This article analyzes the concept of digital humanism and asks whether, and in what sense, it can help ensure that digital systems —including algorithms, automated computation, computer-based models, and large-scale data processing—produce not only efficient outcomes but also knowledge that is understandable and explainable. It examines the relation between digital humanism and epistemic values, focusing on explanation as a central requirement of knowledge in digital contexts. Against a narrow conception of explainable AI, the article distinguishes explanation as a technical output from explanation as an epistemic value. On this basis, it develops a conceptual map of explanatory demands in digital contexts and defends a critical form of digital humanism that assesses digital systems not only in terms of predictive success, but also in terms of their capacity to support intelligibility, scrutiny, and revision.
This article examines both the morality of prenatal testing, as well as selective abortion on the basis of the results of that testing. First, it explores the permissibility of prenatal testing. It assesses arguments that suggest that the fallibility or unreliability of the tests renders them moot for making decisions pertaining to life and death. It then examines arguments that suggest that the very nature of prenatal testing is such that it provides impermissible or immoral directive counseling. If we test to ensure something is not wrongwith the fetus, or that everything is normal, it implies that a positive test, or a departure whatfrom is perceivedto be normal, is necessarilynegative. This article suggests that while these arguments are worth taking seriously, ultimately, they do not render the practice of prenatal testing immoral. Second, it examines the practice of selectively aborting a fetus as a result of a potentially disabling condition. While it acknowledges the ever-present ableist assumptions prevalent in society surrounding what constitutes a life worth living, it suggests that the three dominant kinds of arguments opposing selective abortion, fail. First, selective abortion does not constitute a form of eugenics. Second, disability bias is an insufficient justification for denying selective abortion rights. Third, and finally, prospective parents do not assent to raise any child, irrespective of the outcomes of a prenatal test. The article is not a defence of the practice. It makes no judgment as to whether decisions to selectively abort a fetus are sound (indeed, it suggests they most often are not). Instead, it simply argues that selective abortion is not immoral for any of the reasons that have been provided by opponents.
This paper presents a philosophical perspective on disability theorization grounded in the concept of normativity. The integration of phenomenology in Disability Studies, specifically the critique of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ideas, provides the background. A comprehensive analysis of the concept of maximal grip, as examined within the context of Merleau-Ponty's thought, offers significant insights and potential avenues forfurther investigation. The notion of normativitywill be elucidated through an integrated analysis of the perspectives proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. An interpretation of this notion, which aims to provide a framework for investigating the conceptualisation of disability, will reveal the normative dynamics at play in the relationship between subject and world. This concept will therefore be examined in the context of an analysis of the case study of active music therapy, with a particular focus on how this practice approaches the subject with disabilities through the use of musical improvisation. Inconsequence, an analysis of the normativity of musical improvisation will prove beneficial. The core question of this research is whether it is possible to move beyond the conventional dichotomy of what is and is not considered to be a disability. In pursuing the goal of abandoning a reductionist approach to the theoretical definition of disability, my proposal aims to shift the focus from an examination of the content of the definition of disability to an investigation of the structure of the relationship between the subject and the world. In this regard, the concept of normativity offers an alternative to an approach that mayresult in the categorisation of disability into predetermined categories.
The aim of this paper is to address the philosophical significance of Plato's use of the metaphor of blindness, particularly regarding knowledge and cognition. To begin with, I shall summarise key arguments concerning blindness in Disability Studies. It will emerge that blindness is significantly employed to express ignorance or lack of knowledge due to the current ocularcentric prejudice, i.e. the view that sight is the most important sense. After a brief contextualisation of traditional ocularcentrism embedded in ancient Greek culture, I shall turn to analysing some occurrences of the metaphor of blindness from Book VI and VII of Plato's Republic. The study reveals how Plato's use of the metaphor of blindness in Book VI serves to make subtle epistemological points, such as differentiating knowledge from a cognitive state that only happens to be true. In Book VII, focusing on the famous simile of the Cave, the paper shows that Plato deliberately establishes a complex symmetry between metaphorical and literal blindness: to overcome one's lack of knowledge (metaphorical blindness), one needs to be, temporarily and partly, blind to perceptible things (literal blindness). The striking outcome of this view is that, due to Plato's ocularcentric framework, blindness provides him with the argumentative tool that opens the field of enquiry into the nature of knowledge and its objects.
