The NCAFP co-sponsored with the Tokyo Foundation a conference designed to explore ways of easing China–Japan and China–U.S. tensions, held in Tokyo in October 2014. The following collection of essays includes a conference summary as well as several essays based on conference presentations: four by Americans, one by a Japanese participant, and another by a Chinese participant.
The 1992 Consensus on “one China with different interpretations” is an artful and ambiguous formulation that has served both Beijing and Taipei as the basis for stability in the Taiwan Strait ever since Ying-jeou Ma became Taiwan's President in 2008.
To answer that question this analysis examines the work of the political realist thinker Hans J. Morgenthau who transformed the study of international relations with his analysis of this question. As this analysis turns to Morgenthau, a founder of the National Committee and the chief theorist of the national interest, to define the complexities of the term, Morgenthau read the writings of the founders of America—the Federalists—for an explication of what has become the most important term in the lexicon of international relations. As relayed in this analysis, Morgenthau distilled three precepts underlying the founders’ conception of America's interest in foreign affairs and nine rules that govern the art of diplomacy. They are identified and explained here in an analysis that shows, among other things, the durability of Morgenthau's thought.
On May 8, 2007, a power-sharing executive was constituted in Northern Ireland. Although the fledgling government does not signal that harmony is likely to prevail in the province, it indicates that politics will be practiced in the North by politicians who fought one another to a draw for more than a decade in which the end stages of the formal peace process played themselves out fitfully and relentlessly. This article identifies the strategy that Sinn Fein adopted to resolve the deadly conflict in the North and suggests that by following that game plan to its logical conclusion and by responding to the demands made by its chief foe, the Democratic Unionist party, Sinn Fein left that party with no credible argument with which to sustain its objection to joining a power-sharing government. It conjectures that only a soothsayer can predict with any degree of certitude whether the ultimate goals of the unionists or the nationalists will be realized. Finally, it concludes that the peace process in Northern Ireland provides a model for helping to resolve historic conflicts irrespective of their kind, cause, and duration.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has been attributed to several factors ranging from 30 years of economic stagnation brought about by the inability of the socialist economy to adapt itself to the p...
… ‘Tis folly for one Nation to look for disinterested favors from another …. There can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon, real favors from Nation to Nation.1… The course of this...
Right after the Winter Olympics, Vladimir Putin chose to shake up the post–cold war order in Europe, declaring that he is taking defensive measures to preserve Russia’s security against continuous North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) enlargements that were supposedly being conducted in the United States’ interests. According to that version, the final bitter pill Moscow refused to swallow was the vision of Ukraine moving into the American camp—with Kiev’s rejection of the Russian-led Custom Union membership in favor of association status in the EU. That move was interpreted in Moscow as a new step toward ‘‘defanging’’ Russia’s defenses and a final weakening of Russia in line with the 1991 dissolution of the U.S.S.R. The Western world was caught unprepared for Russian moves. Dependent on Western (mostly European) trade, investments, technology, and especially on the craving for stability and consumer goods for its own middle class, Russia was not considered likely to sacrifice post-Soviet achievements for a shot at Empire rebuilding. Moreover, seen as a ‘‘regional power’’ by none less than President Obama, Russia was not deemed daring enough to challenge the existing world order. Russia’s longterm role in the creation of ‘‘quasi-states’’ on the territory of former Soviet republics (NagornoKarabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Gagauzia), as well as the 2008 war with Georgia, were dismissed as ‘‘regional’’ happenings and not seen as precursors to a challenge of the West in general and of the United States in particular. A great deal of Western evaluation of the post-Soviet situation has been based on the assumption that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the result mainly of the American victory in the cold war. That was a contributing factor, but the implosion caused by the failure of the communist economic system and by the burden of maintaining an Empire in modern times were the key. However, Moscow never envisioned the newly independent former republics as being outside its sphere of influence, but rather as deprived of Russian commitments and subsidies. Furthermore, encouraged by the attitude of President George H. W. Bush (as in his August 1991 ‘‘chicken Kiev’’ speech), Moscow assumed that Washington accepted that relinquishing the Warsaw Pact nations (plus the Baltic republics) was the final Russian retreat and that further inroads into ‘‘the Russian world’’ would not be attempted. The West, for its part, expected Moscow to accept the post-Soviet world order that banned the use of force in Europe. Thus, the military intervention conducted by NATO against Serbia to secure Kosovo’s selfdetermination caused alarm and mistrust in Russia about the application of European rules of the game. Those rules were seen as selectively applied by the United States, itself free from restraints that bound lesser powers. Such perceived arrogance was considered to be the clear result of America’s being the sole superpower and the demise of the multi-power world. In the mind of the Kremlin, Russian interventions in Georgia or Ukraine do not differ from American use of force, whether in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, or elsewhere, or from French military missions in francophone Africa—fortifying the belief that Russia has a similar right to prevent Ukraine from moving into the opposite camp. With the events in Ukraine—which contrary to Washington’s and Brussels’s expectations barged on American Foreign Policy Interests, 37:177–178, 2015 Copyright # 2015 NCAFP ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2015.1056685
U.S.-China relations have developed steadily since President Nixon's groundbreaking visit to China over forty years ago, and are generally stable today. Yet the next U.S. President will face both challenges and opportunities with Beijing. Recent indications are that bilateral cooperation on North Korea's nuclear threat can become a positive, while tensions in the South China Sea are less promising. Perceived Chinese cyberspying, Taiwan and economic frictions will all need to be handled carefully. The next American leader will want to continue the constructive engagement that has characterized past bilateral ties, while speaking out frankly when the two sides differ, as on human rights. Experience has shown that Beijing and Washington can manage their differences and highlight commonalities in what many see as the single most important bilateral relationship in the world today.
