Review of Abraham Anderson, The Skeptical Roots of Critique: Hume’s Attack on Theology and the Origin of Kant’s Antinomy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025, 184 pp.
Kant distinguishes between passive and active citizens; only the latter are entitled to vote. The difficulty is that he never justified this restriction, so two main theses have been proposed to explain it: the corruption thesis, which holds that passive citizens, by virtue of their dependence, lack autonomous judgment and therefore cannot vote; and the interdependent-independence thesis, which argues that the issue is not judgment but social position-those who depend on others cannot be co-legislators. This article advances a middle position: passive citizenship is a social condition of dependence, yet there is also evidence that Kant distrusted the judgment of certain groups he deemed passive, such as women. I will argue that his analysis treats dependence through a bias: the dependent are presumed unable to judge on a par with active citizens.
This article draws attention to the problem of the meaning of knowledge in Kant and the need for an orientation of knowledge. In this perspective, it takes into consideration the kantian distinction between the scholastic concept of philosophy and the cosmic concept of philosophy. Isofar as this concept of philosophy defends the orientation of knowledge towards the moral ends or moral destiny of humanity, it is possible to speak of a cosmopolitan interest of knowledge. The thesis of the article is that this concept of philosophy is linked to the presence of the notion of the interest of reason in Kant, being, moreover, consistent with Habermas's assessment of pure practical interest as a guiding interest of knowledge. It is structured in two points: 1. The interest of practical reason as a mobilising interest and a guiding interest of knowledge 2. The cosmic concept of philosophy as an expression of the cosmopolitan interest in and meaning of knowledge
Along with Goethe, Lessing is the modern author to whom Friedrich Schlegel devoted the most attention. The 1804 prologue On the Essence of Criticism is considered indispensable for understanding the notion of criticism he develops throughout his work. However, influential authors such as Manfred Frank have prioritized Jacobi and his concept of feeling (Gef & uuml;hl) in the philosophical origins of early Romanticism. This paper argues that Lessing was a referent of critical thought in Schlegel's early approaches to transcendental criticism. In particular, his early philosophical fragments presume a notion of critical thinking repeated in his
The text examines the Treaty of Rome's (1957) decision to designate the European executive body as the "Commission," replacing the ECSC's "High Authority." It argues that this ostensibly bland, technical naming sought to avoid the appearance of supranational sovereignty while at the same time installing technocratic grammar that depoliticizes power. In light of Schmitt and Heidegger, it questions the alleged neutrality of technique and its capacity to conceal political decisions under the veil of the "technical." The guiding thread is Kant: the distinction between the technical-practical and the moral-practical, and between the "moral politician" and the "political moralist." Only the primacy of the moral-practical -of laws grounded in freedom, with every decision arising from natural determinations bracketed- can limit politics and orient the State toward perpetual peace; technical prudence yields management, cunning, and simulation. Applied to Europe, calling the executive a "Commission" would have been a ploy that predisposes the Union to the hegemony of technique, weakening transparency and even the possibility of understanding cosmopolitan right as a mandate. The essay concludes that this drift favors nihilism and civic disaffection: without a rearticulation of the unity of reason and of the person's place, the institutional machinery becomes gearwork without a horizon.
This article offers a detailed analysis of Moses Mendelssohn's novel proof of God's existence as developed in chapter 16 of his philosophical testament, Morning Hours. The paper reconstructs the logical structure of the argument, situates it within Mendelssohn's broader philosophical outlook, and explores its far-reaching implications. It also investigates the possible historical sources and conceptual affinities of the argument. While some scholars have read Mendelssohn's argument as a version of Berkeleyan idealism, others highlight its cosmological or anti-idealist dimensions. The article concludes by assessing the philosophical significance and limits of Mendelssohn's approach, arguing that it offers a compelling, if ultimately contestable, attempt to reconcile finite cognition with metaphysical realism through the postulation of an infinite intellect.
