国家监管宏观政策的调整影响着企业微观的现金股利分配行为,而公司的控股股东会依据外部制度环境的变化制定符合本企业发展的股利政策.分析中国系列半强制分红监管政策出台后所引发的控股股东、股权结构、成长性与现金股利分配行为之间的选择效应.研究结果表明:中国上市公司的股利政策更遵从自由现金流量假说,而不是"掏空"假说;国家股利监管政策的制定受企业控股股东和股权结构的制约而对现金股利分配金额产生弱化效应;能够促使股权结构、企业成长性与现金股利分配稳定性之间产生强化效应;这种强化效应源于监管政策的出台,激励了具有高成长性的企业稳健分配现金股利的行为以提升企业的价值.研究为监管部门进一步梳理和完善中国上市公司的分红机制提供了理论依据和经验证明.

This paper starts with the observation of market reaction after the policy of Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies is enacted in 2006 to test the effect of dividend regulatory policy on the dividend policy of listed companies in China by use of One-Way ANOVA and difference-in-difference method.The results show that, total cash dividend level after 2006 did not improve, and there are no significant policy effects;a further exploration to listed companies with a stake in the refinancing based on DID model shows that, the dividend per share has a tendency to reduce.This policy did not have a clear incentive effect on distributing cash dividends of listed companies, and produce expected results.

This paper analyzes corporate governance of main board companies in Shenzhen according to their disclosures in 2009 annual reports. Statistical analysis is conducted for the fulfillment of duties by audit committee and independent directors, and the establishment and implementation of the accountability system for fundamental mistakes in annual disclosure and management system for external information users.