In the present article, we examine a paradox that has gone almost entirely unnoticed by commentators, both ancient and modern. This oversight may surprise scholars, given the extensive body of work on Timaeus’ universe, much of which emphasizes discrepancies with astronomical observations or points out alleged internal contradictions. This paradox arises from the premise of a universe entirely filled with polyhedra and that nonetheless has a spherical surface despite the absence of any void outside it.
Zeno’s well-known Millet Seed logos has only two sources: Aristotle’s brief rejection of it in Physics and Simplicius’ dialogue between Zeno and Protagoras providing that logos. This logos falls beyond Zeno’s familiar paradoxes and is often ignored. Found in the ad hominem style, it has been treated as a refutation of Protagorean relativism. This article provides a new reading of this fundamental evidence for Zeno and his putative dialogue.
In Categories 5, Aristotle declares that what seems most distinctive (ἴδιον) of substance is that, being one and the same in number, it can receive contraries. This assertion involves a problem, since this property is only unqualified true of individual substances. After briefly setting out the problem, I start by examining and rejecting some expedient ways of explaining it away and then give a short history of its reception in Neoplatonic commentary. Finally, I show how the dominant Neoplatonic interpretation fails to solve the problem and submit an alternative solution that achieves this result.
None of the recent accounts of Plato’s first ideal city discuss an important feature of the constitution of kallipolis: that some of the laws are entrenched. I argue that the kallipolitan laws concerning education are entrenched, i.e., they cannot be changed by anyone in kallipolis, even the guardians. Entrenchment serves a stabilizing function, preventing the guardians from becoming worse over time due to an erosion of their moral education.
This article offers a reappraisal of Aenesidemus’ eight modes against causal explanation. The usual interpretation divides the modes into two groups, one which undermines only some causal explanations and another which, more radically, undermines all causal explanations. I argue against this reading on both textual and philosophical grounds and then sketch an alternative interpretation of the modes, which avoids two objections I raise against the usual view.
Hope (ἐλπίς) surfaces more than one hundred times in Thucydides’ History, extensively thematized and deeply explored in almost all reported speeches delivered by politicians and generals. The objective of this article is to elucidate Thucydides’ notion of hope, advocating for its internal consistency. Moreover, in contrast to interpretations that construe hope as an emotion, a passion, or a complex mental state, it posits that Thucydides conceives of hope as a practical intellectual state.
Aenesidemus, the (re-)founder of Pyrrhonian skepticism, is usually said to have begun his career by breaking away from the Academy. This assertion rests on the word συναιρεσιώτῃ as it appears in Photius’ summary of Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonian Discourses. I argue that Photius’ probable understanding of the Academy’s history undermines this traditional reading. I then examine the evidence external to Photius and conclude that it also speaks against the traditional narrative.
It is commonly thought that a central lesson of Republic i is to indicate the flaws of the τέχνη model for thinking about justice and ruling. I provide a novel defense of Socrates’ arguments from τέχνη. I argue that (i) book 1 is less hostile to the τέχνη model than is often supposed and that (ii) Socrates’ arguments from τέχνη are more favorable than they are often supposed.
Lucretius argues at length against love in De Rerum Natura (DRN) iv. Many scholars take Lucretius’ condemnation of love to show that love was impermissible among Epicureans. I argue here that Lucretius’ arguments do not show that love is forbidden on Epicurean grounds. Lucretius’ arguments require controversial presuppositions about the nature and effects of love that the Epicurean is free or has reasons to reject.
Many commentators struggle to explain why thauma is a fitting response to the dice and height comparisons in Plato’s Theaetetus. I argue that Socrates employs these comparisons to test the cogency of Protagoreanism and remind Theaetetus of his mathematical lesson with Theodorus. In this way I align Theaetetus’ wonder with the various senses in which Plato typically employs thaumazein and its cognates. Theaetetus is surprised that the comparisons validate Protagoreanism; he desires to know whether this implausible metaphysics can be squared with more intuitive principles; and he is ultimately led to marvel at the irrational length, an extraordinary measure.
