This study investigated empirically one of the controversial subjects in modern finance, in that there is an optimal level of capital structure for KOSPI-listed firms in the Korean capital market. Given the major theories on the capital structure, such as Myers' pecking order, trade-off, and agency cost ones, this study applied an analysis of covariance models in parametric and non-parametric statistical methods. In particular, two covariates to control for the possible effects of trade-off and agency cost, were employed separately in each corresponding model, while the other proxy for pecking order rationale was adopted in previous research [1] to conduct inter- and intra-industry analyses. Based on the outcomes obtained from the study, it was demonstrated empirically that there are optimal capital structures for firms in the sample industries at the inter-industry level, whereas statistical differences indicating non-existence of an optimal point, were revealed within the industry. Accordingly, these findings suggest a new vision to potential investors that firms in the domestic market may have financial opportunities to increase their value by gradually adjusting the leverage ratios in terms of the intra-industry perspective.

We investigate the real effects of decisions to undertake an initial public offering of stock in periods of favorable investor sentiment. Specifically, we examine potential effects of favorable investor sentiment on investment expenditures and how effects on investment affect firm operating performance and value as well as the likelihood of survival. We find that firms going public during periods of favorable sentiment, on average, spend substantially more on investments, especially acquisitions, than firms going public in other periods. The effect of favorable investor sentiment on investment is more pronounced for younger firms. We do not find, however, that the higher investment spending in the wake of favorable sentiment leads to worse operating or stock performance. Stock returns around acquisitions announcements are also positive for firms going public in favorable sentiment periods. The preponderance of our findings indicate that decisions to go public in favorable investor sentiment periods do not lead to corporate investment decisions that harm firm performance and value.

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We investigate the financial and real implications of corporate cash holdings over different capital market conditions in the period 1972-2008. A recent theoretical work implies that the value of corporate liquidity varies with the supply of external capital and should be higher during market-wide liquidity shocks. We find that for an average firm a marginal dollar in cash holdings has the same value in high and low liquidity periods. However, the additional dollar of cash is more valuable for research-intensive firms, which are more likely to be shut out of capital markets during financial crises. We also study the real implications of cash holdings across the market-wide liquidity cycle. Our goal is to study whether and how cash reserves affect a firm‟s performance and investment relative to its industry rivals in regular and adverse market conditions. Our results indicate that having more cash relative to industry rivals allows a firm to achieve a higher rate of sales growth and spend more on capital and inventory expenditures. However, we do not find that larger cash reserves relative to industry rivals lead to more investment and better performance when capital market liquidity is low. Overall, we conclude that in a market downturn large holdings of cash do not give a firm a strategic advantage over its industry rivals.

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Conservative financial policies are often criticized as serving the interests of managers rather than the interests of stockholders. We test this argument by examining the operating performance and other characteristics of firms that for a five-year period held more than one-fourth of their assets in cash and cash equivalents. Following the five-year period, operating performance of high cash firms is comparable to or greater than the performance of firms matched by size and industry or by a measure of proclivity to hold substantial cash. In addition, proxies for managerial incentive problems, such as ownership and board characteristics, are not unusual and do not explain differences in operating performance among high cash firms. We find that high cash holdings are accompanied by greater investment, particularly R&D expenditures, and by greater growth in assets. For firms that persistently hold large cash reserves, we conclude that such policies support investment without hindering corporate performance.

We examine companies that issue tracking stock or undertake a minority carve-out. These restructurings create equity claims on a business unit yet the parent retains control. Although the average announcement stock price effect is approximately 3%, our evidence implies that these equity restructurings do not lead to an improvement in operating performance. We conclude that corporate restructuring without a change in control of assets does not enhance operating performance. Like other research, our tests are unable to identify the reasons for the positive stock price effects of tracking stock and minority carve-out arrangements.

