Abstract: Introduction: Conspiracy believers often claim that they believe in conspiracy theories not on irrational grounds, as scholars often argue, but because of the real scandals and real conspiracies that have occurred in history. Methods: We tested whether reminding people of real scandals in the political, economic, or scientific domain and exposition to invented scandals (i.e., that did not occur) increase beliefs in conspiracy theories. A secondary research question was whether conspiracy beliefs positively relate to differentiating between real and invented scandals. Results: Our results showed that reminding people of real scandals and exposing them to invented scandals did not affect their conspiracy beliefs. Higher conspiracy believers were slightly better than lower conspiracy believers at recognizing invented scandals but somewhat worse at recognizing real scandals. Participants from left-wing political orientation were also marginally better than those with right-wing orientation at identifying real scandals. Discussion/conclusion: Reminding people of real and invented scandals did not have a short-term effect on conspiracist beliefs. This article supports the argument that conspiracy theories are not helpful for social critique, as higher believers in conspiracy theories were not better than lower believers at recognizing actual scandals.

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Climate change is a most serious challenge. Committing the needed resources requires that a clear majority of citizens approves the appropriate policies, since committing resources necessarily involve a trade-off with other expenses. However, there are distinct groups of people who remain in denial about the realities of climatic change. This chapter presents a range of psychological and social phenomena that together explain the phenomena that lead to denial.

Objectives: To explore how perceived disease threat and trust in institutions relate to vaccination intent, perceived effectiveness of official recommendations, and to othering strategies. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of Swiss adults in July 2020. Outcome variables were vaccination intent, perceived effectiveness of official recommendations and othering strategies (labelling a given social group as responsible for the disease and distancing from it). Independent variables were perceived disease threat, trust in various institutions, perceived health-related measures, and sociodemographic variables. Linear and logistic regressions were performed. Results: The response rate was 20.2% (1518/7500). Perceived disease threat and trust in medical/scientific institutions were positively associated with vaccination intent and perceived effectiveness of official recommendations for coronavirus mitigation measures. Only disease threat was associated with a perception of effectiveness among othering strategies. Age and education levels were associated with vaccination intent. Conclusion: Reinforcing trust in medical/scientific institutions can help strengthen the perceived effectiveness of official recommendations and vaccination. It however does not prevent adherence to ineffective protecting measures such as othering strategies, where decreasing perceptions of epidemic threat appears to be more efficient.

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity—the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain—in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political ‘elites’. Data from the World Value Survey ( n  = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France ( n  = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy ( n  = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Perception of randomness, patterns in visual noise, and coincidences have been associated with propensity to endorse paranormal and conspiracist beliefs. There is, however, controversial evidence about the relationships and related explanatory paths. Whereas some studies report a strong association between pattern and randomness perception, and conspiracy theory beliefs, others note only a weak association or none at all. And while paranormal beliefs have been associated with randomness perception and are routinely correlated with conspiracy theory endorsement, the exact relationships and differences of both types of belief remain elusive. The present research sought to resolve these issues by assessing the predictive power of several factors in competition, such as pattern, randomness, and coincidence perception, using different paradigms in two studies including four samples of participants, as well as a meta-analysis of all findings, testing twelve hypotheses in the process. We find that belief in conspiracy theories was best predicted by coincidence perception, whereas paranormal beliefs were best predicted by illusory pattern perception. Our findings help clarifying the distinction between pattern, randomness and coincidence perception, which are often conflated in the literature on nonconventional beliefs, and qualifies the widespread idea that believers in conspiracy theories tend to reject randomness.

In this review, more than 10 years of research in conspiracy theory beliefs is summarised. As conspiracy theories have these past years invaded the public domain in the whole world, a trend which culminated during COVID-19 pandemic, a growing number of psychologists investigated their antecedents and consequences. In this review, I expose and discuss the definitions, the rationality, the consequences, the measures, the potential causes, and some remedies against the proliferation of conspiracy theory beliefs. The potential causes are classified in five categories. The societal-political category (social inequalities and political extremism), the social category (intergroup competition), the personal (psychopathological) category (personality traits, such as paranoia, schizotypy, narcissism, etc.), the cognitive (irrational) category (cognitive biases and other irrational beliefs), and the communicational category (communication via Internet and social media, and narrative appeal).

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socio-economic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

Research on conspiracy theories tends to frame conspiracy believers as isolated individuals falling prey to irrational beliefs caused by a variety of pathological traits and cognitive shortcomings. But evidence is accumulating that conspiracy theory believers are also linked together in social movements capable of effectively coordinated collective action. We propose that conspiracy theory beliefs evolve over time, as part of a process of increasing disengagement from mainstream groups, and concomitant engagement in a community of like-minded individuals, capable of coordinated collective action. This approach allows portraying extreme conspiracism as attractive not despite its apparent irrationality, but precisely because of it. As such, conspiracy theories could not only be conceived as "beliefs " but also as "social signals " advertising a subversive "counter-elite " posture.

