Understanding the scale and dynamics of U.S.-Mexico firearms trafficking has been hampered by severe restrictions on access to firearm trace data. This article updates empirical knowledge of the illicit cross-border gun trade by assembling and analyzing more than 28,000 firearm records drawn from leaked Mexican government trace data, official Mexican seizure records, and U.S. trafficking court cases. Using capture-recapture techniques, meta-estimation, and econometric analysis, it is estimated that roughly 85,000-135,000 firearms are trafficked from the United States into Mexico annually. There is a positive relationship between trafficking flows and homicide rates in Mexico, evidence of circular causation between police arms purchases and illegal gun seizures, and the continued concentration of trafficking among a small subset of U.S. dealers. Together, these findings refine prevailing estimates of trafficking volumes and illuminate the feedback mechanisms linking legal gun markets, illicit flows, and violence.
Most firearms recovered from crime scenes in Mexico originate in legal U.S. retail markets, yet little is known about whether federal enforcement constrains this diversion. This article examines how compliance citations issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) affect subsequent firearms trafficking from U.S. Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) to Mexico. ATF inspection-violation records are merged with more than 12,000 firearms traced from Mexican seizures and U.S. trafficking court cases, exploiting within-dealer variation overtime. Across multiple model specifications, ATF citations are strongly associated with reductions in trafficking-each additional citation corresponds to a 20-44% decline in trafficked firearms, and cited dealers contribute substantially fewer trafficked guns than comparable uncited retailers. These results suggest that even limited regulatory enforcement can meaningfully disrupt illicit firearms supply chains upstream of cross-border smuggling.
The article analyzes the evolution of French defense spending through the lens of President Macron's declaration of a transition to a "war economy" following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Despite the adoption of the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law, which entails a historically large nominal increase in defense spending, France's budgetary trajectory remains constrained by long-standing fiscal pressures and lags behind most European peers in relative growth. While recent budgets prioritize equipment modernization and industrial adaptation, they largely preserve the existing force structure, thereby limiting gains in mass and resilience. The defense industrial base has begun to scale up production, notably in ammunition and major platforms, but adaptation remains gradual and largely industry-driven. At the same time, high operational tempo and persistent overseas and domestic deployments generate risks of overstretch and declining readiness. France is risking a long-term erosion of its defense model and credibility within NATO.
The trajectory of Belgian defence spending from the end of the Cold War in 1990 to the present day is a compelling case study of how a small, highly globalized nation navigates its defence policy in response to shifting economic, security, and political landscapes. In this article we provide both a historical overview of Belgian defence spending after the Cold War and a comparison with other countries. It is a narrative of decline, stagnation, and a recent dramatic reversal. The period from 1990 to 2014 was defined by the economic imperative of fiscal austerity, which allowed governments to utilize the "peace dividend" to divert resources from defence to other government spending. This trajectory was altered by the geopolitical realities of 2014 and, most notably, 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine served as the catalyst that realigned the three key determinants, i.e., economic, political, and security, in favour of increased military expenditure. Moreover, Belgium not only increased military spending quantitatively but also qualitatively reaching NATO's 20% major equipment and associated research and development investment benchmark.
While studies of trade do consider conflict as a factor in gravity models, they do not consider the converse impact of peace. Using the Global Peace Index this article considers the case of trade between Pakistan and its neighbours which, despite considerable potential, remains very low. It considers whether introducing a measure of peace into a gravity model better explains the patterns of trade. The empirical analysis suggests that it does, and while Pakistan's bilateral trade flows are mainly affected by the economic size of trading countries and a common border, distance had a significant role only in the presence of peace between trading partners.
