This article examines the phenomenon of constitutionalization in regional integration entities, arguing that the adoption of constitutional-like frameworks is a pivotal process for ensuring their sustainable development and effective operation. Through a comparative analysis of the European Union (EU), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the author conceptualizes constitutionalization not in its classical state-centered sense, but in the much broader sense as a spectrum of legal institutionalization and consolidation. This spectrum ranges from the supranational model, characterized by a hierarchical legal order and primacy of common law (EU), to the intergovernmental model, based on strict sovereignty preservation and consensus (ASEAN). The EAEU occupies a hybrid middle ground, strategically balancing economic integration with strong safeguards for national sovereignty. The paper concludes that constitutionalization, understood in this broad, non-traditional sense, is not a uniform process but must be adapted to each region’s unique political, historical, and economic context. It offers insights into how regional integration entities can selectively adopt advanced legal and institutional tools—such as dispute resolution mechanisms, qualified majority voting, and legal harmonization—to enhance functional efficacy and resilience, thereby contributing to their long-term sustainability and effective governance.
Since mid-1990s Russia had been Armenia’s ‘strategic ally’, although Yerevan was inclined to a foreign policy coined as ‘complementarity’. Meanwhile, Armenia backtracked from the Association Agreement (AA)/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU in September 2013 in favour of joining the Customs Union (CU)/Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); such a shift was justified by membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and entailed switching to a policy of ‘supplementarity’. Forging the relations with the EU through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2021, Yerevan’s relations with Moscow deteriorated after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war stopped through the Russian mediation. After Azerbaijan’s subsequent attack on Armenia proper in 2021 followed by the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in 2023 the Armenian government resorted to cumbersome tactical ‘hedging’. Whereas the concept of ‘hedging’ has been widely applied to small and middle powers, ontologically, this article will undertake the task of explaining the puzzle of Armenia’s foreign policy ‘twists’ focusing on the empirical developments as of 2018. Epistemologically, it will be inductive. Methodologically, it will employ process-tracing relying on primary (official discourse, visits, data, figures) and secondary sources to demonstrate the transition from the strategy of ‘bandwagoning’ to cumbersome tactical ‘hedging’. It is inferred that the latter is fraught with risks for Armenia given the persistent great-power competition between the U.S. and Russia, the stakes of middle powers Turkey and Iran in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, which have inflated the previously manageable in-betweenness/ entre-deux into unwieldy in-amongness/ entre-plusieurs.
This article examines how Kazakhstan strategically navigates the complex and evolving landscape of EU-China connectivity, with a specific focus on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Gateway (GG). Drawing on the theoretical framework of geoeconomic hedging, the paper argues that Kazakhstan’s strategic adaptability enables it to maximise national benefits while mitigating risks associated with an increasingly competitive Eurasian environment. Through a detailed empirical analysis, the paper identifies key infrastructure projects and investments from both the BRI and the GG that converge on Kazakh territory. It demonstrates that Kazakhstan actively leverages its geographical position and its multi-vector foreign policy to engage with both initiatives. Ultimately, it concludes that Kazakhstan effectively mediates and facilitates EU-China connectivity, serving as a critical interregional connector. This unique role allows Kazakhstan to convene the interests of Beijing and Brussels, offering a compelling case study for the future of Eurasian trade and transport architecture.
This paper examines how the energy transition may reproduce a “green resource curse” and how Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan attempt to escape it. While debates emphasize upstream ESG compliance or downstream clean-tech deployment, this paper argues the decisive arena is the midstream—smelting, refining, and separation—where value addition, quality, and supply security are set. Because midstream capacity is more concentrated than mining, mineral flows converge on bottlenecks, heightening geopolitical vulnerability and leaving resource-rich states to bear extraction costs while exporting low-value ores. Building on resource-curse political economy, the paper conceptualizes the green resource curse as a midstream capability gap that drives trade deficits, weak diversification, and new dependency under decarbonization. It then compares Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s strategies to climb the value chain through beneficiation, state-led coordination, and external partnerships. Kazakhstan’s rare earth push highlights the technical difficulty of high-purity separation, the temptation of rapid Chinese capital-technology integration, and market-access risks as U.S./EU rules of origin and sustainability standards tighten. Uzbekistan’s approach centers on institutional consolidation (UzTMK), a large investment pipeline, cleaner processing initiatives, and attempts to create domestic demand through EV and battery projects. The paper identifies four conditions for avoiding a green resource curse: (1) internalizing midstream know-how, (2) reducing processing carbon intensity to meet emerging trade regimes, (3) diversifying partners to preserve flexibility, and (4) long-term institutional learning and workforce development. It concludes that Central Asia’s outcomes will depend less on resource abundance than on converting strategy into midstream sovereignty.
