Abstract: The renewal of religious life called for by the Second Vatican Council in its decree Perfectae Caritatis is meant to be a continuous, constant reality. This article explores the five principles of such renewal drawing from the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. It argues that (1) exemplar causality can illuminate the following of Christ; (2) the ordering of ends to charity can clarify and support the special work and characteristics of religious orders; (3) the Eucharist is the source for religious to share in the life of the Church; (4) Aquinas's understanding of the relation between nature and grace can bolster the ability of religious to judge and act wisely; (5) the virtue of penance is integral to any project of spiritual renewal. This article shows, therefore, the continued vibrance of Thomistic thought for the theology of religious life.
Abstract: With his Summa Aurea ("Golden Summa"), William Auxerre, was a pioneering secular (i.e., non-mendicant) master at the University of Paris in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Though typically eclipsed by a more famous, younger generation of scholastic masters at Paris, including Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, and, of course, Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, William made important, seminal contributions to the emerging mode of scholastic theology, including its scientific character and its systematic presentation. But William also strove to hold on to older theological traditions, which viewed theology as both the pursuit of sapiential insight into the coherence and fittingness of its overarching account of reality and also as having a contemplative, indeed experiential telos. In these ways, William's theology stands as a kind of transition and watershed moment, which merits greater scholarly appreciation.
Abstract: In this essay, I clarify in which cases Aquinas ascribes responsibility to agents for the effects of their human acts. In doing so, I elucidate the nature of the per se and per accidens effects of human acts. I argue that not all per se effects of human acts are intended; nor do they all follow for the most part. Rather, a per se effect of a human act is what follows from the intrinsic teleology of an act when brought to bear upon a certain patient. Furthermore, I argue that Aquinas's attribution of responsibility to some effects of human acts, combined with his views on the non-necessitation of causes, entails that he is committed to resultant moral luck.
Abstract: In his treatment of theological themes, Saint Thomas does not usually provide an in-depth analysis of the metaphysical foundation that they require, rather, he refers back to this foundation by means of metaphysical principles that contain it in a condensed form. Among these, none other is more ubiquitous and relevant than the Aristotelian “principle of the maximum.” Heretofore its role within Aquinas’s corpus—especially in his theology—has not been tackled. In this contribution we demonstrate that the principle functions as a metaphysical hub within this corpus because it contains the four basic components of Thomas’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics of causality. These components enable us to recognize its presence despite its manifold formulation and varying contexts: within an analogous genus the first is the maximum and the cause of all the other members. These components also ensure that the principle of the maximum connects other principles to itself, thus revealing their own metaphysical teaching and enriching them through their association with itself and the other principles. The result is a versatile network capable of engaging all manner of topics and elucidating their metaphysical foundation. Within sacra doctrina , the principle of the maximum and its plexus of principles allows Thomas constantly to base his theological discourse on actuality and guarantees its interconnectedness.
Abstract: How should one rightly understand the role of the Trinity in the act of creation? A neglected commentary of Domingo Bañez (1528–1604) on a key article in the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas suggests a way forward through conflicting scholarly interpretations of various high medieval and early modern theologians. Read against the commentary of Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio: 1469–1534) on this same article, one can grasp an early-modern panorama of responses to this question. Bañez argues, in his reading of Thomas, that each divine person creates (a) indivisibly and inseparably, with the other divine persons, on account of the unity of the divine essence, which is the principle of divine action—and yet each person acts (b) in a distinct manner, for the divine essence, the principle of action, is itself possessed by each divine person under or according to a distinctly relational mode. One must coordinate the “essential” and the “personal” perspectives on divine action in order to get a full view of divine activity. That is to say, on my reading of Bañez, the divine persons act in a distinct, proper, and personal mode that is not reducible to appropriation. And, to clarify further, this distinct mode of acting does not jeopardize their essential unity of action, such that each person acts “in virtue of” (speaking from our perspective) one and the same divine essence.
Abstract: Aquinas argues that the relation established by the act of creation is mixed, with the creature enjoying a real relation ( relatio realis )—possessing both the relational mode of being and its relational notion ( esse et ratio relationis )—while the Creator accommodates only a corresponding relation of reason ( relatio rationis )—possessing the relational notion ( ratio relationis ) without any relational mode of being ( esse relationis ). This position is frequently the source of misunderstanding, for theologians, both natural and revealed, and for ordinary persons of biblical faith. By clarifying Aquinas’s position, I show how such disquiet flows from a twofold interconnected failure: lack of appreciation for Aquinas’s conception of relation as a categorial mode of being; and inadequate consideration of the compelling theological reasons he has for holding such an ostensibly disconcerting position. By way of response, I argue that the position of Aquinas possesses a balanced tension that is necessary to secure the crucial duality of divine transcendence and divine immanence, while concomitantly safeguarding the corresponding radicality of creaturely dependence upon the Creator. Finally, I conclude by noting several existential implications of Aquinas’s position, all of which are centered around the unmediated presence of the Creator to the creature, and the correlative unmediated dependence of the creature upon the Creator.