"Building a Regional Order in East Asia: Community, Competition, Conflict." American Foreign Policy Interests, 37(5-6), pp. 251–252
ABSTRACT From one of the most respected fathers of political realism, writing in the inaugural issue of the National Committee's Newsletter, which became today's American Foreign Policy Interests, comes a flawless explanation of the viability of the balance of power.
In focusing on what may turn out to be the most dynamic issue in the Muslim world today, the panelists maintain that democratic reform will not be achieved until the acknowledged rights and responsibilities of women have been implemented
Most Chinese share the American and South Koreans view that North Korea (DPRK) has a bad regime, opposing the North Korean nuclear and missile programs; but most Chinese do not see the North as an immediate and serious threat, including these nuclear and missile programs. Further, both the Chinese government and people want to maintain normal relations with the DPRK. In regional geopolitical and strategic views, most Chinese still see the U.S., Japan, and South Korea (ROK) as the other bloc, and Russia, China, and the DPRK as the loosely different group in Northeast Asia; and the Chinese do not want to change this regional structure.
A resurgent and aggressive Russia, refugee flows and terrorists, and rising antisemitism and xenophobia are all sitting on an economic house of cards with unity in Europe coming apart. Soberly stated, Europe is at the cliff's edge and the time for action is now. What action? A voracious 24-hour media cycle and rapidly developing crises seem to have leaders pinned in a caustic loop of act-react. Given that the top challenges of the day affect each of the European capitals differently, in terms of impact to national interests, it is little wonder that finding consensus, either at the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is difficult. Whether it is monetary policy wielded at the European Central Bank or redefining defense postures, measures taken at the multinational level seem wanting for long-term approaches. A common vision of Europe's future is essential and it needs to be articulated in the form of a strategy. A variety of ways are available to get there but the time is now. The wolves are at Europe's door in ways that are reminiscent of what was seen in 1914 and 1938. Arguably, every nation on the planet has equities in the existing international system as well as Europe's success. After all, from Vladimir Putin to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), both are being challenged. Europe needs her strategy now.
The NCAFP held a conference with participants from the United States and China on opportunities and challenges in the bilateral relationship. The following is a summary of the conference discussion, which was held in March 2015.
In securitisation theory (ST) little attention has been paid to how actors undertake securitisation collectively. The empirical focus of that theory has also, paradoxically, neglected the military-strategic sector and with it regional security organisations like NATO. Such an oversight is worth correcting for three reasons. First, NATO is constantly engaged in securitisation across a range of issues, a process that reflects an underappreciated recursive interaction between the Alliance and its member states. Second, the Ukraine crisis has resulted in Russia being explicitly identified as a source of threat and so has triggered a successful collective (re)securitisation by the Alliance. Third, a framework that demonstrates NATO's standing as a securitising actor has potential relevance to other regional security organisations. This article discusses and amends ST in service of an approach that permits securitisation by actors other than the state, in this case NATO. A model of collective securitisation is presented and then applied empirically to the post-Cold War desecuritisation of Russia and its subsequent resecuritisation following the annexation of Crimea. The implications of resecuritisation for the emergence of a self-reinforcing security dilemma in NATO-Russia relations are also considered.
It is difficult to argue with the central recommendation in Hugh White's The China Choice. If, indeed, the United States had only three basic choices in responding to China's rise—capitulation, con...
The Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS) of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) hosted two days of Track 1.5 meetings in Beijing from October 19-20, 2015. This report is not so much an effort to summarize the rich discussion at the trilateral meeting, as it is an effort to analyze the complex and fragile nature of trilateral relations today and to offer suggestions to all three sides for improvement in their ties with each other. The meeting focused on the interactions between and among the bilateral relationships that comprise this trilateral and the policy agenda for cooperation in ensuring stability in the Asia Pacific during this time of geostrategic change.
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) made its annual fact-finding visit to Taipei, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo from October 13-27 to discuss the current troubled security environment in East Asia with officials, scholars, and think tanks. This report highlights the findings of this mission and puts forth a number of policy recommendations for official consideration.
