The paper argues that the fundamental claim of approaches to cognition that are ‘representation-eschewing,’ such as the enactive one, must have been more intuitively plausible in some cultures where the self is not understood in terms of an inner entity that can feel alienated or separated from the world. Taking cues from ancient literature, the paper demonstrates that even a simple act of perception is understood differently in some ancient cultures. It was more like an activity spread across eyes and objects and not simply an internal event receiving input from the world. This involves understanding oneself as continuous with the rest of existence. Accordingly, there was hardly any need to posit discrete representations inside that stand for objects outside. This suggests that approaches to cognition that are representation-eschewing may appear intuitively implausible in our culture because of certain inveterate but culturally constructed ways of understanding oneself as separate from the world.
In this paper I discuss Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness. Being in a conscious state, according to his view, consists in having an appropriate higher order mental representation – a higher order thought (HOT) about a lower order non-conscious state. I will explain the key points of his theory and discuss several problems, such as the status of qualia in explaining the phenomenal character of sensory experience, versus the role of the HOT content accompanying such states. A version of this problem also underlies the tension in reconciling Rosenthal’s view that all mental states are intentional, with the view that sensory states are non-intentional, exhibiting qualitative properties. Finally, I raise a dilemma concerning the nature of transitive consciousness attributed to HOTs. If transitive consciousness is factive, and thoughts are not, how can all HOTs constitute transitive awareness?
This paper is concerned with the question of where representations begin, i.e., tries to answer the question of which are the simplest organisms that possess representations. This question is addressed to two types of representations: basic representations, which coordinate sensory input with motor output, and decoupled representations, which collect environmental information without being directly tied to specific behaviors. To answer this question, I will adopt an evolutionary approach by which each kind of representation will be mapped onto different stages of the evolution of the nervous system. More precisely, I will argue that basic representations emerged when a simple neural system appeared, while decoupled representations will be linked to the formation of a central nervous system that enables off-line simulation abilities. Such an evolutionary framework will provide empirical reasons to establish which are the minimal conditions that an organism must fulfill in order to qualify as representational, with respect to both basic and decoupled representations. In other words, I will argue that the biological grounding of both types of representations serves as the demarcation element that helps answer the question of where basic and decoupled representations begin.
In his seminal paper On the Notion of the Cause, Bertrand Russell famously attempts to show why the view that causation is a real and mind-independent feature of the world - called "causal realism" is false. His arguments are often cited as a definitive challenge to the metaphysical tradition that takes causality as a fundamental principle of reality. Yet, despite the apparent plausibility and power of his arguments, causal realism is still a predominant view within philosophy of causation today. This paper seeks to explore how causal realism has endured Russell's attack, examining not only the weaknesses in his arguments, but also the ways in which contemporary philosophers have redefined and strengthened the realist position. By analyzing the responses to Russell's arguments, we will try to pinpoint the lessons learned from his critique and demonstrate how it has informed the development of more sophisticated theories of causation. Doing so will also contribute to a redefinition of causal realism, showing how the debate with Russell has enriched our understanding of what it means for causal theory to be realistic.