We compare top management turnover in unacquired U.S. industrial companies during an active takeover market (1984–1988) and a less active takeover market (1989–1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance (measured by operating income scaled by assets). 33% experience complete turnover of the president, CEO, and board chair during the active takeover period and only 17% experience complete turnover during the less active period. Controlling for various determinants of management turnover, we provide evidence that turnover and performance are related only in the active takeover period, and conclude that takeover activity affects the intensity of managerial discipline.

Going public typically leads to a separation of managerial control and stock ownership, and potentially worsens managerial incentives. We document that the median ownership stake of officers and directors declines significantly from the year before going public to ten years later. Median operating return on assets also declines from the year before the offering to the end of the first year of public trading, but performance declines no further in ten years. In general, operating performance both within one year of the offering and during the first ten years of public trading is unrelated to ownership of officers and directors.

Managers typically increase their voting power following the creation of two classes of common stock and the adoption of an employee stock ownership plan. These changes can worsen managers' incentives and lead to a decline in performance. Alternatively, two classes of stock and ESOPs can allow managers to adopt value-maximizing policies that would not be possible in the face of takeover pressure. We find that these events are followed by below normal operating income. However, we find no reliable evidence that the increase in managers' voting power and the resulting divergence between managers' voting power and ownership of equity claims is related to subsequent operating performance.

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.

We examine whether the actions of the blockholder and repurchasing managers in targeted repurchases of common stock benefit the repurchasing firm's stockholders. Positive stock returns from the time of the initial investment through the repurchase indicate that blockholders' actions benefit stockholders. We argue that the negative stock price reaction to a repurchase does not resolve whether the decision to repurchase helps or harms stockholders. That determination depends on the alternatives forgone by the repurchasing managers. A low incidence of reported takeover events before and after block repurchases suggests that repurchases typically are not undertaken in place of a takeover of the firm.

AbstractWe document the premiums over market price paid in negotiated third‐party purchases and negotiated repurchases of blocks of common stock. The blocks range from 1.5% to 44% of outstanding shares and the average premium is approximately 10%. There is no significant difference between the premiums paid by managers in block repurchases and the premiums paid by outsiders in block purchases. Repurchasing managers pay a premium that corresponds to the market value of control associated with the block.

We document managers' vote holdings in a large random sample of industrial firms, and test whether the degree of managerial control of shares affects how often a firm is the target of control events. The likelihood of successful acquisitions of firms is unrelated to managers' holdings. But this insignificant relation reflects two opposing effects. Lower managerial control is associated with a higher probability that a firm will receive a takeover offer, but a lower probability that a takeover attempt will lead to a change in control.

We examine the stock price behavior associated with public offerings of common stock and convertible debt that are withdrawn by the issuing firm, as well as the stock price behavior associated with completed offerings. We find that stock returns are negative in the period from the announcement to the withdrawal, and are statistically insignificant from the announcement to the issuance. Stock returns are positive at the withdrawal and negative at the issuance. Furthermore, the average stock returns associated with withdrawals are significantly different from zero only when the reported reason for the withdrawals is unfavorable market conditions. Our evidence suggests that managers' decisions to withdraw equity offerings depend on recent stock price behavior, and that managers' decisions convey information about firm value to market participants.

This study examines the stock price effects of security offerings and investigates the nature of information inferred by investors from offering announcements. Changes in share price are unrelated to characteristics of offerings such as the net amount of new financing, relative offering size, and the quality rating of debt issues. The type of security is the only significant determinant of the price response. The opposite patterns of abnormal stock returns following the announcement of completed versus cancelled offerings suggest that managers issue common stock or convertible debt when in managers' view shares are overpriced.

This study does not support the view that a large number of shares can be sold at the prevailing market price and at a small cost. A significant stock price decrease is observed at the initial announcement of secondary distributions. The price declines are greater for offerings by officers and directors and for larger offerings, but are significant for all types of sellers and for large and small offerings. There is no significant price decline at the offering when secondaries are announced in advance. Underwriting and other selling costs are substantial and are positively related to relative offering size.