In this study, we aim to analyze the notions of "pragmatic" and "commatic" we encounter in what we highlight to be a process of canonization of style appropriate to each content and theological level since Porphyry. This research is divided into three parts: primarily, we investigate the sense in which the Neoplatonists use the adjective "commatic", which includes on the one hand (i) defining what the Neoplatonists mean by "unity of meaning", and on the other hand distinguishing between a "woven" and continuous style and a "disjointed" and broken style, collecting the stylistic criticisms made by the Neoplatonists of the ancient texts; then (2) we seek to establish the areas of application of the "commatic" style in Neoplatonic discourse, distinguishing on the one hand inspired and ethical discourse, and on the other hand clear and sharp dialectical discourse, bordering on that which eludes philosophical demonstration, namely, the alpha sigma alpha phi epsilon iota alpha; finally (3), we aim to study the "pragmatic" style associated with each theological content in order to highlight its corresponding style and vocabulary. The present research stems from the need to show how behind the lexical and structural choices of the Neoplatonic writings there is a precise theory of style, produced by a process of aesthetic canonization that emerges clearly as early as Porphyry's rhetorical fragments and from Neoplatonic exegetical activity on rhetorical works, as well as from an innumerable amount of references to a rhetorical tradition on the period and its parts, the commata and cola, which the Neoplatonists, as this study aims to show, master and apply on their own structuring and formalization of theological content.
The purpose of this paper is i) to focus on the last section of the In Parmenidem, analyzing Proclus' reflection on the relationship between the First God and what he calls the "axioms of contradiction", accompanied by an attempt to harmonize in a subordinate sense the Aristotelian perspective with the Platonic one; 2) to analyze the reception of this idea in Nicholas of Cusa, the first Latin author to be systematically influenced by the In Parmenidem. It will be possible to show how Cusanus develops a perspective that, on the one hand, finds its explicit antecedent in Proclus and, on the other, how he radicalizes Proclus' perspective, developing theoretical tensions that we can find unsystematically in Proclus' own thought. Proclus is aware that the Principle of all reality and of science itself must be conceived as in itself unknowable. At the same time, he seeks to save the ability of human knowledge to describe reality. Starting from an idea of the relationship between God and the laws of contradiction close to that of Proclus, Cusanus develops an epistemology that, on the one hand, recognizes the principle of contradiction as the ultimate principle of reason and, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion of a separation between thought and reality outside thought.
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the position and role of Plato's Charmides by analysing its second part. In this section, Critias tries to explain s8phrosun & ecirc; as a form of knowledge that is self-referential in the sense that it is a type of knowledge of all other forms of knowledge without being knowledge of the objects of those other forms. Plato remains doubtful about the feasibility and usefulness of such a concept, as he believes that all types of knowledge must be about something else, separate from the forms of knowledge themselves. He also thinks that such formal knowledge, if it indeed exists, is of little interest. This paper also aims to demonstrate that the Charmides belongs to a group of dialogues in which Plato discusses other people's proposals, similar to what happens in the Theaetetus. In the case of the Charmides, this is very likely the project that we will later see developed in Aristotle's PosteriorAnalytics.
This article suggests a novel approach to the study of the argumentative structure of Proclus' Elements of Theology (ET). Instead of studying it through the prism of the Elements of Euclid (EG), this novel approach proposes an evaluation of ET's argumentative structure based on Proclus' reflections about the genre of stoichei & ocirc;sis and the methods of dialectic and geometry. Thus, I argue that studies under the suggested form of evaluation should standardize the conceptual framework of their analyses about the features of ET's argumentative structure, explicating their relevance for the interpretation of the text's system of logical relations. Moreover, this article presents some examples of editorial enhancements made by editors of ET clarifying the argumentative structure of the text. With these examples, I will show how these enhancements help us clarify the argumentative structure of ET.
This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem . I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything.