This article examines processes of national identity transformation in the context of long-established but evolving migration networks between Armenia and Southern Russia and how these processes may be integrated into national policy frameworks relating to social cohesion. The largest Armenian diaspora in southern Russia, numbering around half a million people as of 2022 (620,000 people), a significant part of whom were transnational labor migrants. Existing literature has examined changes in relevant identity narratives using qualitative methods. In contrast this article employs a novel procedure, combining social constructionist, transnational and network approaches with applied statistics methods. Drawing on international comparative sociological research conducted in Armenia and Southern Russia in 2021–2022, the paper traces the history and structure of these migration networks, as well as the new forms of national identity emerging within them. The project identified at least three varieties of networks that influence different understandings and lived experiences of national identity. The first relates to the old Armenian diaspora, formed in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, the second to communities formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the third to contemporary transnational communities, consisting mainly of labor migrants. The article also discusses the potential implications of these findings to policies of social cohesion in Armenia and Russia.
Kazakhstan’s educational expansion and increased mobility have created opportunities for internal migrants, and the nation’s largest city Almaty has attracted diverse populations seeking advancement through education and employment. But significant disparities persist between rural and urban-origin migrants, raising questions about the equalizing effects of internal migration and higher education. Therefore, we examined intergenerational educational and class mobility patterns among 455 first-generation migrants to Almaty, analyzing how regional origin shapes socioeconomic trajectories. Using frameworks of cumulative (dis)advantage and direct effects of social origin, our study revealed complex mobility patterns: while rural migrants showed stronger intergenerational mobility in education and class, they faced persistent structural disadvantages. Higher education, though generally beneficial, yielded reduced returns for rural-origin individuals, who more frequently entered lower-status occupations despite comparable qualifications. Rural origin’s direct impact was limited when controlling for education and parental class, yet disadvantages persisted through other mechanisms. These findings challenge Almaty’s status as an “escalator region” and show that education does not equalize opportunities, as origin-based inequalities still determine life outcomes despite mobility gains. Results indicate the need to address educational gaps, labor stratification, and social capital’s role in inequality.
Despite Azerbaijan’s full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, the South Caucasus remains a region marked by persistent tensions and conflict. A new arms race has emerged between Armenia and Azerbaijan, one that includes actors previously uninvolved in the region’s military dynamics. Historically, Russia has served as a major arms supplier to Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, due to its ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia’s influence and capacity as a key arms provider in the South Caucasus have diminished. Consequently, both Yerevan and Baku have sought alternative sources to meet their defence needs. Armenia has significantly expanded its arms purchases from India and France. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to procure weapons from traditional suppliers such as Türkiye and Israel, but it has also diversified its sources to include the Czech Republic, Italy, and Pakistan. This shift raises several critical questions: What factors are driving this new arms race? In what direction is the militarisation of the South Caucasus evolving? What are the strategic motivations and objectives of the arms buyers and sellers in this emerging dynamic? Furthermore, how might the capabilities of these newly acquired weapons influence the balance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia? Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the authors argue that these developments are likely to push the South Caucasus toward renewed conflict. By examining these trends and their potential consequences, this article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the region’s evolving security landscape.
This study offers a comparative analysis of the opportunities and threats posed by China’s and India’s major economic initiatives—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the TAPI Transit-Economic Project, and the North–South Transport Corridor (NSTC)—for Central Asian countries. Using qualitative thematic analysis based on a thematic matrix framework and document-based indirect observation, data were collected through purposive sampling of academic and policy sources, and thematic coding was employed to extract and categorize significant patterns of strategic impact across the three initiatives. Findings reveal that both China’s and India’s projects present significant opportunities for Central Asia, including expanded connectivity, enhanced transit potential, increased foreign investment, and strengthened multilateral engagement. At the same time, distinct threats also emerged: China’s BRI risks generating asymmetric dependence, regional imbalances, and intensified competition with Russia, while India’s projects may exacerbate geopolitical fragmentation, limit inclusivity, and increase alignment with Western strategic agendas. The analysis further shows that Central Asian states actively leverage the emerging multipolar environment through multi-vector strategies: Kazakhstan combines BRI-backed rail and port investments with participation in the NSTC to consolidate its role as a Eurasian transit hub; Turkmenistan simultaneously commits gas supplies to TAPI while courting Chinese financing and markets through BRI-linked energy corridors; and Uzbekistan engages with both Chinese and Indian connectivity frameworks—alongside Russian arrangements—to diversify export routes and bargaining partners. In this context, the evolution toward a multipolar economic order provides Central Asian governments with greater leverage to balance external actors while asserting their regional agency. The reliability and credibility of the findings were ensured through expert auditing and focus group validation. This research contributes to the broader understanding of Eurasian geoeconomic competition and offers strategic insights for regional policymakers navigating overlapping development initiatives.
