Abstract Aristotle’s semantics for adjective-terms is a matter of debate. Some scholars argue that adjective-terms signify adjectival beings that have both an essence and a definition: e.g., if Socrates is just, just is an entity with its own essence and definition, distinct from both the subject Socrates, to whom it belongs, and the abstract property justice, from which it takes its name – the adjective-term ‘just’ – by paronymy. Others claim that an adjective-term does not signify a distinct essence nor does it have a definition: e.g., ‘just’, in the sentence ‘Socrates is just’, is merely a term that describes an accidental compound qua named after justice, the abstract property that inheres in it. Neither of these proposals is satisfactory. Aristotle implies in several passages that adjectival beings lack an essence of their own ( Top . I 9; cf. Metaph . Z 5.1031b18), and the idea that adjectival beings have distinct essences is philosophically troubling. Yet, according to Aristotle, adjectival beings, while not having a definition stricto sensu , possess an account (λόγος) (cf. Top. I 15.106a13; Top. II 2.109b30–110a9). In this paper, I argue that, while adjectival beings do not possess a definition, they nevertheless possess what I call a non-essential account. Finally, I suggest, by examining the structure of non-essential accounts, that adjectival beings have a peculiar ontological status and are best characterised as non-essential beings.
Abstract This article aims to analyse the interdependence between ethics and cosmology in Atticus’ fr. 2 DP, showing that the unity of philosophy is linked to the unity of the cosmos ruled by providence. Atticus offers a reinterpretation of Archilochus’ fable of the eagle and the fox (frr. 171–181 W) through the lens of Plato’s Phaedrus . This allows him, on the one hand, to engage in a polemic against Aristotle and oppose his way of fracturing the cosmos, thereby depriving the sublunary world of divine pronoia and exposing human beings to the contingencies of fortune. At the same time, he opposes his definition of happiness as requiring material goods, and not being achieved through virtue alone. The two grievances are intertwined and are presented with a complex rhetorical device, based on the reinterpretation of a fable by Archilochus, which is interwoven with several other literary and mythological references – to Hesiod, Aesop, Homer – as well as philosophical references – to Plato and Plutarch – that are more or less explicit. The reference to Phaedrus, however, has a special status: it sheds light on the meaning of the fable and reveals what is the true philosophy, the right path to happiness. This allows us to identify Atticus’ stance on the use of rhetoric: while the misappropriation of references is a powerful rhetorical tool, there cannot be any question of subverting Plato’s thinking for entertainment purposes; on the contrary, it is the works of poets that must be rewritten to express Platonic thought.
Abstract This article studies the use of the concept of σῶμα in Philo of Alexandria’s De opificio mundi . The analysis follows the progressive articulation of the treatise, focusing on the use of the somatic motif in four stages: a) The somatic vocabulary and the cosmos ( Opif . 1–68); b) The first creation account (cf. Gen 1,1–2,4a) and the characteristics of σῶμα ( Opif . 69–150); c) The somatic dimension in the second creation account (Gen 2,4b–25); d) The male-female relationship and corporeity ( Opif . 151–169). The study highlights three main characteristics of the use of σῶμα: 1) The importance of the “somatic vocabulary” in describing the coherence and harmony of created realities; 2) The positive role of σῶμα in relation to the anthropological vision of the two accounts of the creation of man (Gen 1,26; 2,7); 3) The role of “corporeity” in the union between man and woman.
