In this article, I examine the relationship between the ecological thought of Bateson and Guattari, whose views at first sight have much in common. To show the difference between them I will take my cue from Guattari's remark that he parts ways with Bateson on the role of context. Explaining the role of context in both authors will allow me to show how Guattari's thought implies both an endorsement and a criticism of cybernetics, and, specifically, the promotion of a machinic rather than a cybernetic ecology. I will conclude by indicating what is at stake in this distinction.
The aim of this article is to examine John Philoponus's lost treatise "Summikta Theoremata". As far as possible we make use of the indications provided by the Arab biobibliographers in order to reconstitute the structure and organisation of the treatise. In addition, references to this work by Philoponus himself in his commentaries In Phys. and In Anal. Post. reveal its heterogeneous and varied character. Our analysis thus emphasizes the dialectical and aporetic aspect of Philoponus's work. We thus reveal the quality of this independent mind that is gradually evolving towards a vision of the world in which the creationist thesis dominates (transl. J. Dudley).
-This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debates about the methods of comparative philosophy. Although the idea of comparative philosophy was laid down by Paul Masson-Oursel (1882-1956) in the early years of the 20th century, this subfield of philosophy remains an emergent discipline, and many methodological issues remain debated. By exploring its history and developments in the West during the 20th century, I intend to stress three dangers met by any comparatist project in philosophy: assimilation, exclusion, and generalisation. After emphasising these dangers and the philosophical principles that underlie them, I will suggest outlines for a possible comparative approach. I shall argue that history of philosophy can provide efficient guidelines to comparative philosophy. I elaborate on recent scholarship in comparative philosophy and borrow from recent methodological developments in history of philosophy, especially Alain de Libera's revised Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge.
The principle of charity constitutes one of the cornerstones of Davidson's conception of meaning, understanding, and interpretation. It condenses central principles and presuppositions of Davidson's philosophy of language and mind and at the same time accounts for the way in which he treats certain problems that lie at the intersection of philosophy of logic and philosophy of anthropology. One of Davidson's fundamental theses is that there is recognition of a form of mind at the end of an interpretive process only insofar as this form of mind is radically identical to the form of mind of the interpreter. The aim of this article is to bring to light the aporias to which the principle of charity leads, as well as the presuppositions that underpin it, while sketching the outline of an externalist alternative. Its novelty lies essentially in the way in which the highlighting of the presuppositions of the principle of charity is articulated, together with the criticisms that undermine them and the sketched externalist alternative to which these criticisms pave the way (transl. J. Dudley).
The Works of & Eacute;milie Du Ch & acirc;telet consist of printed publica- tions and manuscripts in her own hand or copied. These manuscripts are to be found in various libraries and collections in several countries. The evidence they provide indicates the originality of the thought of Mme Du Ch & acirc;telet, who was long considered to be a translator and transmitter of science. The first part of the article provides a general presentation of the relationship of the manuscript works to the writings published during her lifetime. The second part examines in detail the additions and passages omitted in the chapter "On time" in the manuscript entitled Foundations of Physics.. The third part of the article is devoted to two notes on freedom found in the unpublished manuscript notebooks. These pas- sages provide new evidence on subjects at the heart of & Eacute;milie Du Ch & acirc;telet's research (transl. J. Dudley).
The Works of & Eacute;milie Du Ch & acirc;telet consist of printed publications and manuscripts in her own hand or copied. These manuscripts are to be found in various libraries and collections in several countries. The evidence they provide indicates the originality of the thought of Mme Du Ch & acirc;telet, who was long considered to be a translator and transmitter of science. The first part of the article provides a general presentation of the relationship of the manuscript works to the writings published during her lifetime. The second part examines in detail the additions and passages omitted in the chapter "On time" in the manuscript entitled Foundations of Physics. The third part of the article is devoted to two notes on freedom found in the unpublished manuscript notebooks. These passages provide new evidence on subjects at the heart of & Eacute;milie Du Ch & acirc;telet's research (transl. J. Dudley).
The aim of this article is to study the political philosophy of & Eacute;lise Reimarus (1735-1805), set out in two essays, the authorship of which proposed by A. Spalding (2005) makes it possible to draw out another aspect of the characteristics of their author in the German Enlightenment. Thus in addition to her poetry, her writings on education, and especially the part she played in the controversy about Pantheism, & Eacute;. Reimarus also developed a political philosophy centred on the concept of freedom. Hence our aim is to cast light on this philosophy by identifying her careful reading of Spinoza, on the basis of which she elaborated her own definition of natural and civil freedom, of natural and civil law, as well as her view of the State as a contract. In other words, we set out from the hypothesis of signs of Spinoza's influence in the political philosophy of & Eacute;. Reimarus, a hypothesis which enables us to attribute importance to her theories at the same time (transl. J. Dudley).
