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European wholesale power prices increased to an unprecedented level during the energy crisis in 2022. To tackle the adverse impact on consumers, Spain and Portugal implemented the Iberian Exception (IE) in June 2022, intending to decouple power prices from the rest of Europe to reduce consumer energy bills, via capping the price of gas for power plants. The ‘exception’ was allowed by the European Commission (on behalf of the EU27) because it was deemed to be likely to have a limited pan-European impact on electricity prices. We focus on the direct impact of the policy on gas demand in Spain and in Europe via examination of the bid stack in the Iberian electricity market.We find that the IE did reduce day-ahead power prices and that there were large increases in net exports to France and Morocco resulting in significant, partially offsetting, second round power price rises in Iberia. Gas for power demand increased by 25% from Iberian power plants relative to no IE (and by 3.2% at the whole EU level). IE Induced power exports from Spain account for around one quarter of the increase in gas for power demand in Iberia. We find no evidence that the extra Iberian gas for power directly increased gas prices at the main European gas hub (TTF).
Contracts for Difference (CfDs) drove down renewable electricity costs and are now applied to low-carbon hydrogen. This paper compares UK hydrogen CfDs under the Hydrogen Allocation Rounds (HAR) with renewable electricity CfDs, combining cost-structure, variance-decomposition and demand-scenario analysis. Four asymmetries emerge. First, electricity rather than capital dominates the levelised cost of green hydrogen in central cases. Second, the CfD removes output-price risk but leaves input-price and utilization risk, which dominate residual producer variance. Third, volume support is bounded and conditional, and lapses at zero sales, so it protects least when demand collapses. Fourth, weak demand worsens the ratio of public support to abatement rather than raising per-unit subsidy, and the resulting cost per tonne of CO2 avoided remains well above the UK carbon price across the allocation-round trajectory examined. Hydrogen CfDs can support early market formation, but replicating renewable cost reductions requires complementary instruments sequenced across allocation rounds.
Europe’s gas and electricity markets are deeply intertwined, making the system vulnerable to compound supply and demand shocks—particularly following the loss of Russian pipeline gas. Using a global coupled gas-electricity partial-equilibrium model that incorporates LNG trade, storage behavior, demand-side response, and multiple weather scenarios, we show that Europe can generally maintain physical supply even under severe stress. The principal vulnerability lies not in outright shortages but in sharp, asymmetric price spikes, especially during cold winters or when LNG supply is constrained. LNG import capacity, gas storage, hydropower, and fuel switching in the power sector act as key stabilizers, though network bottlenecks persist in Eastern and Southern Europe. Accelerated renewables deployment materially reduces exposure to gas-linked price volatility, whereas additional Russian LNG has only a marginal impact on prices. These findings point to the importance of system-wide stress testing, targeted infrastructure investment, and reducing gas’s role as the marginal price setter in electricity markets.
If fusion energy is commercialized and deployed by 2040 and then scaled up quickly, it has the potential to significantly mitigate the effects of climate change and meet the growing global energy demand. One of the key factors in the speed of deployment is the licensing and regulatory framework, which can accelerate or impede deployment. Fortunately, this is a factor that can be addressed well in advance, but the time to do so is now. In fact, the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom have realized this and are planning to regulate fusion power plants differently from fission power plants, outside of nuclear law. As is the case in other areas of licensing and regulation, this process will begin with national frameworks and progress through a phase of harmonization, potentially culminating in a global framework. However, if the destination is clear, why take the long way around? This paper argues for starting with a global licensing and regulation framework for fusion energy now. It shows examples from other fields that demonstrate the feasibility of this approach and develops a seven-step plan for such a framework.