Typically, philosophers ignore disability, treat it as a special case addressed at some point in the distant future, or, worse, view disabled people as nonpersons with nothingworthwhile to contribute to philosophical endeavors. However, philosophers and philosophy have much to learn from disabled people. This article, drawing on data collected with phenomenological methods, utilizes knowledge and insights gleaned from the lives of disabled people to amend Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. This outcome stems from adding corporeal variability, an existential that accounts for differences between and changes over time within bodies. This is an important addition as bodily differences and changes influence other existentials and the process of Being. After describing several existentials constituting Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, the author presents pertinent data from Heidegger's own works, disability scholars, and disabled people's personal narratives that support amending the original theory with corporeal variability.
Cognitively disabled people are pervasively marginalized in theoretical work and social-political life. Although more than fiftyyears of social activism and critical theoretical work has politicized and radically reframed the experience of disability, those effects seem to extend only tenuouslyto cognitively disabled people. Historical practices of dehumanization, and eugenicist conflations of cognitive ability with human value, continue to influence attitudes toward those who are cognitively, intellectually and communicatively atypical. Perceptions of these atypicalities are sufficiently insensitive to individual variation that the assumption of radical difference is global and total, and cognitively disabled people continue to be set apart as specially and naturally different and inferior. In this paper, I sketch a conceptual architecture of dehumanization and its relation to the qualitative and quantitative understandings of cognitive disability, with reference to historical instances. In doing so, I aim to denaturalize cognitive disability so that it can be more fully theorized from a critical disability perspective.
This paper starts from the observation that in aworld of pathologising and ableist autism science, identifying as autistic has meant navigating between the necessity of putting words to lived experience and the risk of self-pathologising through problematic metaphors or frameworks. Following the contributions to feminist epistemology offered by Donna Haraway, I ponder the "science question in autism" and consider what kinds of situated knowledges autistics can claim. To do so, I examine the theory of Monotropism's production, dissemination, and reception. First, I show how the theory of Monotropism constitutes a case of situated knowledge of autism which could reach a higher form of objectivity. Then, I show that its production, dissemination, and reception rely on non-innocent metaphors of nonhuman movement, mostly taken from physics and plant life, starting with the very term "tropism", which tends to liken autistic cognition to the interactions between plants and their environments. Finally, I show how, in the age of a hegemony of reductionist science and of renewed binary debates opposing free will and biological determinism, the theory of Monotropism is sometimes taken up in a form that fuels a self-pathologising of autistic individuals. In turn, I call for greater accountability and reflexivity in the production, dissemination, and reception of autistic situated knowledges.
This article analyses the foundations of disability models by focusing on their theoretical and philosophical bases. By updating classical typologies, it seeks to clarify the underlying principles of disability theories and to better understand the associated intellectual issues. Although the scientific literature traditionally opposes the medical model, which considers disability as an individual pathology, and the social model, which perceives it as a form of social oppression, this division masks a diversity of theoretical currents. The latter are distinguished by their ontological and epistemological anchoring. Between nominalism, realism, materialism and idealism, four positions of study of disability can be identified. By reinterpreting Priestley's typology (1998) in light of contemporary scientific perspectives, the article highlights four major theoretical orientations of the study of disability: subjective materialism; subjective idealism; objective materialism; and objective idealism. The proposed rereading allows us to better understand the diversity of research perspectives that exist beyond the simple opposition between medical and social models and opens up new avenues for a more complex and nuanced understanding of disability.
Compared to social sciences and other humanistic disciplines in which the field of Disability Studies gained legitimacy in the 1980s and 1990s, especiallyin the Anglosphere, philosophy has been somewhat slow to engage with disability. Disability Studies is an interdisciplinary field that has benefited from the contribution of many different fields of research; sociology, art, anthropology, architecture, cultural and literary studies, law, history, postcolonial and decolonial studies, psychology, education, sport studies, science and technology studies, sexuality studies, etc., as shown by the variety of international handbooks published (Albrecht & Bury 2003; Berghs, Chataika, El-Lahib 2019; Blanck 2020; Brown, Maroto, Pettinicchio 2023; Chataika & Goodley2024; Davis 2013; Ellis, Kent, Cousins 2024; Hadley & McDonald 2020; Howe, Jensen-Moulton, Lerner, Straus 2016; Ned, Rivas Velarde, Singh, Swartz, Soldatic 2024; Rembis, Kudlick, Nielsen 2018; Shuttleworth & Mona 2022; Watson, Roulstone, Thomas 2012). Asignif-icant tenet of Disability Studies, which is relevant to mention here, is the remark that disability, even though not always explicitly addressed, pervades nonetheless culture, literature, and scientific endeavour-as a concept, image, or metaphorical crutch (Snyder & Mitchell 2000; Snyder, Brueggemann, Garland-Thomson, 2002). Despite this abundance, however, disability is still largelyunrecognised as atopic of academic interest, especially in the Humanities-the phenomenon that David Bolt and Claire Penketh define as "disciplinary avoidance" (2015).