This article explores the mechanisms and actors of internet censorship in Kazakhstan, situating the case within broader frameworks of digital authoritarianism. Drawing on qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews with 17 informants and thematic analysis, the study uncovers a deeply institutionalised and multifaceted censorship regime. Kazakhstani authorities employ a dual strategy encompassing digital tools, such as website blocking, internet shutdowns, throttling, and bot-driven manipulation, and administrative resources, including state procurement, journalist accreditation restrictions, informal directives, and direct interventions. The censorship system is coordinated by a hierarchical network of state actors, led by the Administration of the President of Kazakhstan and implemented through the Ministry of Culture and Information. The findings highlight how, rather than fostering political participation or free expression, the internet in Kazakhstan operates as a tightly regulated space that serves authoritarian governance objectives. This research contributes to the understanding of contemporary digital authoritarianism, providing insights into the evolving nature of state power and information control in authoritarian contexts.
The idea of world majority, floated by Russian experts after 2022, seeks to simultaneously offer a foreign policy direction for the country while also building a meta-category to define the non-western world. As an emerging concept, this article seeks to be one of the first systematic approaches towards understanding what the world majority stands for and how it reflects Russian foreign policy thinking, through engagement with the political and expert discourse. It argues that while the concept would be a useful tool for Russian foreign policy, it offers a weak proposition for a broader application beyond its borders. The article also argues that the characteristics of the world majority are a near perfect replication of the already established ideas of the global south, thus failing to offer a new interpretation of the international system to the non-western world. Having established their similarities, the article uses the challenges faced by the global south to predict the faultlines that can be expected to hinder the real world implementation of the world majority. It also highlights just how difficult delivering a common agenda through such meta-categories is, bringing into question the true value of these concepts.
Russia’s strategic engagement with the Afghan Taliban following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 exemplifies a calculated realist approach to post-hegemonic regional statecraft. This study argues that Moscow’s policy towards Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, marked by conditional cooperation until July 2025 when it officially recognized the Taliban’s government, was driven by defensive security imperatives, offensive power-balancing against Western and Chinese influence, and a neoclassical realist adaptation to systemic constraints. Through qualitative analysis of primary sources, multilateral forums (Moscow Format, SCO), and elite rhetoric, the paper demonstrates how Russia leverages the Taliban as a transactional partner to contain ISIS-K, stabilize Central Asia’s security architecture, and assert diplomatic centrality, while avoiding the pitfalls of overcommitment. Key findings reveal a tripartite strategy: (1) security pragmatism (intelligence-sharing, border stabilization), (2) institutional hedging (CSTO deterrence alongside bilateral Taliban engagement), and (3) economic minimalism (targeted aid sans reconstruction investments). The research challenges binary interpretations of recognition/non-recognition, proposing instead a model of “de facto alignment without de jure endorsement”—a tactic that preserves Russia’s autonomy amid Afghanistan’s volatility. The study further highlights how Moscow’s historical trauma from the Soviet-Afghan War informs its restraint, distinguishing its approach from U.S. nation-building or China’s Belt and Road expansionism. Conclusions posit that Russia’s strategy reflects a broader middle-power playbook for navigating multipolarity: exploiting power vacuums through fluid alliances while mitigating reputational and resource costs. The implications extend beyond Afghanistan, offering insights into 21st-century realist diplomacy in contested regions, where non-ideological transactionalism increasingly supplants liberal institutionalism.
This paper aims to enhance the understanding of how the Russian imperial project has been sustained from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present, by examining its institutional and discursive attributes and their interplay. We argue that the 1990s witnessed a marked weakening of imperial patterns in both institutional structures and official discourse, even as significant segments of Russian society were permeated by grassroots post-imperial resentment. This resentment was strategically mobilized by Vladimir Putin upon assuming power in 2000, as he initiated a consistent restoration of imperial institutions both domestically and abroad, alongside a revival of imperial civilizational discourse. Later, the “Crimean Consensus” of 2014 marked a pivotal moment, synchronizing the development of imperial institutions with both official and popular imperial discourse. However, the 2022 war against Ukraine has introduced a new phase, characterized by the strengthening of imperial discourse while the institutional dimension has either stagnated domestically or been frozen externally in the post-Soviet space. This divergence—a reinforcement of imperial discourse alongside institutional stagnation—may serve as one of the explanations for Russia’s further political dynamics.
