Abstract: This study investigates the health status of defectors from North Korea and their process of assimilating into the economy of South Korea. Utilizing data from the National Health Insurance database spanning 2003 to 2022, we constructed a comprehensive dataset covering nearly all North Korean defectors in South Korea, alongside a 2 percent control sample that was randomly selected from the national population. Our findings indicate a higher incidence of medical treatment for mental illnesses and infectious diseases among North Korean defectors than native South Koreans. Through a panel analysis, we observed a significant initial income disparity between North Korean defectors and South Koreans, which narrows as the defectors’ length of residence in South Korea increases. However, the income gap remains large even decades after their arrival, thus suggesting potential challenges in achieving economic convergence considering the working period of North Korean defectors in South Korea. Furthermore, defectors arriving with infectious diseases or mental health issues tend to earn less than those without such health concerns. The economic disparity associated with mental health issues tends to decrease over longer periods of residence, while the gap related to infectious diseases does not diminish over time.
Abstract: While China’s coal-based electricity generation has attracted much interest, less attention has been paid to coal used in its chemical industry, including ammonia used for fertilizer production, an important but often overlooked source of emissions and an important contributor to climate change. The rapid growth of ammonia produced on the basis of coal since the early 1980s is a contributing factor to the growth in CO2 emissions. China’s growing production of coal-based ammonia and nitrogen fertilizer has been an important driver in this rise, with important global climate consequences. What drives China’s use of coal as a basis feedstock for fertilizer production, and why does it matter for understanding China’s participation in global efforts to combat climate change? This article tackles these questions by bringing to the foreground the domestic underpinnings of this situation, highlighting domestic-level considerations essential for understanding China’s ability to live up to its global climate commitments.
Abstract: This article examines Japan’s institutionalization of Maritime Domain Awareness as a non-military response to China’s gray zone tactics in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on neoclassical realism, this analysis demonstrates how systemic threats, mediated by domestic variables—such as elite perceptions, media framing, and bureaucratic reforms—prompt information-centric adaptations rather than militarized responses. Constructivist insights highlight Japan’s shift toward proactive maritime engagement through its evolving sovereignty and identity narratives. Employing process tracing, this article analyzes key cases—the 2004 Chunxiao dispute, 2012 Senkaku crisis, and 2019 Umishiru launch—to examine how non-military pressures reshaped Japan’s maritime strategy from resource utilization to comprehensive governance. This study extends neoclassical realism to the study of hybrid threats and derives policy lessons for regional initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA).
Abstract: How do different types of military dictators behave when managing elites? In this study, we argue that much of this has to do with the initial formation of the regime. In collegial military regimes, where there are plural elites, dictators must devise strategies to redistribute power between the existing coalition and officers who are excluded, in order to consolidate power. Conversely, when there is no unified and cooperative power base, dictators struggle to consolidate power initially. However, once they overcome this initial hurdle, they can swiftly concentrate power without having to negotiate with other elites. This research focuses on the patterns of elite reshuffling and purges in South Korean military regimes from 1962 to 1988, revealing significant differences in the management of elites between the two types of military rule.
Abstract: This study forms part of a project that examines the question of how China practises its increased activity in global environmental governance (GEG). To shed light on this, we explore biodiversity and China’s role as host for the 15th Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2022 (Kunming/Montreal). We ask how we can describe and assess China’s changing role in global biodiversity governance, an issue that has so far received scant academic attention. We develop and apply a set of indicators to classify various roles states can perform in global environmental governance: types of leadership, the intermediary, the bystander, and the laggard. Based on the indicators, we investigate how China’s activities fit with the various roles. We conclude that although, as host, China proclaimed ambitions for global biodiversity governance, its behavior cannot be described in terms of any leadership role, but rather displays traits of the laggard and the bystander. Our methods for data collection are key actor interviews and document analysis.
Abstract: Advancements in Japan-South Korea strategic cooperation have raised expectations for a powerful alignment that would reshape the security structure in Northeast Asia. In this article I first examine arguments for a tight Japan-South Korea security alignment, which emphasize the role of growing external balancing needs. I then assess the extent to which these balancing imperatives could indeed be translated into an effective and tighter Japan-South Korea security alignment. In particular, this article suggests that geography, as a persisting structural constraint, would undermine the development of a security alignment between the two states in three key dimensions—military capability aggregation, economic resource augmentation, and organizational adaptation—even if their leaders refrain from mobilizing nationalistic voices against each other and embrace similar threat perceptions. There is a significant upper limit to Japan-South Korea alignment, and strategic cooperation between the two states is likely to be limited to backing and binding the United States.
Abstract: This paper examines the challenges to the liberal international order posed by China, Russia, and North Korea. Their relationship harkens back to the Axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan before World War II. A review of the Axis identifies three factors to analyze China-Russia-North Korea relations: shared will to balance against a common threat, strong mutual expectations of support, and sufficient combined power. We find the China-Russia-North Korea triangle lacks cohesion and formal military commitments; distrust exists between China and the other two; and the combined military capabilities of China, Russia, and North Korea lag those of its main competitor, the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral partnership. The China-Russia-North Korea triangle is thus a loose alignment with significant internal divisions, making it a less potent force compared to the Axis. However, US and allied policymakers must prevent closer alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, since their possible coordinated nuclear threats could fundamentally challenge US nuclear extended deterrence for its non-nuclear allies.
