
AI-enabled disinformation and sophisticated deepfake technologies are eroding trust, undermining democratic institutions, and complicating global governance. Generative AI blurs the distinction between truth and fabrication, which drives polarization and fosters civic disengagement. This form of information warfare and its effects on internet users fragment diplomatic and policy baselines, destabilize cooperation on issues ranging from climate to arms control, and prompt states to adopt restrictive measures that weaken the rules-based order. As trust in governance wanes, compliance with laws and public health measures diminishes, jeopardizing stability. This article identifies the existential threat to the multilateral system and argues that current international responses remain fragmented and inadequate. It proposes five practical policy priorities aimed at bolstering resilience against AI-enabled manipulation and restoring public trust: negotiating international information integrity norms through the United Nations; establishing a mechanism for attribution and early warning; introducing mandatory provenance standards and independent AI auditing for major digital platforms; embedding AI and media literacy within national education systems and public-sector training; and creating coordinated Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) governance mechanisms incorporating intelligence sharing, collective attribution, and proportionate sanctions. Together, these measures provide a politically feasible framework for strengthening information integrity while preserving democratic freedoms and multilateral cooperation.
The Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules were created by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy and ensure that large multinational enterprises pay a minimum level of tax on the income arising in each jurisdiction where they operate. The GloBE rules have been viewed as a success in being able to establish the Inclusive Framework to get over 145 countries and jurisdictions involved in this international tax initiative. However, cooperation in achieving GloBE is not in itself proof that the rules are beneficial for all of the cooperating countries, especially developing countries. Developing countries continue to express discontent with the highly publicized cooperation accord of the Inclusive Framework. This article highlights how GloBE is not an overall resounding success of international tax law cooperation because the GloBE governance and rule-making process favors OECD member countries. Part 2 of this article discusses how the OECD being the governing organization naturally favors its member countries. Part 3 of this article describes the international tax law cooperation developments that have gained support at the United Nations (UN) due to the GloBE governance and rule-making process not being fully beneficial to developing countries. The article concludes with an analysis of why the UN can serve as a more suitable venue for international tax law cooperation because of its inclusive governance structure and processes. This article proposes the creation of a political tax forum at the UN called the UN High-level Political Forum on International Taxation as a key policy solution for the United Nations Tax Committee to implement.
Why do states pursue observer status in regional international organizations (RIO s) despite its limited participatory rights and absence of voting power? While prior research has analyzed membership structures, the motivations behind observership remain understudied. We develop an original analytical framework explaining why states seek observer status as part of their broader foreign policy strategies. Drawing on an original empirical dataset combining twenty-one practitioner interviews, official documents, and diplomatic communications we identify three distinct mechanisms through which observer status yields benefits: (1) as a signaling device of recognition and intent to cooperate, (2) as access to the RIO's social network for information, cooperation, and influence, and (3) as a prestige-enhancing attribute through collective recognition by member states. These mechanisms illuminate the strategic, relational, and symbolic value of observer status as a diplomatic tool. The study contributes to ongoing debates on institutional design, non-member participation, and status-seeking behavior in international organizations, while offering a systematic conceptualization of observership as a widespread and understudied diplomatic practice in the evolving architecture of regional governance.
Abstract The Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules were created by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ) to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy and ensure that large multinational enterprises pay a minimum level of tax on the income arising in each jurisdiction where they operate. The GloBE rules have been viewed as a success in being able to establish the Inclusive Framework to get over 145 countries and jurisdictions involved in this international tax initiative. However, cooperation in achieving GloBE is not in itself proof that the rules are beneficial for all of the cooperating countries, especially developing countries. Developing countries continue to express discontent with the highly publicized cooperation accord of the Inclusive Framework. This article highlights how GloBE is not an overall resounding success of international tax law cooperation because the GloBE governance and rule-making process favors OECD member countries. Part 2 of this article discusses how the OECD being the governing organization naturally favors its member countries. Part 3 of this article describes the international tax law cooperation developments that have gained support at the United Nations ( UN ) due to the GloBE governance and rule-making process not being fully beneficial to developing countries. The article concludes with an analysis of why the UN can serve as a more suitable venue for international tax law cooperation because of its inclusive governance structure and processes. This article proposes the creation of a political tax forum at the UN —called the UN High-level Political Forum on International Taxation—as a key policy solution for the United Nations Tax Committee to implement.