This paper examines the recurring presence of disability as a trope in modernist art and evaluates whether this presence challenged or reinforced societal conceptions of disability. Drawing on Critical Disability Studies, it analyzes how these artistic tropes, from the Vitruvian Man as an early manifestation of the "normate" as coined by Garland-Thomson to modernist disability aesthetics, have shaped representations of normative and disabled bodies across visual arts, literature, music (Straus, 2018), and medical and technological disciplines. The paper explores how modernism marked a turning point, with avant-garde movements incorporating Disability Aesthetics - a framework celebrating bodily diversity and disrupting normative ideals. This paper argues that contemporary Disability Justice artists, such as Carmen Papalia, Nomy Lamm, and Chun-Shan (Sandie) Yi, extend this aesthetics by prioritizing lived experiences and advocating for Crip beauty as a site of resistance. By comparing modernist tropes with contemporary practices, this paper underscores the importance of situating disability aesthetics within their social and historical contexts. It concludes by proposing a framework to analyze the legacy of modernist art for today's Disability Justice movements, emphasizing the need to balance historical continuity with critical awareness of systemic differences.
Cognitively disabled people are pervasively marginalized, in theoretical work and social-political life. Although more than fifty years of social activism and critical theoretical work has politicized and radically reframed the experience of disability, those effects seem to extend only tenuously to cognitively disabled people. Historical practices of dehumanization, and eugenicist constructions of cognitive inferiority and human value, continue to influence attitudes toward those who are cognitively, intellectually and communicatively atypical. Perceptions of these atypicalities are sufficiently insensitive to individual variation that the assumption of radical difference is global and total, and cognitively disabled people continue to be set apart as specially and naturally different and inferior. In this paper, I sketch a conceptual architecture of dehumanization and its relation to the qualitative and quantitative understandings of cognitive disability, with reference to historical instances. In doing so, I aim to denaturalize cognitive disability so that it can be more fully theorized from a critical disability perspective.
The paper contends that madness can be used as a way to engage with theories of utopia. The author draws upon their own autoethnographic experiences of madness and analyzes them through a Nietzschean perspective. They argue that utopic thought requires a breakage with normative interpretations of the State. Thereby, madness should be examined as a pathway to rupture with the normative world and thus develop a utopia. Utopias may require madness.
Disability theorists have long argued against the valorization of work under capitalist social relations; I explore some of the key arguments for why. Similarly, feminist theorists critiquing productivism have suggested that we should aim not just for better work, but for less work. Given this, it is surprising that disability arguments against what has been called productivism have not been taken up by theorists arguing against work. In this paper, I argue that feminist anti-work theories should be engaging critical disability theorists on work. However, I claim that in turn critical disability theories benefit from help envisioning how we make meaning in ways not organized around wage work. Following this approach, I turn to science fiction writer Ursula K. Le Guin’s anarchist politics for an orientation towards such imagining.
I examine both the morality of prenatal testing, as well as selective abortion on the basis of the results of that testing. As our ability to test for a variety of genetic conditions grows, the necessity of a nuanced assessment of this practice increases. First, I explore the permissibility of prenatal testing. I assess arguments that suggest that the fallibility or unreliability of the tests renders them moot for making decisions pertaining to life and death. I then examine arguments that suggest that the very nature of prenatal testing is such that it provides impermissible or immoral directive counseling. If we test to ensure something is not wrong with the fetus, or that everything is normal, it implies that a positive test, or a departure what from is perceived to be normal, is necessarily negative. I suggest that while these arguments are worth taking seriously, ultimately, they do not render the practice of prenatal testing immoral. Second, I examine the practice of selectively aborting a fetus as a result of a potentially disabling condition. While I acknowledge the ever-present ablest assumptions prevalent in society surrounding what constitutes a life worth living, I suggest that the three dominant kinds of arguments opposing selective abortion, fail. First, selective abortion does not constitute a form of eugenics. Second, disability-bias is an insufficient justification for denying selective abortion rights. Third, and finally, prospective parents do not assent to raise any child, irrespective of the outcomes of a prenatal test.
