Este artículo analiza las técnicas de reproducción asistida (TRHA) desde una perspectiva feminista, abordando las tensiones entre autonomía, deseo y justicia. Se examinan las implicancias éticas de la medicalización, la mercantilización del cuerpo, y las normas de género y familia que estas tecnologías pueden reforzar o desafiar. A partir del concepto de autonomía relacional, se considera cómo las condiciones sociales, económicas y culturales influyen en las decisiones reproductivas. Se propone integrar la ética del cuidado y la justicia reproductiva como marcos analíticos que permitan una comprensión más inclusiva y crítica de las TRHA, con énfasis en la equidad, la dignidad y los derechos.
La presente nota busca recuperar la centralidad de una pregunta que rotula un ensayo de reflexión filosófica como el propuesto por Ricardo Ibarlucía: ¿Para qué necesitamos las obras maestras? Escritos sobre arte y filosofía, a instancias de su revisión crítica. Se tomará como punto de partida el mencionado ensayo para indagar acerca del alcance argumental allí propuesto. A fin de sostener un diálogo con este que permita dimensionar los logros derivados, se buscará brindar aportes que iluminen determinados ejemplos y consignar la magnitud de su propuesta. Esta breve presentación acompañará el modo en que los ensayos cifrados en el texto de base se desarrollan.
El Modelo de la Esquizofrenia como Trastorno de la Ipseidad (IDM) caracteriza los síntomas de la condición como alteraciones radicales en la estructura subjetiva de la conciencia. Recientes críticas provenientes desde la filosofía de la mente y la tradición fenomenológica han motivado la formulación de una versión revisada del modelo (IDMr). Sin embargo, no todos los defensores del IDM comparten esta estrategia y algunos se preguntan incluso si realmente existe continuidad entre los dos modelos. Este artículo analiza los alcances y limitaciones del tránsito del IDM al IDMr. Luego de clarificar las principales ideas del IDM con un énfasis especial en la manera en que conceptualiza las nociones de sí-mismo (self) e ipseidad en su caracterización de la esquizofrenia, el artículo explora las críticas más relevantes al modelo original y evalúa las respuestas de sus defensores. Luego, se examina la versión revisada del modelo, evaluando los avances que representa, los problemas que deja abiertos y el grado de continuidad que mantiene con respecto a su formulación original.
Analizamos los aportes que pueden realizar las teorías de casi-conjuntos para los intereses del lógico. Las diferentes teorías de casi-conjuntos han realizado valiosos aportes a los fundamentos de la matemática y física cuántica; sin embargo, no queda claro cuánto pueden favorecer tales formalismos a la lógica. De ser el caso, ¿podrían tener repercusión tanto a nivel sintáctico como semántico? ¿Qué precauciones deberíamos tener? ¿Qué implicaciones tendría su aplicación a diferentes niveles y metaniveles del lenguaje lógico? Motivados principalmente por investigaciones provenientes de la lógica cuántica, aunque también presentamos motivaciones lingüísticas, proponemos ciertas aplicaciones y analizamos algunas de sus consecuencias.
This paper proposes a hybrid teleosemantic account of meaning in (non-human) animal-to-animal communication. I consider two families of cases: signals about events external to the sender, and signals about the sender’s identity or current condition. On the most influential teleosemantic approach to animal communication, such signals represent the conditions in the world required for their receivers’ signal-guided behavior to be beneficial. I argue that, taken on its own, this benefit-based approach yields implausible ascriptions of content, diverging both from ethological practice and from what the view is advertised as delivering in cases of animal communication. To address this problem, I draw on a teleosemantic framework I previously developed for simple perceptual representations, which I here extend to the case of animal signals. In particular, I supplement the benefit-based approach with a signal-production condition that constrains content to what causally elicits the sender’s signaling. The resulting hybrid delivers plausible contents for signals about both events in the external world and a sender’s identity or current condition.
Kistler’s “Constitution and Causation in Mechanisms” raises important issues regarding Craver, Glennan, and Povich’s “Matched Interlevel Experiments” approach to determining relations of non-causal dependence. Is this theory meant to be an account of actual scientific practice or merely a set of joint sufficiency conditions for determining relations of non-causal dependence? Has the manipulability approach to relations of non-causal dependence overlooked an important scientific source of evidence for relations of non-causal dependence? This paper draws attention to these questions.