Depuis le printemps 2020, la Suisse fait face a la pandemie du COVID-19. Afin de continuer a limiter la propagation du virus, les recommandations sanitaires emises en 2020 basees sur le respect de la distanciation sociale et des gestes barrieres (i.e. l’hygiene des mains et le port du masque) ont ete maintenues en 2021, ainsi que certaines mesures exceptionnelles (i.e. fermeture des lieux de loisirs et de culture). La vaccination, disponible depuis le debut d’annee 2021 pour les personnes a risque et dans le courant du printemps 2021 pour tous les adultes, represente actuellement une des principales options pour lutter contre la pandemie a long terme. Dans un precedent numero de cette serie (1) nous avons presente les resultats de la 1ere enquete realisee entre juin et juillet 2020 sur les representations et la comprehension de la population quant au COVID-19. Une seconde mesure a ete realisee en fevrier 2021 afin de voir de quelle maniere les representations et la comprehension du public avaient evolue apres une annee de contexte pandemique. Connaitre cette evolution est importante pour adapter la communication et les politiques publiques dans ce contexte inedit. Ce document presente une comparaison entre les deux editions de l’enquete ainsi que d’autres resultats specifiques a 2021.

Even though conspiracy theories are diverse, they are typically construed as a homogeneous phenomenon. Based on classic theorizations of conspiracy theories by Popper (1945; 2002) and Moscovici (1987), we propose to distinguish between belief in upward conspiracy theories (i.e., targeting relatively powerful groups) and downward conspiracy theories (i.e., targeting relatively powerless groups). The former are theorized as power-challenging beliefs and the latter are theorized as being underpinned by conservative ideology. Across three studies conducted in Belgium (Total N = 2363), we show that these two types of conspiracy beliefs indeed relate differently to power-challenging attitudes (i.e., political extremism, feelings of leadership breakdown) and conservative ideology. Specifically, upward conspiracy beliefs were characterized by a U-shaped relationship with political orientation (i.e., an “extremism” bias), and a strong relationship with feelings of leadership breakdown. By contrast, downward conspiracy beliefs were strongly associated with conservative ideology. Both types of conspiracy beliefs were, however, positively correlated. ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g. religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede’s model of cultural values, three nation-level analyses of data from 25, 19 and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5,323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between Masculinity, Collectivism and CT beliefs. A cross-sectional study among US citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual-level measures of Hofstede’s values, replicated these findings. A meta-analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, Collectivism, r = .31, 95%CI = [.15; .47] and Masculinity, , r = .39, 95%CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual-differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

En decembre en 2019, le premier cas de COVID-19 est detecte en Chine. Le nombre de cas augmentant rapidement sur le plan international, l’OMS donne a la COVID-19 le statut de pandemie en mars 2020 et le Conseil Federal Suisse instaure un semi-confinement des le 13 mars 2020. Des lors, les services de sante suisses ont ete contraints de se reorganiser et d’augmenter leur capacite pour prendre en charge les patient·e·s COVID-19. En parallele, le gouvernement a emis des recommandations afin de proteger les personnes vulnerables et d’eviter la surcharge des hopitaux. Ces recommandations sont basees sur le respect de regles de distanciation sociale et de gestes barrieres (p.ex. : l’hygiene des mains et le port du masque), et ont ete accompagnees de mesures exceptionnelles telles que la fermeture ponctuelle des restaurants, des commerces, des espaces culturels et sportifs, la generalisation du teletravail, etc. L’adhesion de la population a ces mesures, qui ont pu etre parfois contraignantes, depend des representations et de la comprehension qu’elle a de la maladie : quelles sont ses origines, son mode de propagation, les strategies efficaces pour s’en proteger, les enjeux sanitaires, etc. Connaitre ces representations et la facon dont la population apprehende la maladie et ses enjeux est des lors crucial pour adapter la communication et les politiques publiques et, ainsi, lutter efficacement contre la propagation du virus. Dans ce but, nous avons realise une etude par questionnaire aupres d’un echantillon de la population adulte de trois cantons suisses : Geneve, Vaud et Fribourg. Nous presentons, dans ce document, les principaux resultats en fonction de l’âge et du genre des repondant·e·s.

One of the most widespread and long-running conspiracy theories is about an alleged Jewish plot to undermine Christianity and dominate the world. The longevity, spread and impact of the Jewish conspiracy theory is breathtaking. The Jewish conspiracy theory illustrates an extreme point on three fundamental dimensions along which conspiracy theories can vary, namely stick, spread and action. Stickiness refers to the potential of a representation for belief. The chapter describes the process of transmission itself, before reviewing research on situational factors and features of conspiracy theory content that affect transmission. It aims to define transmission as the process of communicating about a conspiracy theory with other people. Conspiracy theories can also be broadcast via mass media or social media as when people debate the plausibility of conspiracy theories in online forums. Conspiracy theories are spread in two main communicative genres: storytelling and argumentation.