain the observed effects. In the current study, we go beyond measuring the effect of student work and we examine for the first time what exactly is being signalled by student employment. We do this by means of a vignette experiment in which we ask 242 human resource professionals to evaluate a set of five fictitious profiles. Whereas all types of student work signal a better work attitude, a larger social network, a greater sense of responsibility, an increased motivation, and more maturity, only student employment in line with a job candidate's field of study is a signal of increased human capital and increased trainability.

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates’ unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate what underlies this pattern. To this end, we conduct a survey experiment in which employers make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who have experienced spells of unemployment of different length. In addition, candidates are rated on several statements that are central to four signals often associated with unemployment: (i) a signal of trainability, (ii) a signal of other fixed skills, (iii) a signal of skill loss, and (iv) a signal of negative evaluation by other employers. We use these ratings to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four signals. Our findings indicate that longer unemployment spells are mainly perceived by employers as a signal of lower motivation and, as a result, the long-term unemployed (LTU) have lower chances to be hired or even be invited to a job interview. Understanding the reasons why employers are reluctant to hire the LTU is crucial to devise proper activation measures to facilitate their re-employment. Our study is a contribution in this direction.

Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates' unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation. Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates' unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation.

This study empirically assesses the thesis that student employment only hurts academic performance for students with a primary orientation towards work (versus school). To this end, we analyse unique data on tertiary education students' intensity of and motivation for student employment by means of a state-of-the art moderation model. We find, indeed, only a negative association between hours of student work and the percentage of courses passed for work-oriented students. This finding may explain the contradictory results in the literature neglecting this factor.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of two policies (an extension of the waiting period before entitlement to unemployment insurance (UI) and an intensification of counselling) targeted at unemployed school-leavers in Belgium on unemployment duration and on the quality of work. Design/methodology/approach The length of both policies is sharply determined by two distinct age thresholds. These thresholds are exploited to estimate the impact within a regression discontinuity design using a large administrative data set of all recent labour market entrants. Findings The longer waiting period does not significantly impact job finding while the Youth Work Plan does increase the job-finding rate eight months after the onset of the programme. The accepted wage is unaffected, but both policies lower the number of working days resulting in lower earnings. This effect is especially prevalent for youth from low-income households. Research limitations/implications For both policies, participation was delineated by an age cut-off which was only four months apart. This sizeably reduced the width of the age window to detect a corresponding discontinuity in behaviour and hereby also the statistical power of the estimator. Additionally, due to confounding policies the estimated effects are local treatment effects for highly educated youth around the age cut-offs. Social implications The findings suggest that threatening with a sanction is not the right instrument to activate highly educated unemployed school-leavers. While supportive measures appear to be more effective, this may be partly a consequence of acceptance of lower quality jobs due to liquidity constraints and of caseworkers giving misleading advice that temporary jobs are stepping stones to long-term employment. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the impact of changing the waiting period in UI. The paper adds to the existing literature on the effects of counselling and UI design on employment and job quality.

De recessie van 2008 heeft een enorme impact gehad op de jeugdwerkloosheid in Europa. Tegen 2010 was de jeugdwerkloosheid in Europa (EU27) gestegen tot een nooit eerder geziene hoogte (22,8%). Dit was niet alleen veel hoger dan de voorgaande jaren, maar ook het dubbele van de werkloosheid bij de 25- tot 54-jarigen. Als antwoord op deze ontwikkelingen heeft de Europese Unie aan de alarmbel getrokken en in april 2013 het jeugdwerkgarantieplan gelanceerd. Ook individuele Europese landen ondernamen actie om jeugdwerkloosheid terug te dringen. Zo introduceerde de Vlaamse overheid in 2009 het Jeugdwerkplan, wat inhoudt dat jongeren onder de 25 jaar recht hebben op een (meer) intensieve begeleiding na een maand werkloosheid. In 2012 verlengde de Belgische overheid de wachttijd (nu beroepsinschakelingstijd: de periode die doorlopen moet worden vooraleer een schoolverlater recht heeft op een uitkering) voor jongeren onder de 26 jaar met drie maanden, van negen naar twaalf maanden. Het doel van deze wijziging was om jongeren aan te zetten om intensiever naar werk te zoeken en sneller jobs aan te nemen. In dit onderzoek beoogden we de evaluatie van deze twee maatregelen.