As Vetter says, we are at the “beginning of the debate, not the end” (2015: 300) when it comes to evaluating her potentiality-based account of metaphysical modality. This paper contributes to this developing debate by highlighting three problems for Vetter’s account. Specifically, I begin (§1) by articulating some relevant details of Vetter’s potentiality-based view. This leads to the first issue (§2), concerning unclarity in the idea of degrees of potentiality. Similarly, the second issue (§3) raises trouble for Vetter’s proposed individuation conditions for potentialities. Finally, the third issue (§4) is about apparently unmanifestable intrinsic potentialities, and suggests that there might be some deeper problems with anchoring metaphysical possibilities in concrete objects. More generally, though the issues detailed here are problematic, I do not take them to be fatal. However, they do show that, at minimum, further clarification of Vetter’s potentiality view is required.
This contribution offers an interpretation of the last half of chapter 1 of book 5 of Aristotle’s Physics in the form of a commentary. Among other things, it attempts an explanation of why Aristotle calls the termini of changes ‘something underlying’ (ὑποκείμενον) and ‘something not underlying’ (μὴ ὑποκείμενον). It also provides an analysis of Aristotle’s argument for the claim that what is not simpliciter does not change in the light of this interpretation.
We show in this paper how three continental philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida respectively) respond negatively to the analytic correspondence theory of truth using different notions developed by them (i.e. the notion of Intentionality by Husserl, the notion of Dasein by Heidegger, and the notion of Trace by Derrida). We show that despite the fact that the three philosophers are united against the analytic correspondence theory of truth, there are still deep differences between them which stem from the different tools they use to articulate the concept of truth. Also, we argue that Husserlian truth has an advantageous position over the other concepts of truth presented.
This paper attempts an investigation to the relationship between the Analects by Confucius (the Lun-Yu), which contains the very core of the philosophy of Confucius and the Chinese language in terms of describing the degree to which the structure of the Chinese language has been beneficial for the evolution of philosophical thought. The idea investigated has its root to the individuality of the Chinese language, which is differently structured compared to the Indo-European languages. Therefore we set to explore how it became possible for this particularity to give birth to original philosophical ideas and thus some comparison examples are used to the Greek language. In other words may we assume that the way one speaks defines the way one thinks according to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?
In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the Heideggerian concept of 'place' for each respective domain of inquiry. In particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new dimensions of Jeff Malpas's work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas through an analysis of 'place'. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and engagement between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly acknowledge throughout.
This study is a comparative investigation of Proclus’ and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s positions about “remaining” as demonstrative of the ontological monism. Focusing the attention, first of all, to the Neoplatonist philosopher, who represents polytheism, it comes that “remaining” indicates the state of standstill and unchangeability of those beings which are able to function as productive principles. Thus, a transcendental and a productive plane are identified, a parameter which combines the apophatic with the affirmative approaches. The theory about “unparticipated-participated-participating” brings to the light a middle phase between “remaining” and “procession”, in order the relation “one-multitude” to develop. In Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, “remaining” appears in two planes: a) the transcendent One, which does not take part in the production process, b) the One which includes all the beings in the form of archetypical reasons. Note that this is not an eternal co-existence or an ontological identification of the beings with the One’s substance or a transition from the first One to the second, as Proclus suggests. Pseudo-Dionysius just describes the providential function of the One, which is manifested owing to its goodness. In conclusion, the main difference between the two thinkers is how they conceive the notion of “metaphysical multitude”: in Proclus, it indicates a hierarchy of beings, while, in Pseudo-Dionysius, it expresses the inner richness of the unity. In both the worldviews though, the ontological prospect which is formed is actually an optimistic one.
Heidegger and Sartre developed the projects of their fundamental ontologies within the framework of the phenomenological approach. The traditional view of reality is based on dualistic oppositions of ideal and material, spirit and body, reality and possibility, and visibility and essence. According to both authors, phenomenology enables elimination of the above-mentioned dualisms and restoration of the world’s ontological unity on a reliable foundation. A special attention is paid to a problem of authenticity and transcendence from the point of view of above-mentioned ontological concepts. The problem of authenticity is one of the main issues of human life: the person can come up against a situation of a tough choice and get to a special paradigm of submission that it is practically similar to loss of own authenticity. Method of a research is the comparative analysis of approaches of Sartre and Heidegger to phenomena of freedom, authenticity, the truth and being. In addition, the analysis of a modern discussion on this subject is carried out. The main conclusion of this research is that though Sartre's existentialism was exposed to criticism both from right, and from the left intellectuals, and is not a "fashionable" current at present, and the fundamental ontology of Heidegger was estimated by Levinas as ontology of the power subject-centered line, nevertheless the author considers that attention which is paid in these concepts to such phenomena as the voice of conscience, care and freedom represents the most urgent philosophical value nowadays; the author in this regard points to insufficient validity of modern criticism of approaches of Heidegger and Sartre, in particular - reproaches in a subject-centered line from adherents of "ontology of the Other"
In this paper, I introduce a novel view of fairness: I explain fair sport competition through the notion of successful competition. I begin by analysing successful competition. I propose that competitions can be successful, both internally and externally. Internally successful competition is connected to the internal purpose of competition and has two senses: narrow and wide. Competition was internally successful in the narrow sense if three criteria of ‘betterness’ – official result, ideally adjudicated result, and display of athletic skills – were congruous in that competition. Competition was internally successful in the wide sense if the three aforementioned criteria of betterness were congruous and the competition also embodied ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’. Externally successful competition is connected to the external purposes of competition. Financial gain is an example of an external purpose. I argue that competition was fair if it was internally successful in the narrow sense, that is, if the three criteria of betterness were congruous in the competition.