Over the past two decades, Russia and China have maintained an operational partnership, often characterized as an “axis of convenience,” centered on promoting a non-Western regional order in Central Asia (CA). However, recent developments, including United States (US) withdrawal and China’s expanding regional posture, have accelerated shifts in this dynamic. Adopting a bottom-up approach grounded in empirical evidence, this study examines China’s increasing engagement with Central Asian states through the lens of Power Transition Theory (PTT). The paper argues that China’s incremental rise in CA is reshaping the dynamics of Sino-Russian relations in the region, challenging Moscow’s traditional monopoly across multiple domains. The findings suggest a narrowing asymmetry between Moscow and Beijing, with China emerging as a credible challenger to the status quo and increasingly attracting regional states to align with Chinese-led regional initiatives.
The article aims to address the historical knowledge gap concerning Russia’s ideological shifts in economic management. Previous research has often focused on isolated periods, overlooking the continuous transformation driven by internal crises and international pressures. Our study adopts a comprehensive perspective to trace these ideological transitions and their long-term impacts. Each phase reveals how the USSR/Russia adapted policies to mitigate economic stagnation and address shifting geopolitical realities. The qualitative historical and phenomenological analysis has been applied to generate arguments based on primary and secondary sources. The findings suggest that ideological rigidity – manifesting in both Marxist and neoliberal forms – contributed to economic stagnation, while episodes of pragmatic flexibility facilitated stability and recovery. This historical trajectory underscores the necessity of adaptability in economic governance. Russia’s experience reveals that blending state control with market mechanisms can serve as a strategy for managing complex economic and political environments, offering lessons in balancing ideology with pragmatic policy-making.
The aim of this research is to comprehensively analyze Russia’s military policy in Central Asia from 2000 to February 2022. Additionally, the study tests the hypothesis that the growth of Russia’s material power and the strengthening of its position in the international arena will lead Moscow to seek dominance in the region, including in the military sphere. The author considers the geopolitical position of the Russian Federation at the beginning of the XXI century and after 2013, enabling an analysis of the relationship between Moscow’s position in the international arena and its policies in Central Asia. Special attention is given to analyzing the measures through which Moscow strengthens its influence in the region. The author highlights the following measures used by the Russian Federation: maintaining and strengthening its military infrastructure in the region, increasing arms exports to Central Asian states, increasing the number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, expanding cooperation between the Russian military-industrial complex and counterparts in the countries of the region, creating joint air defense systems with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, providing free education in Russian military institutes for military personnel from Central Asia, and developing CSTO collective forces. The conclusions state that, due to its growing material power and more active foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, Russia has re-emerged as a leading security partner for Central Asian states.
This study examined how skilled and unskilled migration differentially affected formal sector wage structures in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan from 2019 to 2024. Using difference-in-differences analysis with instrumental variables on region-sector-quarter panel data, the research found skilled migration generated wage premiums 2.2 times larger than unskilled migration effects. Instrumental variable estimates revealed skilled migration increased wages by 38.6% while reducing inequality, compared to 16.4% wage increases from unskilled migration. Capital-intensive sectors showed stronger responses than labor-intensive industries, with Kazakhstan exhibiting larger effects than Uzbekistan. Effects operated through productivity channels, capital accumulation, and positive sorting. These findings inform skill-differentiated migration policies in transitional economies.
The purpose of this paper was to comprehensively examine the diplomatic and geopolitical aspects of U.S. policy towards Kazakhstan in order to identify the key factors determining the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Central Asia. The results of the study revealed three key phases in U.S. policy towards Kazakhstan: the nuclear disarmament period (1991–2001), the phase of anti-terrorist cooperation (2001–2014), and the current phase of containing the influence of Russia and China (2014–2024). It is found that energy policy remains the most successful area of American strategy in Kazakhstan, while in the sphere of democracy promotion and military-political cooperation, the results are limited. It is revealed that the C5 + 1 format, initiated by the U.S. in 2015, has become a key tool for strengthening American influence in the region, allowing Washington to coordinate its policies with Central Asian countries without the involvement of Russia and China. The study found that the effectiveness of the U.S. strategy varies depending on the specific area: the U.S. has been most successful in the energy sector, with U.S. investment in Kazakhstan’s economy exceeding $65 billion and trade between the countries reaching a record $4.1 billion in 2023. It was found that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, aimed at maintaining a balance between the interests of the United States, Russia and China, creates additional challenges for the implementation of the U.S. strategy, including support for projects to diversify energy export routes as a counterbalance to Russian and Chinese initiatives.
This article focuses on people’s perceptions of security in three Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Using the data from WVS (wave 7, 2017–2022), we sought to find how being religious is linked to people’s perceived security. First, our OLS model showed that being religious is differently linked to perceived security across the three states. Religious people feel more secure in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and not in Kazakhstan. In addition, the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition shows a statistically significant difference between religious and non-religious citizens in all three states.