When Odysseus makes his trip to meet the souls of the famous dead, he encounters the "shade of Heracles," while "Heracles himself" is dining with the gods. This passage has inspired many poets and philosophers. A notable case is Plotinus who generally uses the term eid6lon along with other terms to define the "image of the soul" which is responsible for basic forms of ensoulment. The Homeric passage complicates matters: "Heracles himself" stands for the so-called undescended soul, but the "shade of Heracles" seems to encompass more than the lower forms of ensoulment the eid6lon of Heracles thinks, remembers and talks. Plotinus' take on the story is unique. Instead of allegorizing the story in a general fashion, he seems driven to explain all its details, not from some general need for exegesis but because these challenge his ideas on the undescended soul, the image of the soul and the concept of self.
This article challenges some common modern conceptions of Plotinus' ethics and suggests a more positive view on the basis of an ancient paradigm of self-relatedness that runs from Plato through Aristotle to Plotinus with different emphases in each, but that is often misunderstood. Following Stern-Gillet's rejection of some modern views that Plotinus' ethics is egoistical, impractical, and world renouncing, we argue that while self-directedness is primary in the ancient tradition, there flows from this an intrinsic correlation between self-directedness and care for others. Negative views of Plotinus' ethics do not take account of Plotinus' understanding of energeia or activity which pre-includes praxis and transforms external action into focused energeia. In other words, self-relatedness in the context of divine inspiration, as in Socrates' second speech in Plato's Phaedrus, is for Plotinus a psycho-somatic activity, but rooted in the psyche and in principle intelligible, genuinely capable of unifying intelligible and sensible in a form that can be really attentive to both practical and contemplative concerns simultaneously. From this perspective, Plotinus' ethics includes not only care of the self and others, but also, we maintain, broader ecological and cosmic concerns.
Although the text of this argument seems to present itself as a tight logical argument, it has what we might call dangling threads. Commentators, beginning in antiquity, have taken these to be invitations to speculation. The result is an array of contradictory analyses about, e.g., the subdivisions of the arguments and, then, how the subdivisions are related to one another, and to the conclusion. In this article, I will offer a new analysis, in which I will distinguish two sub-arguments: one dealing with the principle of motion and one dealing with the principle of becoming; then I will show how the two sub-arguments are related. I will argue that to understand this whole argument, and the way the two sub-arguments fit together, we must assume a conception of motion that differs in important ways from our contemporary conception of motion.
This paper concerns the translation of Plato's Palinode and in particular, Phaedrus 247d8-el, where the soul is said to see and feast upon the Forms of Justice, Temperance, and Knowledge. The paper looks forward to the passage's reception as revealed in Plotinus' expanded contemplation of it in Ennead v.8, On Intelligible Beauty, and then in Ficino's subsequent translation of and Commentarium on the Phaedrus, the final versions of which were published after Ficino's translations of the Enneads. Both of these Neoplatonist philosophers understood the Hyperouranian topos, site of the soul's encounter with the Forms, as a contemplative landscape, wherein the mind, that is, the soul, as a knowing subject, comes to rest in its object, the Form, realizing its unity with this object by discovering the very ground of the soul, namely Nous, or Intellect. The soul, in Plotinus' parlance, reverts to (epistrephetai) intellect (nous), thereby discovering its deeper or truer identity. The intellect, from the viewpoint of Plotinus, is a One-Many, a unity that contains within itself and as itself, the Forms, the real beings, which it eternally contemplates. For Plotinus and for Ficino after him, the erotic longing of the soul for beauty is also a path to self-knowledge, as the soul discovers true beauty within itself. In this paper, we advocate for a reading of Plato's Phaedrus that can be said to navigate the reader toward such a search for intelligible beauty, namely, within him or herself. The paper builds on Suzanne Stern-Gillet's work, especially her studies of Plotinus' own treatment of Plato's Phaedrus. In particular, her essay, one of the last studies she authored, "The double Hamartia of the Soul Iv 8 [6] 5.14-37," spurred our own meditations on Plotinus' readings of Plato's Palinode in the Phaedrus.
