Particularism is the position that perceptual content is essentially singular, and all perceptual representations are as of particulars: I see that cat. Existentialism is the position that all perceptual representations are as of general features, not particulars, which are satisfied when the world would satisfy the corresponding existentially quantified statement: I see there as being a cat. H. P. Grice famously raised the problem that existential contents could fail to refer to the particulars which made them accurate, such as when a mirror is placed in front of an object that reflects a qualitatively identical object in a different location. Christopher Hill and Mark Sainsbury have recently proposed refinements to existentialism that resolve Grice's problem, by adding a causal condition for perceptual awareness of a particular. In this article, I describe three counterexamples to this refined existentialism, from the wagon wheel effect, misperceptions of continuity, and misperceptions of seamless transition. Particularism correctly judges these to be cases of hallucination as of a particular, whereas existentialism misjudges these cases to be accurate perceptions of a particular, since a cause of the perceptual experience satisfies the existential content.
This paper asks a basic but largely neglected question: which behaviors genuinely qualify as instances of joint attention, and why? I argue that the current literature relies on an heterogeneous explanandum: very different behaviors are treated as paradigmatic cases of jointness, without a unified criterion for what makes attention joint rather than merely individual and parallel. I propose an exclusion criterion in the form of a canonical description of joint attention. In an enactivist-phenomenological spirit, I treat joint attention not as a capacity or mental state, but as an episodic phenomenon of social interaction in which subjects engage in a task whose success essentially depends on a specific kind of co-dependent and shared exercise of attention: an interwoven attentional exercise. I first use thought experiments (one-way mirrors, mutual spying and declarative pointing) to argue that attentional co-dependence alone does not warrant invoking 'jointness'. I then examine real experimental cooperative linguistic scenarios, drawing on Merleau-Pontian reading and Clark and Krych's Lego (R) task, to argue that genuine joint attention requires interwoven contributions. I close by distinguishing this proposal from close accounts and sketching a different conception of attentional overtness.
On the standard conception of self-control, self-control entails the resolution of a motivational conflict in favour of the option ranked better, loftier, or otherwise more valuable, and behaving accordingly. Sometimes, however, we appear to use self-control under ambivalence, or against our better judgment. In this paper, I seek to eliminate the apparent paradox induced by these cases by defending and developing a value-deflationist conception of self-control. For the value-deflationist conception of self-control endorsed in this paper, self-control is that which is enacted to align one's behaviour with intention in the face of a competing motivation. I develop the view further by showing that errant and ambivalent cases of self-control are not mere anomalies or theoretical curiosities but instead are important for understanding disruptions of agency due to motivational-executive double binds, where agents struggle both to rank options and to steer their behaviour. Adopting a value-deflationist account allows us to describe how ambivalence undermines self-control. Value-deflationism about self-control has faced a range of criticisms, such as the criticism that errant cases would turn out to be standard cases under a different description. The paper responds to these criticisms, showing that attempts to reconcile these cases with the standard conception fall short.
Several philosophers have argued that intention is conceptually governed by a normative standard of correctness. Intention normativism is supposed to be the practical counterpart of belief normativism, which is widely discussed in the literature. In this paper, I discuss the extant formulations of the norm of intention and find all of them wanting. I then suggest and defend a new formulation of the norm of intention. I argue that the suggested formulation is immune to the problems that beset other candidates for the norm of intention.
This paper makes the case for an overlooked phenomenon in action theory: logically complex actions. Although the case it makes relies on some ideas from Anscombe and her recent interpreters, the paper also argues that the phenomenon is a neutral desideratum, and so important for all philosophers of action, regardless of their theoretical commitments. Then, it goes on to emphasize the phenomenon's importance by showing its relevance to three cases from the literature.
Whilst philosophical argument remains the gold standard regarding what one can aspire to argue for normatively, to have interdisciplinary credibility and potential impact in real-world contexts, theory must be answerable to empirical evidence. Taking heed of this maxim, this paper expounds a new neo-Aristotelian theory of emulation qua moral role modelling by synthesising a previous philosophical argument with insights from current developmental moral psychology and neuroscience. By advancing three hypotheses derived from the aforementioned argument, I argue that emulation is a two-phase process of moral virtue and phronesis (practical wisdom) development, where pre-phronetic 'habituated emulation' evolves into phronetically-informed 'complete emulation'. Through doing so, I further establish the centrality of phronesis to the emulative process by refining how the psycho-moral mechanism of 'entangled phronesis' drives it. Representing the aligned moral-psychological states of role model and learner, I make clear how entangled phronesis stimulates emulation by enabling complex normative information to be shared and acquired through a developmentally sensitive combination of modelled virtuous action, verbal reason-giving and non-verbal mind reading.