Dentro del ámbito de la teoría evolutiva, las posturas causalista y estadística postulan diferentes formas de entender los conceptos y parámetros que los modelos poblacionales de la Síntesis Moderna involucran. En especial, la discusión se centra en gran parte sobre si la selección natural y la deriva deben entenderse como procesos causales o como parámetros estadísticos de los modelos. Este trabajo propone una lectura representacional de los compromisos centrales establecidos por una de estas posturas: los cuatro “pilares” de la visión estadística (Walsh et al., 2017). Para esto se realiza un análisis de los mismos a partir de las herramientas conceptuales del acercamiento de Van Fraassen (2008) en cuanto a la representación científica, entendiendo los pilares de la visión estadística como consecuencias del carácter representacional de los modelos poblacionales. A la hora de establecer cada uno de los pilares, enfatizamos la relevancia puesta en el uso de los modelos para ciertos objetivos científicos, así como en las características perspectivistas de los modelos poblacionales. Esto nos permite contrarrestar ciertas críticas e interpretaciones que la visión estadística ha recibido; en particular, argumentamos que es incorrecto asumir que la visión estadística establece que la genética poblacional sea “simplemente” matemática.
According to the Evolutionary Theory of Creativity, creative processes proceed through blind variation and selective retention of ideas. As I will argue, this theory has the virtue of providing a naturalistic account of the phenomenon of creativity but imposes an unnecessary limitation: it restricts the selection processes of ideas to the individual level. In contrast, some cultural evolution theories suggest that variation and selection processes also occur at the community level. In this sense, I propose reformulating the Evolutionary Theory of Creativity by incorporating the processes that take place at the community level into its explanation of the originality and value of creative products.
The book under review presents a comprehensive set of problems and theoretical perspectives on self-knowledge and related issues, particularly self-deception. We will examine three closely interconnected questions here: the relationship between selfknowledge and self-deception, the role of rationality in self-knowledge, the extent to which beliefs about ourselves are susceptible to volitional influences, and, finally, the possibility that different explanatory models may coexist.
Anticipatory behaviors are widespread and fundamental for survival; however, their origin in very diverse mechanisms limits the informational value of attributing anticipation in a general way. Therefore, this work develops a restricted definition of Future-Oriented Cognition (FOC) designed to investigate the complex cognitive bases of such behaviors in non-human animals. It begins with a review of the predominant paradigm (object choice tasks), drawing on evidence from developmental psychology, to identify its limitations against alternative explanations (associationist or present-restricted) and to derive stricter control conditions. Consequently, a restricted definition of FOC is formulated, postulating as requirements that the behavior does not originate from mere association and that it involves a genuine representation of the future-complex capacities that emerge late in human development (from 5 years onwards). Finally, recent evidence in New Caledonian crows is examined, where experimental controls similar to those present in evidence with children are applied (object salience and the active planning of a temporal sequence). The corvids' success under these experimental conditions reduces the plausibility of alternative explanations and satisfies the criteria of the proposed restricted FOC, thus offering reasonable proof of this cognitive capacity in the species.
This article critically examines the claim that "every cell has a sex", an approach asserting that sex chromosomes (XX and XY) determine fundamental biological differences at the cellular level. Through an interdisciplinary analysis, the empirical, conceptual, and ontological validity of this perspective is questioned. The article argues that sex is neither a fixed nor binary property of cells but rather a contextual and dynamic category. Finally, alternative approaches better suited for biomedical research are proposed, allowing for a more precise analysis of biological diversity without resorting to essentialist frameworks.
This note seeks to recover the centrality of a question that titles a philosophical reflection essay such as the one proposed by Ricardo Ibarlucia: & iquest;Para qu & eacute; necesitamos las obras maestras? Escritos sobre arte y filosof & iacute;a, prompted by a critical review of the same. The aforementioned essay will be taken as a starting point to explore the scope of the arguments put forward there. In order to sustain a dialogue with it that allows the achievements derived from it to be properly assessed, this note seeks to offer contributions that shed light on certain examples and record the magnitude of its proposal. This brief presentation will accompany the way in which the essays contained in the source text unfold.