In this paper, we try to establish a connection between Heidegger's conception of authenticity and the Aristotelian Q7tou&aioc. Through an exploration of Heidegger's reference to authenticity, Aristotle's concept of Q7tou&ioc, and a reinterpretation of Heidegger's reappropriation of certain Aristotelian concepts, such as aYQA eta Qic, 7tiQTic and 7tpoaipsQic, we wish to show that the authentic Dasein has assumed full responsibility of its role in life, and it has developed ontologically, in the same way a Q7tou&aioc man acknowledges one's full potentiality in purposeful action. The Q7tou&ioc as the authentic Dasein grasps the moment, gives rise to the occasion by directing one's judgement towards the praxis, and comes to provide its own stance in the facticity of life. In fact, the Q7tou&ioc, like an authentic Dasein, in a way, comes to reflect the synthesis between Ascpia and 7tpa xi ic as well as an implicit effort for Dasein to uncover itself to the world and to allow the world to uncover to it.
Ancient philosophy has been a source of inspiration for contemporary philosophy in recent decades. An outstanding example is the renaissance of hylomorphism in the field of philosophy of biology. For the philosophy of mind, hylomorphism has been little discussed so far. Therefore, ancient models in the philosophy of mind are still of interest. This article argues that Plato's Phaedo can act as a source for contemporary debates. As a starting point, Simmias's objections to the immortality of the soul are analyzed. Plato does not simply reject these objections, but introduces conditions for a hylomorphistic understanding of the soul in Socrates' reply. These conditions are the following: (A) the mind supervenes on the body; (B) this supervenience must allow the strong emergence of the mind; (C) the mind comprises causal powers; (D) teleological explanations are a necessary ingredient of a suitable model for the mind-body problem. With these conditions, Plato already introduces central components that are present in contemporary philosophical debates, but have not yet been unified into a hylomorphistic concept in the philosophy of mind. The present article proposes this unification.
Book 6 of Eusebius' Church History contains a fascinating fragment of Porphyry's Against the Christians in which the latter lambasts Origen's allegorical reading of the Jewish Scriptures. Though many aspects of this text have received abundant scholarly attention, relatively little has been written on the theory underlying the critique, that is, why exactly Porphyry thought Christian allegories were illegitimate. Furthermore, among the few scholars who have treated this topic at any length, there is no consensus about the precise nature of Porphyry's objection. In this article I will argue that Porphyry denies the legitimacy of Christian allegories because he thinks the texts they exegete are clear and simple. They are not, for Porphyry, full of the mysteries and enigmas that indicate allegorical exegesis is appropriate. Consequently, Porphyry understands Christian allegories as an attempt to save a text that is plainly immoral rather than genuinely mysterious.
Scholars of political thought often view Plato as a ‘political moralist’, or a ‘utopian’ partly due to the Republic’s emphasis on ‘justice’. But in the Republic, Plato offers a distinctive theory of legitimacy, one that grounds legitimacy on an interdependent relationship between justice and moderation. Justice requires that the principle of specialisation be respected, while moderation requires that citizens agree about who should rule. But citizens will only agree if their ‘necessary’ desires are satisfied. Conversely, the ‘necessary’ desires can only be satisfied when the principle of specialisation is maintained. In this way, justice requires moderation, and moderation requires justice, and both are necessary for legitimacy. Plato’s theory of legitimacy is positioned in relation to existing accounts, especially those of John Rawls and Bernard Williams. It is shown that Plato’s theory is a genuine theory of legitimacy, not a theory of acquiescence. In the concluding section, Rawls’ theory is subjected to a critique based on Plato’s theory.