This paper aims to present the relationship between God's perfection (God as the most perfect being) and the obligation for human perfection in Mendelssohn's essay Evidenzschrift fiber die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften, particularly with regard to his reception of Christian Wolff's philosophy. In the Evidenzschrift, Mendelssohn seeks to investigate how much certainty there can be in philosophy-therefore including both natural theology and practical philosophy. Against this background, if we are to consider the interconnection between divine and human perfection, we must regard (a) Mendelssohn's ontological proof of God as the most perfect being, as well as a teleological proof concerning the perfection of the world (in the third chapter of the Evidenzschrift); and (b) his account of the obligation human beings have to pursue our own perfection and that of others (in the fourth chapter), which is ultimately connected to the notion of the reflection of God's perfections. In this paper, we shall firstly present Mendelssohn's account of God as the most perfect being, and that of the perfection of the world; secondly consider his account of the law of nature and the obligation to pursue perfection; so that thirdly we may examine both notions against the background of Christian Wolff's philosophy (particularly his natural theology and practical philosophy), to show that although Mendelssohn was substantially influenced by Wolff in both regards, he also introduced new nuances not present in Wolff's account.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, against Marcus Willaschek's statement that Kant's systematicity of metaphysics is shared with the other sciences, it examines Kant's assertion that metaphysics is the only discipline capable of achieving completeness. Second, this article explores the continuity between Kant and Wolff regarding the inquiry about what criterion of completeness is suitable for metaphysics as a system. To this end, we address two central questions: what does it mean for metaphysics to be 'complete'? Is there something special about the completeness of metaphysics that is not shared by other sciences? We will identify two kinds of completeness, which we refer to as 'unconditioned completeness' and 'comprehensiveness' and demonstrate the continuity in how Kant and Wolff understand these terms. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that both Kant and Wolff argue that unconditioned completeness is unique to metaphysics. Finally, we will discuss why, despite these similarities, Kant would still be dissatisfied with Wolff's conception of metaphysical completeness.
The paper explores the philosophical debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger at the 1929 Davos Conferences, focusing on their divergent conceptions of the human being. Cassirer, from a Neo-Kantian perspective, emphasizes culture and symbols as key elements for understanding human experience. Heidegger, on the other hand, through his concept of Dasein, concentrates on individual existence, finitude, and authenticity. The debate, which took place in a context of intellectual and political crisis in interwar Europe, marked a bifurcation in the history of philosophical thought, revealing a clear divergence in the idea of man. The analysis also draws parallels between this debate and the characters in Thomas Mann's novel The Magic Mountain, highlighting the influence of these ideas on 20th-century philosophical and cultural thought.
The birth of aesthetics in Baumgarten is usually understood either as a continuation of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism or as a rupture towards a proto-irrationalism. Neither of these interpretations proves adequate, for what is decisive in his work consists in a shift with respect to tradition that redefines the very idea of rationality. For this, it is hermeneutically necessary to distinguish two senses of confusion in Baumgarten's work. The rereading of the rational that this distinction enables is what grants its full meaning to the notion of "extensive clarity."
This essay aims to show the dialog that Kant's suggestions for education establish with his philosophy of History. Starting from the thesis present in the Lessons on pedagogy which suggests that << The human being is the only creature that must be educated >>, we seek to justify it based on the Kantian concept of Bestimmung, according to which the realization of man's vocation depends on a permanent effort of an intergenerational nature. Within this framework of ideas, the question concerning education reveals its importance in two senses: both the educational process which is intrinsically presupposed in the pathway towards the integral development of reason and the cultural and civilizational progress, and the educational process in the strict sense, considered as an institutionalized mechanism. On this level, we see Kant reinforcing the urgency of thinking about an educational system in line with the purposes of the human species and therefore reflecting in his suggestions for education-and in its four tasks: to discipline, cultivate, civilize and moralize-the path of maturation of reason in its various stages.
