The College of Europe (French: Collège d'Europe) is a postgraduate institute of European studies with its main campus in Bruges, Belgium, and a smaller campus in Warsaw, Poland. The College of Europe in Bruges was founded in 1949 by leading historical European figures and founding fathers of the European Union, including Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak and Alcide De Gasperi as one of the results of the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague to promote "a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding between all the nations of Western Europe and to provide elite training to individuals who will uphold these values" and "to train an elite of young executives for Europe". The founders imagined the college as a place where Europe's future leaders could live and study together. It has the status of "Institution of Public Interest", operating according to Belgian law. The second campus in Natolin (Warsaw), Poland was opened in 1992. The College of Europe is historically linked to the establishment of the European Union and its predecessors, and to the creation of the European Movement International, of which the college is a supporting member. Federica Mogherini, former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was appointed as the Rector to start in September 2020; former President of the European Council Herman, Count Van Rompuy is chairman of the board.The College of Europe is bilingual, and students must be proficient in English and French. Students receive an advanced master's degree (formerly called Diploma and Certificat) following a one-year programme. Students specialise in either European Political and Administrative Studies, EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, European Law, European Economic Studies, or European Interdisciplinary Studies (at the Natolin campus). For much of its history, the college only admitted a few students, although the number has increased since the 1990s.According to The Times, the "College of Europe, in the medieval Belgian city of Bruges, is to the European political elite what the Harvard Business School is to American corporate life. It is a hothouse where the ambitious and talented go to make contacts". The Economist describes it as "an elite finishing school for aspiring Eurocrats". The Financial Times writes that "the elite College of Europe in Bruges" is "an institution geared to producing crop after crop of graduates with a lifelong enthusiasm for EU integration". Former European Commissioner for Education Ján Figeľ described the college as "one of the most emblematic centres of European studies in the European Union". The BBC has referred to it as "the EU's very own Oxbridge". The college has also been described as "the leading place to study European affairs" and as "the elite training center for the European Union's political class". RFE/RL has referred to the college as "a Euro-federalist hot-spot". The Global Mail has described its students as "Europe's leaders-in-waiting". The well-connected graduates of the college are sometimes referred to as the "Bruges mafia;" Schnabel and Rocca note that "many of the most successful Commission staff members are also graduates of the elite College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, which offers a one-year master's course in European studies, and whose graduates are said to form a 'Bruges Mafia.'"Each academic year is named after a patron and referred to as a promotion. The academic year is opened by a leading European politician. The College of Europe shares several traditions with the École nationale d'administration (ENA) of France, but has a more European focus. Its alumni include the former Prime Minister of Denmark Helle Thorning-Schmidt, the former Prime Minister of Finland Alexander Stubb, the former British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy Enzo Moavero Milanesi, several of whom have also been professors at the college. Many of its alumni go on to serve as diplomats and senior civil servants in European institutions.
This article examines the European Union's (EU) shift from a cooperative and non-binding model to a sanctions-based enforcement mechanism for Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). Since 2011, all EU FTAs have included TSD chapters, traditionally enforced through non-binding panel recommendations and without recourse to sanctions, based on the assumption that reputational pressure and civil society oversight ensure compliance. NGOs, the European Parliament, and the EU Member States have criticized this 'cooperative approach', citing limited compliance incentives. The European Commission's 2022 Trade Policy Action Plan introduced a 'hard approach' that underpins the enforcement of TSD Chapters with sanctions as a last resort. This policy shaped the EU-New Zealand FTA (in force since May 2024), which subjects certain TSD commitments to the general dispute settlement mechanism of the FTAs. This comprises binding rulings, compliance review, and, in cases of recurrent non-compliance, trade retaliation or financial compensation. The article argues that sanctions can strengthen the effectiveness of TSD chapters and mitigate legal uncertainty, especially in the aftermath of Opinion 2/15. It criticizes the cooperative approach, using as case study the EU-Korea Labour Commitments dispute, which is the only TSD case to date under an EU FTA. This article also draws a parallel between the EU-New Zealand FTA and the WTO's sanctions regime, which has yielded over the past decades a high compliance record.