The Greek commentary on Aristotle's De Anima is assigned by Michael Hayduck to Philoponus, except that he assigns Book 3 to Stephanus. The true continuation of Books 1 and 2 is now known to be a Latin text which claims to be a translation from Philoponus. Peter Lautner, however, contends that both the full commentary and the stray Book 3 are by Philoponus. Pantelis Golitsis argues that Philoponus composed the stray Book 3 while the full commentary is by his tutor Ammonius. Here it will be argued that: (a) Lautner is probably right to deny the stray Book 3 to Stephanus; (b) the criteria employed by Golitsis suggest that Philoponus had a hand in both the Greek and the Latin Book 3; (c) Philoponus is therefore likely to be the author of both the full commentary, as editor of Ammonius, and the stray Book 3 in his own right.
Origen of Alexandria uses the language of pc c to explain God's desire to be with humanity. However, Plato's classic definition of pc c as a mix of poverty and plenty seems to be at odds with Origen's commitment to classical theism. This article explains why Origen does not consider this attribution to contradict his theological commitments. It starts with a discussion of Origen's theory of divine attributes, the pi hioicu XpI Tou. Next, Origen's doctrine of passio caritatis, which states that God can actively will to be passive, is explained. Then, Origen's familiarity with Plato's Symposium is demonstrated. The article then considers Origen's attribution of pcc to God, and its context, in the Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum; it emerges that the Incarnation is, for Origen, God's most erotic act. The final section shows that Origen maintains his understanding of God's erotic, incarnational movement towards fallen humanity in works other than the Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum.
This paper examines whether Giordano Bruno's philosophy should be considered pantheist or immanentist two philosophies that scholars regard as partly equivalent. However, this paper distinguishes them and argues that Bruno either identified the whole of nature with God or recognized a primary principle that is immanent, yet distinguishable, from matter. In terms of Bruno's interpretation of the Aristotelian notions of form and matter, the difference between an immanentist view and a pantheist one lies in the role that form (or act) assumes with regard to matter (or potency). This paper maintains that Bruno interpreted and adapted Aristotle's philosophy to find his own immanentist metaphysics, which is built on the traditional Aristotelian system. This argument was based on the reconstruction of how he used Aristotelian thought as an instrument to subvert Aristotelianism. In particular, Bruno attested that intellect exists within nature, but it is not co-extensive with the whole nature. Finally, the paper highlights how Bruno applied Aristotle's language, method, and themes to criticize the fundamentals of Aristotelian philosophy and the related traditions.
In one of the most famous but equally obscure passages in the Timaeus, Plato describes the generation of time and the heavens. The "moving image of eternity" (37d5) is commonly read as Plato's most general characterisation of time. Remi Brague famously challenged the traditional interpretation on linguistic grounds by claiming that Plato actually did not conceive of time as an image (epsilon i kappa nu) but rather as a number (rho iota theta mu sigma). In this paper, I shall claim that this controversy is by no means a modern one. The traditional interpretation is mostly owed to Plato's most prominent reader, Plotinus, who famously conceives of time in relation to eternity ( Enn. IIL7.13.24-25). Brague's alternative reading, however, is anticipated by Simplicius' attempt to refute the Plotinian interpretation, as I shall show. According to my reconstruction, Simplicius' reading of the Timaeus not only shows why the traditional interpretation falls short, but it also offers a systematic argument that bolsters Brague's alternative reading. Finally, I shall show that this is consistent with Plato's text. It shall become clear that current interpretative problems are essentially prefigured in the late ancient debate.
One of the central aspects of Plotinus' short treatise on Eros ( Enn . III.5.[50]) is the exegesis - rare for Plotinian standards - of the myth of Eros' genealogy from the Symposium (2 03b1 -c6) . In this context, Plotinus offers some methodological remarks about how to interpret myths, as well as rational discourses. Starting from these meta -remarks I will try to show the relevance of the Phaedrus and its dialectical method in reading III .5, both in terms of Plotinus' exegesis (first -order application), as well as in terms of structuring the whole treatise (second -order application). I will also attempt to illuminate the relation between the form of the treatise, its mode of approach and its topic, i.e. Eros.