Some philosophers and psychologists have recently paid significant attention to the phenomenon of unsymbolized thinking, particularly following the research on inner experience conducted by psychologist Russell Hurlburt. Philosophers Fernando Mart & iacute;nez-Manrique and Agust & iacute;n Vicente have further characterized this phenomenon as a mental activity endowed with propositional features and syntactic structure. In this paper, I argue for a sustained critique of the notion of 'unsymbolized thinking' and a more decisive rejection of its propositional and syntactic characterization, while proposing an alternative, yet more conceptually orthodox, conception of the phenomenon, which leads me to identify it as a form of intuition.
Anger is often criticized for its lack of instrumental value. In Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage, she responds to such critiques by arguing for 'Lordean rage', anger that is uniquely productive for fighting against injustice. Unlike Cherry, I bite the bullet and argue that, even if anger tends to fail in achieving its goals, there are good instrumental reasons to remain angry. Anger should be seen as an emotion that encourages incurring costs and risks to achieve a goal that has been thwarted, and whether or not one should remain angry depends on details about the risks, costs, likelihood of success and desirability of the goal. My paradigm example is anger at systemic injustice. I argue that, while anger against systemic injustice is unlikely to achieve its goal, that says more about systemic injustice than it does about anger. I argue that abandoning anger could discourage fighting systemic injustice. I further argue that anger often arises when one has faith that a better world is possible and understands our world as unjust for not being that world. Abandoning anger could weaken one's resolve in fighting that injustice.
If an agent's moral blameworthiness is mitigated by her addiction, fitting blaming responses by affected parties should register this. What might be the proper way of doing so? I refer to this as the problem of fitting blame in addiction. The view I put forward rests on a distinction between desert-presupposing and non-desert-presupposing forms of blame. Retributive blame is the paradigm of the former, presupposing that target agents deserve to suffer harm on account of their behavior. This presupposition, I argue, is typically incorrect when an agent's actions result from a significant impairment of behavioral control, as is often the case in severe addiction. In contrast, non-desert-presupposing forms of blame toward people with addiction can be fitting, regardless of considerations about their instrumental value. The argument for this claim is based on the notion of scaffolding blame. Scaffolding forms of blame presuppose that target agents have the capacity to recognize their wrongdoing, care about harm done, engage in a productive moral conversation, and have some potential to act differently in the future. These presuppositions, I argue, are typically correct in cases of severe addiction.
According to the Anscombean thesis, when one is doing something intentionally, one must know that one is doing it. Such agential knowledge of what one is doing is often called 'practical knowledge'. According to the inferential account of practical knowledge, practical knowledge is inferred from knowledge of intention. Kieran Setiya famously argues that the inferential account cannot square with the Anscombean thesis. I propose two different readings of his argument and contend that neither of them works. I then present a new argument to demonstrate the incompatibility between the inferential account and the Anscombean thesis by focusing on their temporal aspects.
The philosophy of agency has accomplishised a good deal of work on the notion of agency. In mostly focusing on deliberated, human agency, though, little has been done to understand agency as a general phenomenon, beyond the human: what kinds of agents are there and what kinds of things may qualify as agents? In this spirit, I will advance a general taxonomy of agents, thereby including fully-formed rational human agents all the way to more thermostats or riots. I will use this conceptual framework to argue that biological agency is intrinsically superior to artificial agency, both collective and automated. In Section 2, I will introduce a notion of agency based on a development of Searle's theory of intentionality. In Section 3, I will define three levels of agency: active, reactive, and proactive; based on that, I will present a taxonomy of agents with three kinds of agents - natural, collective, automated - classified through varying degrees of agency. Finally, in Section 5, I will discuss the limits of non-human agency, precisely arguing against the existence of collective and artificial persons. If granted, this has important implications in that human agency would enjoy systematically superior agential dispositions than artificial agents.
This paper links mathematical consciousness science, particularly Integrated Information Theory (IIT), to Immanuel Kant's philosophy. Skeptics of IIT's theoretical foundation often target its fundamental identity between an experience and Phi-structure. My account brings in the Kantian notion that this identity is a constitutive a priori principle and responds to some objections by drawing on Michael Friedman's defense of similar principles in spacetime physics. As constitutive a priori, the < Experience $= \Phi$=Phi-structure > principle serves various intra-theory functions: (i) enables the application of the intrinsic information formalism to the axioms' phenomenology; (ii) gives empirical meaning to phenomenological concepts; (iii) ensures the possibility of scientific assessment of theory's predictions and explanations; (iv) constructs the theory's explanandum: consciousness as structured, maximally irreducible, specific, intrinsic cause-effect power; and (v) makes possible other a priori explanatory principles. Generalizing beyond IIT, this paper advocates for using constitutive apriority tools to refine the epistemological foundations of other mathematical and scientific consciousness theories. Leveraging the neo-Kantian philosophy of consciousness science research program, it highlights the potential for connecting phenomenological descriptions, physical principles, and mathematical formalism to render current theories more transparent, rigorous, and empirically tractable - a move toward a more mature consciousness science.