This paper argues that despite recent scholarly accounts arguing the contrary, an asymmetry between 'the market' and 'the social' continues to exist in the EU legal order. This asymmetry manifests itself, in particular, in the case law, which-more as the rule than as the exception-underprotects the values of the European Social Model and overvalues economic freedom. A new frontier of negative economic integration is being crossed in the interpretation of Article 16 EUCFR (the freedom to conduct a business), while social fundamental rights are overlooked and misunderstood. Furthermore, despite the (politically driven) post-Brexit renaissance of Social Europe over the past decade, the constitutional scope of positive social integration through European-level collective bargaining (cf. EPSU) and legislation (cf. EU Minimum Wages) has been constrained. This paper argues that the resulting imbalance is contrary to the identity of the EU legal order as laid down in the Treaties and the Charter, which reflects an attachment to 'social democracy', and that it is for the Court to correct, as it is largely of its own making.
Within the intricate tapestry of global geopolitics, small states occupy a distinctive and nuanced position, encountering a myriad of unique challenges and opportunities. This article critically explores Armenia’s complex engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through the lens of small state theory, accentuating the geopolitical consequences arising from potential border openings following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Integrating small-state theory, the analysis fills a scholarly gap, providing nuanced insights into how Armenia’s foreign policy influences its BRI integration. Despite a decade since the launch of the Initiative, Armenia is not included in any BRI corridors and struggles to attract significant Chinese infrastructure investments compared to its neighbouring countries. The article concludes that Armenia’s cautious approach, prioritising security over immediate economic gains, exemplifies the delicate equilibrium small states navigate in the pursuit of global initiatives. In other words, Armenia, as a small state, seeks to align its interests with China’s mega-initiative while grappling with limitations on its participation.
This article examines the growing divergence in transatlantic climate policies between the European Union and the United States, analysing its structural, political, and economic drivers as well as its broader implications. While the EU has pursued an increasingly regulatory and normative approach - centered on binding emissions targets, carbon pricing, and sustainability standards - the United States has adopted a more fragmented and incentive-based strategy, shaped by domestic political constraints and sub-federal governance. This paper argues that this divergence has widened in recent years due to differing institutional capacities, economic priorities, competitiveness concerns, and perceptions of climate urgency. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the Inflation Reduction Act, carbon border adjustment mechanisms, and industrial policy instruments on transatlantic relations. The analysis demonstrates that, despite periods of renewed political engagement by the US in climate action, policy misalignment risks undermining cooperation, distorting trade, and weakening collective climate ambition. At the same time, the article identifies areas of partial convergence, starting with theoretical concepts, the objectives of climate negotiations, and approached to third-countries' climate efforts. The article concludes that the transatlantic climate rift could lead to a complete rupture and therefore requires a pragmatic approach to the EU's climate ambitions and strategic patience regarding future US re-engagement within an evolving geopolitical context.
While Article 2 TEU lists six concepts as 'values' on which the European Union is founded, a look at other EU normative instruments and policy-oriented documents reveals inconsistency as to which abstractions should be conceived as 'values', as distinct from p'rinci-ples' and 'objectives'. This inconsistency does not prevent the Union from defending the three core values of liberal democracy. Yet, the fluctuation in terminology does not bode particularly well for a concerted approach to the defence of Union values. Looking at the various remedies and mechanisms that the Union may be able to marshal with a view to defending its core values, some involve actions before the CJEU, while others are of a more political nature, and none of which are free from their own challenges. These challenges become all the more pressing in the current climate, which implies an increasing hostility towards liberal democracy and a move towards extremist ideologies. These developments would require a firm resolve to meet the challenges both internally and externally. Yet, the EU is not particularly potent in taking forceful and swift action in a political environment where the Unions' traditional 'soft power' is simply not good enough. Solving the present conundrum would require a significant overhaul of the constitutional system by creating a much more federal structure. That, again, seems like a pipe dream. Therefore, this contribution argues that it is national political developments in Member States, rather than legal norms, that will determine the future of European integration.