Abstract: In the Monologion , Anselm of Canterbury asserts that “each and every person is perfectly the supreme essence.” In De incarnatione Verbi , he says things like “God is the Father,” or “God is the Son.” In De processione , his last and most mature work of Trinitarian theology, he says such things even more frequently, and in one passage, he also introduces the phrase, “God is the Holy Spirit.” Before Anselm, Christians did not speak this way. They said things like “The Son is consubstantial with the Father,” but they did not say things like “The Son is the divine essence.” They also said things like “The Father is God, and the Son is God,” but they did not say things like “God is the Father, and God is the Son.” This article will first show that Christians did not use Trinitarian formulas like these before the eleventh century, at least not to any noticeable extent. Then, it will argue that the new Trinitarian formulas that became popular in the twelfth century trace directly to Anselm. Finally, it will discuss the significance of this historical development and offer a provisionary evaluation of its implications for contemporary Trinitarian theology.
Abstract: Ongoing disputes in bioethics and moral theology concerning double effect reasoning (DER) prompt a reevaluation of it—going back to its roots in Thomas Aquinas, who first considers an act with good and bad effects in his justification of killing in self-defense ( Summa theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 7). In my analysis of this article, I will argue that Aquinas’s account contains all the basic elements found in contemporary articulations of DER. However, more recent accounts contain modifications that suggest a departure from natural teleology. I will propose revised criteria for DER that more accurately reflect Aquinas’s appreciation for natural teleology: (1) the act must be naturally ordered to the good effect, but not the bad effect, which is per accidens (the bad effect may foreseeably follow sometimes or in few cases); (2) the good effect must be intended, but the bad effect must be praeter intentionem ; (3) the act must be proportioned to the good effect, such that the chances of the bad effect occurring are not unduly increased; and (4) the act must have priority over a foregone act that would prevent the bad effect.
Abstract: Thomas Aquinas teaches that custom ( consuetudo ) is remarkably powerful: custom can blot out secondary precepts of the natural law, can condition the quality and effectiveness of positive law, and can have the force of law itself. And yet, for all the power admitted to it, custom is remarkably undertheorized by Thomas, pointing to the need for a Thomistic sociological synthesis. Considering the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu as a candidate for such a synthesis, this article identifies promising conceptual “grafting points” in the rootstock of Thomistic moral theory and the branches of Bourdieu’s sociological theory especially by considering Thomas’s account of the goods of recognition harmed by verbal injuries. For Thomas, reviling, detraction, gossip, and derision are verbal injuries that harm a person’s goods of honor, reputation, friendship, and the glory of a good conscience. These goods are socially constituted and in turn constitute social structure in a manner like Bourdieu’s forms of capital. This conceptual similarity is explored to sketch the outlines of a Thomistic sociological synthesis along Bourdieusian lines, arguing that the power of custom can be explained in part by how customary acts of honoring and shaming establish the conditions according to which goods of recognition can be obtained.
Abstract: The thesis of this article is that, in his famous discussion of the natural law in ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, Thomas borrowed the three “inclinations” he mentions there from Cicero’s De officiis 1.4.11-13. I argue that Thomas uses them as a structuring device to catalogue and distinguish different levels or kinds of natural law. This is his version of the lists of the different kinds or levels of ius naturale that were ubiquitous in the works of the canon lawyers in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Reading Thomas’s text in the context of Cicero’s discussion in book 1 of De officiis and in the context of the discussions of ius naturale among the decretists of the twelfth century and theologians of the thirteenth helps us to understand his concern to establish the proper sense of “nature” appropriate to any proper understanding of human natural law. It also helps us understand why it is wrong to try to turn the natural law into a separate moral system apart from consideration of grace, the cardinal and theological virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Abstract: Prime Matter Pluralism (PMP) states that while the prime matter of all terrestrial bodies is the same, there is a unique prime matter for each celestial body. Prime matters are distinct in virtue of being in potentiality to different forms. Steven Baldner argues that although Thomas Aquinas endorsed PMP in Summa theologiae I, he ultimately rejected it in his De caelo commentary and De substantiis separatis . Besides exegetical evidence for this claim, Baldner presents a philosophical objection to PMP: according to PMP, distinct prime matters are restricted in their respective potentialities; such restriction requires form, however; therefore, prime matter is not pure potentiality. Since prime matter is pure potentiality, PMP is false. Pace Baldner, I argue that Aquinas endorsed PMP as heartily in the later works as in STh I. Moreover, he resisted substantially the same objection to PMP as Baldner’s several times. In particular, Aquinas repeatedly rejected the claim that the restriction of prime matter’s potentiality requires form. In that case, when Aquinas calls prime matter “pure potentiality,” he means that it is formless of itself, not that it is in potentiality to any form whatsoever.
Abstract: This article examines the Thomistic conception of equity ( aequitas ) and its implications for contemporary debates on justice, particularly racial justice. While modern discourse often employs equity ambiguously, Thomas Aquinas provides a structured, twofold framework integrating equity not only as the virtue of epieikeia , but within the broader context of distributive justice. Aquinas’s insights emphasize that equitable judgment must account for human rights and historical conditions. Furthermore, discussions of equity require attention to diverse social structures, including but not limited to modern democratic frameworks. Ultimately, Aquinas’s account, grounded in divine wisdom, demonstrates that any appeal to justice or equity presupposes an underlying moral order, offering a foundational perspective for addressing modern concerns of racial justice. Yet, finding equity in contentious racial disputes demands another essential prerequisite: virtue. The virtues and vices Aquinas highlights reveal the moral conditions that enable or thwart the search for genuine equity.