Shortly after the death of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) his sister, Gilberte P & eacute;rier n & eacute;e Pascal (1620-1687), wrote La Vie de M. Pascal (The Life of Mr. Pascal), which is often viewed as an important part of the Works of Pascal, as shown by the custom of including it in the classical editions of his Pens & eacute;es (Thoughts). However, we cannot fail to observe the ambiguous status of this piece of writing due to the relative value often attributed to it for two main reasons: the only function of this Life is held to be that of a preface to the Pens & eacute;es presenting Pascal the man, and its account of Blaise is considered patchy. Following in the footsteps of studies that single out the many treasures found in this essay, the present article seeks to come to grips with it in itself and for its own sake while considering its possible interest for philosophy. Having clarified the history of its publication, the inquiry looks into two ways of viewing the philosophical issues found in the Life. Part one shows how it is possible to identify in the narrative Gilberte's considerations about Christianity, meaning being- Christian or the essence of Christianity, by means of reconstituting the main aspects of the Christian life of her brother. Part two devotes attention to possible divergencies between Gilberte's thought and that of her brother in the field of anthropology. Thus these two main themes, one pertaining to the philosophy of religion and the other to the history of philosophy, are to be understood as contributing to the inclusion of Gilberte Pascal and her Life in the field of modern philosophy (transl. J. Dudley).
Marie de Gournay is an outstanding case for fostering contemporary questions about the canon of modern philosophers and its protagonists. She makes it possible to reflect on what makes a woman philosopher in terms of content and forms of discourse from both a modern and a contemporary point of view. The status of Gournay in the intellectual world has indeed been discussed since her own time both by her contemporaries and by herself. She is at the heart of reflection on what makes a woman author among the men of letters of her time. At the same time she never ceases to model her own status as a woman author and to impose it by means of various strategies of self- affirmation. Finally, her case is of interest also to contemporary historians of philosophy. She acts as a << case study >> in a number of articles on the inclusion of women in the corpus of philosophy. Several times Gournay speaks of herself as a << robed person >> (person in a dress). Now this item of clothing has a double meaning. It is the clothing of women (as opposed to men), but it is also the clothing of clerics, magistrates and learned people (as opposed to the common people). Thus Gournay seems caught between two very different adornments: the robe of women and that of the learned. The one would classify her among the dominated and the other among the dominant. Her works show how she weaves her own garment from these two kinds of clothing, a robe truly her own, made to measure, but which may one day become a ready-made garment (transl. J. Dudley).
Marie de Gournay is an outstanding case for fostering contemporary questions about the canon of modern philosophers and its protagonists. She makes it possible to reflect on what makes a woman philosopher in terms of content and forms of discourse from both a modern and a contemporary point of view. The status of Gournay in the intellectual world has indeed been discussed since her own time both by her contemporaries and by herself. She is at the heart of reflection on what makes a woman author among the men of letters of her time. At the same time she never ceases to model her own status as a woman author and to impose it by means of various strategies of self- affirmation. Finally, her case is of interest also to contemporary historians of philosophy. She acts as a << case study >> in a number of articles on the inclusion of women in the corpus of philosophy. Several times Gournay speaks of herself as a << robed person >> (person in a dress). Now this item of clothing has a double meaning. It is the clothing of women (as opposed to men), but it is also the clothing of clerics, magistrates and learned people (as opposed to the common people). Thus Gournay seems caught between two very different adornments: the robe of women and that of the learned. The one would classify her among the dominated and the other among the dominant. Her works show how she weaves her own garment from these two kinds of clothing, a robe truly her own, made to measure, but which may one day become a ready-made garment (transl. J. Dudley).
In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish's theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of "self-knowledge" and "perception" (OEP, p. 138), so that every part of nature "must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature" (OEP, p. 141). It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish's use of the notions of "self-knowledge" and "perception" implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish's system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body.
Setting out from the vision of care proposed by Joan Tronto, this article explores the ties between the abandonment of studies in nursing and the historical, political, managerial and gender context in which burnout and ethical suffering develops in numerous male and female nurses. The analysis proposed here is based on an ethnographic investigation that draws attention to the experiences of male and female nursing students during their traineeships and the tensions that run through the profession. We find marginalisation, exclusion and the rendering invisible of numerous agents considered to be secondary. Setting out from the ethics of care the author inquires into the consequences of political priorities that aim at profitability and a decrease in the costs of professions centred on human beings. The article raises social, pedagogical and managerial questions to be resolved in order to improve the attractiveness of educational programmes and to ensure the perpetuation of an essential profession in health care systems (transl. J. Dudley).
