
India started reaching out to the East Asian countries through its Look East Policy in early 1990s. In the first two decades, the policy successfully got India connected more to the region. To further strengthen the process and inject more dynamism into its engagements with East Asia, India revised the policy and named it Act East Policy in 2014. India’s engagement with South Korea also got more attention in this process. There have been more frequent meetings of the top leaders of both the countries and both the countries have created more mechanisms and institutions to cooperate with each other. It has led to noteworthy progress in India-South Korea relations. However, it is also true that both the countries have not been able to realise the full potential of their relations. The reason for this shortfall has been certain inadequacies in the intents and executions of the Act East Policy especially in the case of South Korea. The paper argues that insufficient realisation of each other’s importance, insufficient trust in each other and looking for immediate reciprocity are the three important reasons which have limited the progress and both the countries need to rectify them to realise the full potential of their bilateral relations.
While India-ASEAN relations have strengthened and New Delhi aims to position the Northeast of India as the “gateway” for the Act East Policy (AEP), despite various initiatives, the long-standing policy appears to have yielded only limited benefits for the states in Northeast India. Foreign investment numbers and development indicators suggest that Northeast India continues to remain in the “periphery”. In light of this context, this article raises two important questions: why are flagship projects still experiencing delays, and what role do various stakeholders play? Secondly, considering that the success of AEP depends on multiple factors, in what ways does the issue of “alignment of interests” between the different actors shape the advancement of the AEP in Northeast India? Adopting Putnam’s “two-level game” framework, this article argues that at a time when there is a noticeable crisis in multilateralism and issues along India’s international border continue to have a strategic edge, the rewards from the AEP for the states of Northeast India will remain sporadic.
Southeast Asia is often described as a confluence zone situated between the South of China and East of India. ASEAN and its affiliate institutions, as manifestations of Southeast Asian regional aspirations, are at the centre stage of the Indo-Pacific region, directly impacted by the major power politics involving not just the US–China dynamics but the growing role of India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the European Union as well. Notwithstanding initial successes and failures of post-War Asian regionalism, Indian and Chinese institutional engagement with ASEAN only began during the 1990s. Over the past three-and-a-half decades, ASEAN’s ties with both India and China have progressed well with the region attracting greater diplomatic competition among stakeholders vying for economic and soft power influence as well as strategic leverage. This paper aims to analyse the extent to which Southeast Asian engagement with China and/or India could lead to polarisation or partnership. It also aims to examine the conditions under which the potential downside of polarisation competes with the benefits of the partnership. This paper argues that while ASEAN could exercise moderating influence on the two Asian giants in pursuing greater cooperation with the region, its ability to do so gets severely constrained if India–China relations take a more confrontational turn. In essence, ASEAN’s cooperation with China and India hinges on two critically important aspects: (1) China and India’s own interests and aspirations in the Indo-Pacific regional dynamics as well as their bilateral equations and (2) ASEAN’s ability to lead the regional discourse in favour of multipolarity and multilateralism by keeping its normative agency intact.