The term mitigation plays a central role in both climate change and pandemic debates, yet it is used with markedly different-and often conflated-meanings across these domains. This article offers a systematic conceptual analysis of mitigation by distinguishing between ante-factum mitigation and post-factum mitigation. Ante-factum mitigation refers to measures aimed at reducing the likelihood that a harmful event will occur, whereas post-factum mitigation concerns efforts to prevent the worst consequences of an event that has already materialized. Drawing on the history of climate ethics, the article shows how early ambiguities surrounding mitigation, adaptation, and prevention re-emerged in pandemic ethics, particularly before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis demonstrates that much confusion in policy and ethical debates stems from shifting objects of mitigation rather than from substantive disagreement about goals. Clarifying these distinctions is essential for evaluating preparedness, response, and responsibility in the governance of global risks. The article concludes that conceptual precision regarding mitigation is indispensable for coherent ethical analysis and effective policymaking in both climate and pandemic contexts.
This article constitutes the first of two works that proceed to the rational reconstruction of the Popperian conception of science, identifying it as one of the theories in the series that makes up the rationalist program of knowledge. As a late theory of this program, the quantity and scope of problems left as a legacy to it is considerable, which, however, are resolved within a somewhat elaborate conceptual matrix, in which commitments of various orders converge. In the present work, we highlight how theses of an axiological nature connect and inspire theses of an ontological order to build an epistemology without resorting to any form of scientific or philosophical dogmatism, which leads, apparently in a contradictory way, to a normative view on scientific praxis . To this end, a methodological tool-the methodology of the theory of science-proves to be of great value in defining and tracking the dynamics of these commitments. Subsidiarily, we will show how the Popperian proposal involves, on the one hand, a radicalization of modern trends, such as the ontologization of epistemology, without falling, on the other, into the emptying of truth as consistency.
According to Van Rensselaer Potter, the birth of bioethics occurred within the limits of a moral tradition centered on immediate human interests, neglecting the interdependence between humanity and nature. Expanding this ethical dimension to ensure the continuity of life and the health of the future biosphere thus becomes one of the central challenges of our time. This study aims to understand how Potter's conception of global bioethics, understood as a new ethics grounded in biology, can guide the formulation of sustainable public policies aimed at planetary health. The research adopts a bibliographic and analytical-reflective approach. First, the main characteristics of Potter's proposed ethics are examined; then, the study analyzes how its foundations may contribute to the development of environmentally responsible public policies. It is concluded that global bioethics provides relevant conceptual foundations for building public policies focused on planetary sustainability. Among these foundations are: concern with the long-term consequences of human actions; the redefinition of the human being's place in the biosphere as a member of a biotic community in a relationship of interdependence - rather than as a conqueror of nature; the intergenerational responsibility regarding the quality of life of future generations; and the integration of science, ethics, and sustainability aimed at preserving life on the planet.
In her brief treatise Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, British philosopher Anne Conway presents an ontological proposal that aims to deal with the problem of dualism between spirit and matter. Criticizing the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes and, in part, Scholastic philosophy, Conway introduces an ontology composed of three elements: God, Mediation and Creature. In her thesis, the three elements are part of the same substance, differentiated as modes of being. Generally referred to as a monist and/or vitalist philosopher, Conway attempts to overcome the separation between body and spirit by attributing equality between the terms of this duality. In general, the attributions of monism consider above all the part of creatures and do not seek to encompass the whole of her ontology. This article aims to indicate that, if the entire philosophical system presented by Conway is considered, then her ontology can be taken as that of a transcendentalist monism.
This article aims to delve deeperinto the phenomenon ofaporophobia. First, I present the neuroethic foundations that support Adela Cortina's approach to this concept and that clarify the true meaning of aporophobia. Next, I outline a series of theses that derive from the phenomenon of aporophobia: 1) aporophobia obscures the inherent value of the person; 2) we are all aporophobic; 3) we can all be poor; and 4) aporophobia has a dialectical nature. These derivatives reveal the radical nature of this social pathology and its implications for human nature. On this basis, I then develop an interpretation of aporophobia from the perspective of status psychology that opens this phenomenon to the perspective of the poor. The poor, in situations of aporophobia, protect their status. Finally, I will explain how this protection of status by the poor can be explained from the perspective of Rousseau and is reflected in an evangelical passage and in the work by Pirandello.
