In a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Steven Nadler draws attention to the neglected argument of Francois Lamy that Malebranche's doctrine of occasionalism conflicts with his own criticism of Descartes's appeal to a "force of rest " in physics. Nadler claims that this argument is well worth considering insofar as its conclusion seems to be "absolutely correct. " In this discussion note, I offer reasons to doubt that Lamy is in fact correct in charging that there is an internal tension on this point in Malebranche's system. I also briefly consider the significance of Malebranche's critique of Descartes for early modern Cartesian physics.
We provide the first in-depth analysis of Anton Wilhelm Amo 's 1734 intention plays in this work. Specifically, we argue that the "Intentional Principle, " which states that everything that exists (except for God ) is the effect of an intentional action, is key to understanding his account of the operations of human and divine spirits and his account of what exists (and why ). In doing so, we demonstrate that Amo was a systematic thinker who grounded his philosophy in intention. Furthermore, we show that intentions are key to understanding Amo 's views on what the ends of philosophy are and how philosophical inquiry ought to be pursued.
This paper shows how interpreting religious scriptures contributes to applied Kantian ethics. It addresses concerns in recent literature with introducing principles of practical reason in the historical and institutional spheres. Just as the formal principles of the moral law apply under all conditions, the pure religion of reason is critically applicable to diverse historically formed religions. Interpreting traditions through pure moral religion responds to the problem of actualizing principles of practical reason in the world. For Kant, the final purpose in the interpretation of holy books is the moral improvement of human beings and the actualization of the highest good in the world.
This paper explores the metaphysical significance of Leibniz's conception of elasticity and its development during the 1680s. The first part is devoted to the discussion of elasticity as a system property in the Hypothesis physica nova of 1671. A second section shows the transition, in the second half of the 1670s, from such a conception to an understanding of elasticity as a condition for the spontaneity and individuality of bodies. Finally, through an examination of writings from the 1680s about the transmission of sound and the elastic properties of materials, I will reconstruct the underlying metaphysical framework characterizing Leibniz's conception of elastic matter, namely the idea of a "mechanical mirroring " which is proper to individual bodies.
abstract: The discussion of friendship in Eudemian Ethics VII is often taken as evidence that Aristotle relies on dialectic in this treatise. I argue that, although he uses some dialectical resources, these are insufficient for fully developing his account of friendship. His approach has four features: the arguments are philosophical, aiming at the nature and truth of friendship; he appeals to phainomena , including both endoxic and non-endoxic claims; resolving aporiai requires substantive philosophical knowledge; and, guided by epistemic optimism, he seeks to preserve what is true in existing beliefs. This contrasts with dialectical argument, which reasons from endoxic premises without aiming at endoxic conclusions.
Many scholars hold that Albert the Great favors a distinction theory of the soul and its powers. According to this theory, the soul is a substance, while its powers are qualities. In this paper, I challenge this interpretation. I argue that Albert takes the soul itself to be the power to vivify the body. I also show that, for Albert, such powers as sight, which are qualities distinct from the soul, depend on this basic vivifying power. To this end, I expound Albert's claim that the power to vivify is "determined and specified " by such powers as sight.
abstract: This paper introduces readers to a master ’s thesis defended by June Downey to the Philosophy Department of the University of Chicago in 1898. I have two goals. The first and major goal is to show that an unknown and unpublished piece of work from the end of the nineteenth century is, in fact, well worth reading. Downey ’s paper makes useful contributions to the field by foregrounding the importance of activity in Berkeley ’s metaphysics and in making a novel use of his Philosophical Commentaries . Finally, taking on board the usefulness of Downey ’s unknown work adds insights about the project of adding women to accounts of the history of philosophy.