Abstract: China expands its influence in the Islamic world through economic, diplomatic, and cultural initiatives while committing crimes against humanity against Uyghurs. Turkey is one of the striking cases to examine this contradiction between China’s atrocities in the Uyghur region and its expansive soft power maneuver in MENA. This article focuses on how the Uyghurs affect China-Turkey relations through the lenses of insecurity, transnational repression, and legitimacy. The article argues that the Chinese government’s insecurity about the Uyghurs resulted in the persecution of Uyghurs since late 2016 with the “Strike Hard” campaign, where Uyghurs with foreign ties were severely punished. Parallel with developments at home, the Chinese authorities also carried out transnational repression to target critics or surveil diaspora communities in countries like Turkey. Furthermore, anti-Western sentiments in Turkey and China’s growing economic influence prevented Ankara from speaking out for Uyghurs, which is exploited by China to legitimize its policies in the Uyghur region at the international level.
Abstract: There is a paucity of literature on India-Pakistan, China-Pakistan, and non-state actors (NSAs) using triadic deterrence. Additionally, a comparative analysis of India’s and China’s strategies with respect to Pakistan to motivate the latter to prevent NSAs targeting India and China respectively, is also missing. This article fills these gaps in the existing literature. It argues and illustrates that the prior nature of India-Pakistan and China-Pakistan relations influences the choices available and tools employed by the two countries. Due to India-Pakistan rivalry, India is following a dual policy of “non-violent compellence” that is building international political and diplomatic pressure, and conducting covert/overt military strikes to coerce Islamabad to forgo terrorism. Contrarily, China and Pakistan enjoy a comprehensive “all-weather” strategic partnership with China following a multi-pronged strategy to stabilize Pakistan and increase state capacity to combat militant/terrorist groups. Simultaneously, it has pressurized Islamabad at the bilateral level to forgo terrorism.
Abstract: In this study, we examine Turkey’s multifaceted engagement with Huawei amid global tensions over China’s role in digital infrastructure and the US-China trade wars. Despite NATO-related security concerns, Turkey engages with Huawei in both telecommunications and renewable energy sectors. We analyze the role of growth coalitions among Turkish political, business, and societal actors in shaping this engagement. Challenging the dominant geopolitical narratives, we focus on domestic state-capital and state-society relations as well as their interaction with foreign investment. Drawing on desk research and fieldwork, we reveal how growth coalitions mediate foreign investment, offering insights into international political economy and technology transfer.
Abstract: Expectations regarding China’s potential positive role in Turkey’s economic development have risen in recent years, particularly since Turkey joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015. However, the existing literature lacks a data-driven analysis of China’s economic engagement in Turkey. Based on a review of approximately 10,000 company files, this article addresses the gap by introducing and analyzing a newly compiled dataset of 1,382 foreign-invested firms operating in Turkey. Our study presents four main findings. First, official data on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey has significant shortcomings, including the mislabeling of closed firms as active, registering non-Chinese firms as Chinese, and vice versa. Second, while Chinese investment in Turkey has increased notably, China remains a relatively minor player in Turkey’s FDI landscape and does not currently challenge Western influence on the Turkish economy. Third, Chinese investments have largely been concentrated in low-value-added sectors, with minimal impact on Turkey’s industrial upgrading and research and development (R&D) capabilities. Finally, the limited developmental impact of Chinese investment is less a result of Western influence or specific shortcomings of Chinese investors, and more due to Turkey’s internal weaknesses, including issues with labor force quality, scientific infrastructure, and bureaucratic capacity. These endemic challenges hinder Turkey’s ability to attract significant, transformative FDI from any country, including China.
Abstract: The 2023 Washington Declaration strengthened the US-ROK alliance, thereby temporarily quelling public opinion favoring Seoul’s nuclear-arming. However, it has failed to reduce South Koreans’ doubts about the credibility of US security commitments over extended deterrence. The goal of this article is to examine whether US extended deterrence for South Korea is still effective in deterring North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. The central thesis of this article is that the United States should abandon its policy of extended deterrence for Seoul against a nuclear-capable North Korea and boldly explore a new strategy to keep stability and peace in Northeast Asia and maintain global nonproliferation regimes for the foreseeable future. The controlled and limited proliferation to South Korea seems to be a prime alternative, as it would allow the United States to minimize damages to both its policy of extended deterrence around the world and its objective of global nonproliferation.
Abstract: In an era of escalating US-China technological rivalry, Jordan’s decision to refrain from using Huawei’s 5G from its telecommunications networks stands as a significant case study of how small states navigate great power competition. Despite having received 2G, 3G, and 4G infrastructure services from Huawei, and not perceiving Huawei’s 5G as a security threat, as the United States does, Jordan is the only Arab country to make this decision. Drawing on in-depth interviews and media analysis, this article argues that Jordan’s choice does not fit neatly into traditional balancing or bandwagoning frameworks, nor hedging. Due to its dependence on US foreign aid and economic ties with China, Jordan adopted indirect bandwagoning behavior; it covertly aligned with the United States while publicly maintaining a neutral stance. Jordan avoided an explicit ban on Huawei to mitigate potential economic fallout from China. At the same time, it ensured that Huawei would be excluded from 5G bids, thereby satisfying US expectations. This dual approach highlights how small states manage competing pressures by maintaining public neutrality while privately aligning with a dominant power.
Through its first full decade, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, has reshaped much of the discourse and reality of global geopolitics. The BRI's impact in geoeconomic terms, especially at the region-al level and across localities, remains understudied. In this article, drawing from scholarships on economic statecraft, infrastructure development, and policy mobility as three conceptual pillars, I offer a combined analysis of a tripartite or three-part case featuring: 1) the logistics/trade complex in Djibouti, 2) industrial park-based manufacturing in Ethio-pia, and 3) the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (ADR) linking Djibouti and Ethiopia into a cross-border economic corridor, with a multifaceted focus on the compositional features of these embedded and connective infrastructural projects, their spatial and socioeconomic consequences for local, re-gional, and national development, and broader analytical implications.