This paper examines whether groups can and should be self-interpreting agents. It seems that at least groups based on shared interests, 'interest groups', and groups providing a collective identity, 'identity groups', would prima facie benefit from becoming self-interpreting. This is a claim which is reflected both in political philosophy and analyses of group agency. In this paper we evaluate this claim, first, by providing a taxonomy of groups regarding their capabilities for self-interpretation. Second, we outline six reasons why non-self-interpreting groups should become self-interpreting. Third, we argue that only properly organized groups, and not looser self-interpretive groupings, can reliably avoid attribution and legitimacy issues regarding their self-interpretations. Fourth, we assess the desirability of forming self-interpretive groups by identifying theoretical, economic, social, and political costs that are typically involved in becoming a self-interpreting group agent, and argue that in some cases the costs are high enough to outweigh the reasons for becoming a genuinely self-interpreting group. Thus, despite the prima facie case, it is not always clear whether identity-groups and interest-groups should become self-interpreting. The answer in different cases hangs on the balance of costs and benefits. We finish with a brief discussion of two objections, and a short reflection.
In this paper, I emphasise the relevance of affectivity in skilled acquisition and performance, an aspect that remains under-theorised in the philosophy of skills. Drawing on a phenomenologically informed enactivist framework, I argue that affectivity is not a mere by-product but an integral dimension of skilled agency. I identify two key ways in which affectivity shapes the dynamics of skilled performance. First, I discuss how affective appraisals serve as pre-reflective indicators of normative adequacy or inadequacy during performance, guiding corrections, sustaining motivation, and fostering creativity. Second, I examine self-esteem as an existential feeling that configures our sense of agency and practical engagement with the world. In this context, I analyse the phenomenon of stereotype threat to show how interpersonal interactions and sociocultural norms modulate self-esteem, and how repeated exposure to negative stereotypes can gradually erode it, thereby undermining an agent's skilful performance. These insights invite a reconceptualisation of affectivity as central not only to the execution and development of skilled action, but also to its possible breakdown.
Known as self-illness ambiguity, subjective confusion about whether patients or their mental illnesses are in control may partly stem from clinical methods mimicking medical models that diagnose illnesses (e.g. viruses) as present or not irrespective of sufferers' life stories. Researchers accordingly propose narrative contextualization as a way of disambiguating self from illness. But what if heightened self-attention is symptomatic of mental illness? Wellbeing may then associate with a smaller 'me' versus 'not-me' divide, a position Csikszentmihalyi's flow psychology and Dewey's aesthetics both support. What I call aesthetic flow involves embodied, non-linguistic dramatic structure, suggesting another way to view narrativity. By lessening self-preoccupation - and perhaps illness severity - this kind of narrativity may help dissolve self-illness ambiguity. However, a perplexity remains. Aesthetic flow depends on encountering resistance, including psychological obstacles. In life, as in art, this resistance delineates and individuates. Thus, aesthetic flow might lead to a temporary loss of self, followed by its reemergence in more immersively relational forms. A second complexity is that experiences of 'self' vary across time, cultures, and individuals - much like concepts of 'justice' or 'love.' This fluidity makes broad generalizations about selfhood and illness problematic. My solution partly sidesteps this by downplaying the importance of self.
Compatibilist libertarianism proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical assumptions (in particular: supervenience) can be modified in order to avoid this problem. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of pushing the position to the limits in this way.
A traditional assumption in the literature on inner speech is that inner speech allows us to have knowledge of our thoughts. I argue that inner speech cannot even be part of an explanation of how we know our propositional states. My argument turns on the existence of unsymbolized thought, and makes the case that whatever explains self-knowledge in the absence of inner speech also explains self-knowledge when inner speech is present. Inner speech is thus 'screened off' from explaining the knowledge we have of our propositional states. Nevertheless, inner speech seems to have a reflexive character: in inner speech we seem to represent aspects of ourselves. I argue that inner speech does not allow us to represent our own propositional states, as the tradition holds, but rather our own voices. In representing my own voice in inner speech, I bear a distinctively second-personal relation to myself, addressing myself as a 'you'. The paper suggests a broader reorientation in theorizing about inner speech: away from questions about how inner speech maps onto mental states and toward questions about its second-personal nature.
The rivalry between intuition and reasoning has long been a central topic in philosophy and cognitive science. In recent decades, Dual Process Theory (DPT) has formalised this distinction, differentiating between intuitive, automatic processes (System 1) and reflective, deliberate processes (System 2). While this duality has historical roots, Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense offers a prescient and systematic articulation of these ideas. Reid's emphasis on common sense aligns with System 1 processes, setting his approach apart from his contemporaries who prioritised System 2's analytical reasoning. This paper argues that Reid not only anticipates key aspects of DPT but also provides a normative framework for understanding the role of System 1 processes in knowledge acquisition, particularly in the context of testimony. By analysing Reid's discussions of common sense philosophy, his 'first principles,' and social cognition, this study demonstrates how Reid's ideas bridge descriptive cognitive science and normative epistemology, highlighting his significance as a precursor to contemporary DPT and offering valuable insights for current debates in these fields.
