ABSTRACT According to the so‐called ‘standard theory of conditions’, ‘being a sufficient condition of’ and ‘being a necessary condition of’ are converse relations, that is, if A is a sufficient condition for B , B is a necessary condition for A . This theory faces well‐known counterexamples that appeal to causal and other asymmetric considerations. I show that these counterexamples lose their plausibility once we clarify two key assumptions of the standard theory: that to satisfy a condition is to instantiate a property, and that what is usually called the ‘conditionship relation’ is an inferential relation. Throughout the paper, I favour this way of interpreting the standard theory over an alternative interpretation outlined in causal terms, since it can be applied to all the counterexamples without losing its intuitive appeal.
ABSTRACT The topic addressed is persistent difficulties in writings on Russell and early Moore, of stating what it is one has in mind when thinking what there is. If propositions, whether before or after the multiple‐relations theory of judgement, are made up of the things themselves, then propositions cannot be the content of thought. In arguing for realism, Russell and Moore cannot open up a problem of the external world, as that would fail to refute idealism, but neither can they accept intermediary senses or ideas as these risk differing from what there is, precluding knowledge (cf. the Mont Blanc correspondence between Frege and Russell). Given Moore's and Russell's rejection of psychologism, what is left is an external relation of acquaintance as fully adequate representationism, as a condition on realism if we can be said to know what we are thinking and speaking about.
ABSTRACT ‘Propositions’ are or include truths and falsehoods—potential points of agreement and disagreement. On the question of when it's a case of different propositions, or instead a case of the same proposition differently expressed, conflicting philosophical positions are canvassed and a Fregean conclusion drawn.
ABSTRACT Hinge epistemology maintains that certain propositions must stand fast for our epistemic practices to be possible. Yet the notion of ‘practice’ and its relation to hinges remains undeveloped. This paper offers a Wittgensteinian reading of practices and develops more explicitly their connection with hinge propositions. On this view, hinges are understood as rules that give epistemic practices their own internal structure, motivating a contextualist account of hinges. The paper then considers some prominent critiques of hinge contextualism and suggests that they can be avoided. The aim is to develop a systematic connection between hinge epistemology and Wittgenstein's conception of practice, extending the application of hinges beyond quotidian certainties to the propositions that structure different epistemic practices.