It is widely accepted that bigoted and prejudiced speech has no place in democratic communication. But how can it be fought? One response resorts to negative counterspeech, in which the resistant hearer typically denies what was said by the bigot; e.g., denying a harmful negative stereotype, like 'women are submissive'. Lately, however, this type of negative strategy has been treated with some pessimism by philosophers who point out that denying stereotypes tends to reinforce their salience and to amplify their cognitive influence. This can cause refutations to backfire as counterspeech. It has also been argued, more broadly, that it is unfair to demand resistance duties from typical victims of bigotry, since their speech is often silenced and/or stumble upon hermeneutical gaps. My goal here is to question the pessimistic view of negative counterspeech by arguing that it is still an adequate choice in combating bigoted speech, provided the reply either changes the QUD (i.e., question under discussion) - which represents the goals of the conversation - or the terms of the conversation. I propose that rephrasings, which are negative replies in nature, are good alternatives to in situ denials. I also hold that rephrasings used in the State's communication are less likely to be silenced, and this helps to avoid problems related to deontic concerns. Finally, I analyze a practical case of use of rephrasing in state counterspeech.
In this paper, I argue that the Gricean model of conversational implicature, although widely used to analyze fictional discourse, needs to be adapted to the particular communicative aims of such discourse. I show, through an example of conversational implicature in a fictional story, that working out implicatures is problematic in some cases, and I attribute this difficulty to the fact that, while in ordinary conversations the maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner serve the conversational goal of maximizing the efficient exchange of information, in fictional discourse the primary goal is to endow the discourse with tellability. The traditional maxims, therefore, do not align with the communicative objective of fictional discourse. To account for these problematic cases, I propose introducing a new maxim, the Maxim of Narrativity, which states that the author should aim to maximize the narrative quality of the story. In this way, I extend the Gricean framework without significant theoretical cost, preserving its usefulness for the analysis of communication in fictional contexts.
Ezcurdia, in Complejidad y ambig & uuml;edad, proposes and defends functional referentialism. This is a novel proposal about what makes a linguistic expression referential. In her book, Ezcurdia also argues that proper names are not indexical, despite being context-dependent. In this article I explore this idea. Doing so is a fruitful exercise, as it shows interesting connections in the philosophy of Ezcurdia. The conclusion of the article is that, given Ezcurdia's theoretical commitments, there is no impediment to maintaining that proper names are indexical and that it is best to hold that they are. This conclusion is in accordance with functional referentialism.
In this work, I jointly take up the books on truth written by Guillermo Hurtado and Eduardo Fermandois. I focus on situating both texts within three distinct theoretical frameworks: the investigation of importance (in Frankfurt's sense), the non-ideal theory, and the non-definitional approach. I then present both Hurtado's negative genealogy and Fermandois's conception of truth as dissent, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, with particular attention to the proximity of both positions to a form of pragmatist-inspired expressivism.
Pure powers ontologies hold that all or many fundamental natural properties are completely powerful. Their nature is exhausted by the various causal, dispositional, and nomic roles they play. I discuss an underappreciated challenge against the pure powers view based on considerations from physics: How can we harmonise the complete powerfulness thesis and the manifest qualitatively structural, geometrical, and mathematical character of physical properties? I identify and assay five approaches that could answer this question: (i) eliminativism, (ii), the identity view, (iii) emergentism, (iv) essentialism, and (v) prioritarianism. Any satisfactory answer to the challenge should preserve the primacy of the powerful over the qualitative, and it should avoid collapsing the pure powers view into one of its competitors. I argue that each of (i)-(v) either fails to meet such desiderata or raises new problems for the pure powers view.
Can species membership warrant the advantageous treatment of an individual, human or nonhuman? For decades, philosophers have debated the moral justification of speciesism. This debate, however, risks becoming a hard to solve clash of ultimate intuitions-a possibility that has led some authors to develop an alternative epistemic approach to speciesism, which inspects, not speciesism's moral correction, but the epistemic reliability of speciesist judgments. That is, whether, those judgments arise in epistemically favorable circumstances-or whether they are the product of reliable judgment-formation mechanisms. In this article, I pursue three goals. First, to survey and articulate, in a coherent manner, a so far undertheorized epistemic turn in the literature. Second, to explain why it is desirable to adopt an epistemic approach which supplements the traditional moral approach. And, third, to critically assess three recent contributions-suggesting some possible avenues for future work, as of yet neglected.