This paper presents a philosophical perspective on disability theorization grounded in the concept of normativity. The integration of phenomenology in Disability Studies, specifically the critique of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, provides the background. A comprehensive analysis of the concept of maximal grip, as examined within the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, offers significant insights and potential avenues for further investigation. The notion of normativity will be elucidated through an integrated analysis of the perspectives proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. An interpretation of this notion, which aims to provide a framework for investigating the conceptualisation of disability, will reveal the normative dynamics at play in the relationship between subject and world. This concept will therefore be examined in the context of an analysis of the case study of active music therapy, with a particular focus on how this practice approaches the subject with disabilities through the use of musical improvisation. In consequence, an analysis of the normativity of music improvisation will prove beneficial. The core question of this research is whether it is possible to move beyond the conventional dichotomy of what is and is not considered to be a disability. In pursuing the goal of abandoning a reductionist approach to the theoretical definition of disability, my proposal aims to shift the focus from an examination of the content of the definition of disability to an investigation of the structure of the relationship between the subject and the world. In this regard, the concept of normativity offers an alternative to an approach that may result in the categorisation of disability into predetermined categories.
How can the self-portraiture by people with disabilities render visible ableist expectations? The paper investigates the visual practices of people with disabilities on social media. A philosophical-anthropological approach to selfies is deployed to understand the self-representations of people with disabilities. The conditions of 'showing oneself' are researched as the relation of the body, the others, and the normative environment. A visual analysis of social media posts gives insights into how people with disabilities distance themselves from stigmatizing experiences and embody themselves in social relationships. Despite risking stigmatization, the images potentially transform the viewer's gaze on disabled bodies and visualize disability experiences.
Cet article examine l’essor des études sur le handicap en tant que domaine façonné par les mouvements sociaux défendant les droits des personnes handicapées. Il met en évidence l’évolution des études sur le handicap aux États-Unis, en Grande-Bretagne et en Scandinavie, qui ont émergé à travers des contextes politiques et scientifiques distincts. L’article explore également la variété des modèles dans les études sur le handicap, allant au-delà de la dichotomie entre le modèle médical et le modèle social, en utilisant la philosophie des sciences. En analysant les positions ontologiques et épistémologiques, il identifie quatre cadres théoriques clés : le matérialisme subjectif (déterminisme médical), l’idéalisme subjectif (interprétations individuelles), le matérialisme objectif (structures sociales) et l’idéalisme objectif (éléments discursifs). L’article démontre comment les études sur le handicap contribuent aux luttes politiques en remodelant les idées de citoyenneté, de justice et d’égalité, en promouvant une société plus inclusive qui reconnaît les facteurs sociaux et environnementaux qui façonnent le handicap.
Typically, philosophers ignore disability, treat it as a special case addressed at some point in the distant future, or, worse, view disabled people as nonpersons with nothing worthwhile to contribute to philosophical endeavors. However, philosophers and philosophy have much to learn from disabled people. This article, utilizing critical and crip phenomenology, employs knowledge and insights gleaned from the lives of disabled people to rehabilitate or improve the functioning of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. This outcome stems from adding corporeal variability, an existential that accounts for differences between and changes over time within bodies. This is an important addition as bodily differences and changes influence other existentials and the process of Being. After describing several existentials constituting Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, the author presents pertinent data from Heidegger’s own works, disability scholars, and disabled people’s personal narratives that support amending the original theory with corporeal variability.
The aim of this paper is to address the philosophical significance of Plato’s use of the metaphor of blindness, particularly regarding knowledge and cognition. To begin with, I shall summarise key arguments concerning blindness in Disability Studies. It will emerge that blindness is significantly employed to express ignorance or lack of knowledge due to the current ocularcentric prejudice, i.e. the view that sight is the most important sense. After a brief contextualisation of traditional ocularcentrism embedded in ancient Greek culture, I shall turn to analysing some occurrences of the metaphor of blindness from Book VI and VII of Plato’s Republic. The study reveals how Plato’s use of the metaphor of blindness in Book VI serves to make subtle epistemological points, such as differentiating knowledge from a cognitive state that only happens to be true. In Book VII, focusing on the famous simile of the Cave, the paper shows that Plato deliberately establishes a complex symmetry between metaphorical and literal blindness: to overcome one’s lack of knowledge (metaphorical blindness), one needs to be, temporarily and partly, blind to perceptible things (literal blindness). The striking outcome of this view is that, due to Plato’s ocularcentric framework, blindness provides him with the argumentative tool that opens the field of enquiry into the nature of knowledge and its objects.