Feminist thought from its emergence has been involved in a dilemma called the dilemma of difference obliging women to choose between a universalist option which denies individual differences and a differentialist option which essentialises them. Strategies are found in the Ethics of care, as in the ecofeminist galaxy, for getting around this dilemma, which take the form of << shifting moral boundaries >> (in Joan Tronto), identification of << oppressive conceptual frameworks >> (in Karen Warren) or of a << reclaim >> (in Emilie Hache). I shall start by explicitating the dilemma of difference in the more general context of reflection on equality, then I will apply it to feminism with a view to then explicitating the strategies for getting around the dilemma identified in the two schools of thought discussed, namely care and ecofeminism (transl. J. Dudley).
During the first months of the Covid-19 pandemic, our research participants experienced an overload of cognitive and physical care work. This increase in care work held them back, not necessarily from their paid jobs in academia in general, but from one particular activity that the wealth-care oriented university is most focused on: producing wealth in the form of publications. The case of the university may be transferred to other social subsystems and institutions in ou wealth-care societies in all of which men tend to be the most productive, creating the most wealth. Consequently, men have become the most valuable members of society. We therefore call for a system change away from the wealth-care oriented university towards an ethics of care approach in academia. We argue that if the university followed an ethics of care approach with regard to their scientific staff in general, it would prioritize the well-being and flourishing of researchers as individuals, rather than simply treating them as cogs in a wealth-producing machine. An ethics of care approach to academia would prioritize the well-being and flourishing of researchers as individuals, and would seek to create a more supportive and collaborative environment in which researchers can thrive.
The writings of Marion Segaud (Segaud M., 2008) and of Joan Tronto (Tronto J., 2009) reveal to us that Inhabiting and vulnerability are anthropological invariants. Now industrial society by its socio-spatial organisation << has established parameters for >> (Femia A., Ardenne P., 2021) relations between human beings and between humans and their environments. The hypothesis of this article is that the ethics of care invites us to rethink the socio-spatial conditions that separate us and unite us as inhabitants of the Earth : the thresholds of care. In the first place we examine the thresholds as spheres that can potentially be mobilised for the advent of care - care support - (Courbebaisse A., Salembier C., 2022) and as places to be taken care of - spatial care - (Lussault M., 2018). In the second place we question the << right distance >> in care practices. For these to occur it is in fact a matter of finding an equilibrium between << forgetfulness of self >> and << forgetfulness of others >> (Gilligan C., 1982). Finally, we bring out the issues in the socio-spatialisation of care which encourage overcoming the normative duality between public and private and changing from a society organised "around" the nuclear family to the creation of care communities (transl. J. Dudley).
Towards the end of her enquiry into the need to make care, not economics, the central concern of democratic political life, Joan Tronto takes seriously the idea that "democratic citizens care" and tries to envision the practical effects of this paradigmatic shift. They aim to promote care in society, in a way capable of addressing the diversity of caring needs of each person and through the creation of "social institutions congruent with that diversity". Moreover, the democratic citizens' "care about care" stimulates them to gear society and politics towards freedom, equality, and justice. As a result, care entails fostering personal and relational abilities, including the attentiveness to one's own needs as well as those of others, the capacity to cooperate instead of simply competing, and the boost of collective responsibility. According to Tronto, education is the practice thanks to which society achieves these goals. What I find interesting is the convergency between Tronto's care-based perspective and current democratic-educational practices spread across the world. But as regards one of these, namely Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp's "Philosophy for Children" (P4C), the convergency is even more interesting and unique, due to the centrality of "caring thinking" in P4C. What I endeavour to show in this article is that the similarity between Tronto's approach to care and P4C is mutually revealing, in the sense that Tronto's reflection sheds light on the political potential of P4C, whereas the latter provides an effective embodiment of Tronto's "thick" utopian thinking.
This article inquires into Husserl's doctrine of the concept. The aim is to understand what Husserl meant by the notion of << concept >> in the period 1900 to 1913, thus between the publication of Logical Investigations and the appearance of Ideas..., vol. I. In Logical Investigations Husserl describes the concept as an << equivocal >> notion, which can be understood as a general object and as an intention of meaning. We shall interpret this ambiguity/equivocation as an expression of what Marc Richir calls the << symbolic tautology >>, which in his view describes a fundamental aspect of metaphysical thought (transl. J. Dud-ley).