What is the metaphysical significance of the aesthetic disinterestedness? In this paper, I address this question by examining the tension between aesthetic disinterest and intellectual—or metaphysical—interest in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. While aesthetic disinterestedness is often interpreted as a mark of the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere, I argue that this autonomy is deeply entangled with a reason’s aspiration towards systematic and metaphysical unity. Against the background of contemporary readings—particularly those of Dieter Henrich—I explore how the disinterested aesthetic attitude may serve as a starting point for a renewed engagement with the metaphysical dimension of Kant’s philosophy, offering a reinterpretation that resists ontologisation while highlighting the idealist orientation of Kant’s critical system.
This note is a version of an online talk I gave at the Workshop “Kant and Universalism from a Global Perspective”, October 25th 2024, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. The event was organised by Marcus WIllaschek and Simon Rebohm. I took the chance to talk about the meaning of reading Kant in the Third World and my experience with the geopolitics of knowledge.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, against Marcus Willaschek’s statement that Kant’s systematicity of metaphysics is shared with the other sciences, it examines Kant’s assertion that metaphysics is the only discipline capable of achieving completeness. Second, this article explores the continuity between Kant and Wolff regarding the inquiry about what criterion of completeness is suitable for metaphysics as a system. To this end, we address two central questions: what does it mean for metaphysics to be ‘complete’? Is there something special about the completeness of metaphysics that is not shared by other sciences? We will identify two kinds of completeness, which we refer to as ‘unconditioned completeness’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ and demonstrate the continuity in how Kant and Wolff understand these terms. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that both Kant and Wolff argue that unconditioned completeness is unique to metaphysics. Finally, we will discuss why, despite these similarities, Kant would still be dissatisfied with Wolff’s conception of metaphysical completeness.
The paper tackles the question as to whether Kant has successfully substantiated his claim that there exists a moral and juridical duty to leave the state of nature. Our thesis is that he has not. In the first step, it is demonstrated that Kant’s concept of provisional ownership is a logical impossibility. Thus, property rights themselves cannot generate the duty to submit to the state. The only way to argue for the duty to exit statelessness that the Kantian is left with is therefore to conceive of that duty as implied directly by the right to freedom. Yet, one may plausibly argue that at the conceptual level, public law runs afoul of Kant’s notion of freedom to a greater degree than private law does. Therefore, in virtue of the innate right to freedom, a prima facie duty arises to stay in the state of nature.
Kraus’s ‘Kant’s Ideas of Reason’ offers a ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ of a part of the Transcendental Dialectic. I will focus on two central topics: the concept of ideas and the concept of reason. First, I argue that Kraus’s reconstruction of the concept of ideas requires significant refinement. Despite what the title of her work might suggest, her analysis is limited to transcendental ideas without engaging with Kant’s broader typology, which includes at least seven distinct types of ideas. Greater attention to the fundamental features of the concept of ideas, as well as to the relevant scholarship, could help avoid the introduction of the problematic ‘isms’ ‘noumenalism’ and ‘fictionalism’. Second, I highlight that Kraus does not clearly distinguish between reason in its broader and narrower senses, nor does she provide a precise definition of reason in the narrower sense. I propose modifying the ‘perspectivalist interpretation’ in accordance with my suggestions.
In the context of the emergence of aesthetics as an autonomous discipline in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, Moses Mendelssohn was one of the leading voices in the development of a new theory of sentiments and representation. In this context, Mendelssohn understood the need to delineate the limits of aesthetic representation and addressed the issue through an in-depth study of sentiments. In this article, I propose a study of the category of disgust in Mendelssohn's aesthetics, starting from his theory of aesthetic illusion. Disgust is, in fact, a feeling that cannot be reduced to the illusion created by the work of art but always refers to reality. To this end, I will refer mainly to the 82nd Literaturbrief, in which Mendelssohn expounds his study of disgust, and secondly to the Rhapsody as a text that reveals the need to deepen the theory of aesthetic illusion in light of the limits indicated through disgust. Finally, an aesthetic paradigm will emerge, which is also relevant to the contemporary debate on the possibilities of aesthetic representation