The cost of the Gaza war for Israel, as estimated by the Israeli Minister of Finance and Bank of Israel, does not consider a wide range of expenses, which have not been disclosed to Israeli taxpayers. This study examines the true cost of the Gaza war for Israel using Stiglitz and Bilmes’s (2008) approach. The findings indicate that the true cost of the war, based on our calculations, is more than twice the budgetary costs estimated by the Israeli Ministry of Finance and Bank of Israel. We also demonstrate that the ultimate cost could be higher owing to substantial future obligations on the Israeli economy. Keywords: Gaza War, Economic Cost, Accounting Cost, Bank of Israel, Israeli Ministry of Finance
Many countries, including India, promise ambitious climate goals. Yet global institutions and national incentives often make these promises hard to keep. This article examines the “Climate Security Paradox”, the gap where policy commitments and security outcomes diverge. It questions how India’s climate commitments interact with incentive structures, finance, and equity within global climate governance and finds three interlinked barriers. First, short-term growth incentives often favor continued coal use and infrastructure choices that keep emissions high. Second, climate finance remains uncertain and slow, which delays state-level adaptation projects and local resilience investments. Third, resource allocation often sidelines vulnerable groups, reducing trust and disengages from climate programs. By introducing an analytical triad, “incentives, finance, equity”, and presenting the trade-offs between sovereignty, development, and global cooperation—a clear, practical framework is created for analyzing climate-policy failure in developing countries. Reshaping national incentives, securing predictable finance, and embedding fairness are each necessary to narrow the paradox and specific policy steps are suggested: phased responsibilities, stable finance mechanisms, and stronger local institutions. It also calls for predictable loss-and-damage funds and targeted investments to protect local livelihoods in climate hotspots urgently. These measures can help India and similar countries align commitments with measurable climate security outcomes.
Smith wrote instructively about the unaffordability and inadequacy of defense spending in the U.K. and the difficult challenges facing the Strategic Defense Review committee. Some of the challenges facing the U.S. resemble those of the U.K., others are of the same ilk but differ in their intensity, still others are unique. This article describes the current state of budgeting for defense in the U.S., focusing on key changes in the last few decades. Such changes are organized into three categories, (a) the strategic, political, and fiscal context for defense budgeting, (b) the allocation to defense and the distribution within that budget, and (c) core processes in both the Pentagon and in Congress. The article ends with some thoughts about the consequences of those changes, considering the needs of the military to effectively implement strategy and the recommendations of the Congressional Committee on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform.
One of the reasons why economic sanctions fail to achieve their objective is sanctions-busting—where the target country engages in transactions with third parties to counter the effect of sanctions. Sanctions-busting has not been captured by existing theoretical models of sanctions. Developed here is a game-theoretic model of the sanctions-busting game between the third party and the target by accounting for the costs and benefits for all three players in the triad. A full range of equilibria consistent with actual sanctions episodes are obtained.
Violent conflicts function as disincentives for sustainable socioeconomic development in conflict-prone societies, especially in the Global South. Existing studies focus largely on economic, political, and social triggers of violent conflicts—cultural factors are often not considered. This article studies the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, to investigate the importance of cultural factors in the cycle of violence. Analyzing field data collected in conflict-impacted communities, it is argued that an interplay of political, social, economic, and environmental drivers has engendered violent conflicts, and society’s permissiveness regarding violent behavior in the guise of the “Niger Delta struggle”, has created a latent culture of violence—reflected in the emergence of new cultural norms that support and encourage violent behavior. These norms shape individual and collective interpretations of the struggle for self-determination against structural violence meted out by the Nigerian state through militarization along with the economy of violence created by this struggle. Violent conflicts are increasingly a means to achieve socially desirable goals (e.g., wealth, political power, and status) as society rewards violent actors with social goods. This has created a cycle of violence as these rewards incentivize new entrants, while violence is increasingly legitimized in material and non-material aspects of culture.
The recent growth in international tension has been associated with countries either increasing their military spending or discussing such increases-consequently,defensebudgeting has attracted increased attention. This articlereviews the U.K.defensebudget in an historical context. It sets out the position in mid-2024when the newly elected Labour Government commissioned a Strategic Defence Review. It summarizesthe planning process and the government'sbudget constraints; considers the issues involved in measuring the defensebudget and making international comparisons; reviews trends in the defensebudget;and the choices that need to be made between spending on personnel, conventional equipment, and nuclear weapons.
How do the armed forces pay and compensate military personnel? In this article, this question is addressed by investigating the monetary incentive systems in place in the armed forces in twelve NATO and NATO-partner countries. The primary objective is to understand how the armed forces, in a variety of advanced countries, structure their compensation and personnel policies. The countries' monetary incentive systems are analyzed and comparedusing a Request for Information distributed by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence to NATO and NATO-partner countries. The secondary objective is to motivate the research community in the nexus between personnel economics and defense economics to study monetary incentives in the armed forces in a cross-national perspective. There is greatpotential to learn from the experiences of compensation policies in other armed forces
Armed conflicts significantly affect the social and economic conditions of societies in turmoil, disrupting the normal functioning of local economies. The study described in this articleseeks to delve into the repercussions of armed conflicts on the dynamics of local economies in S & eacute;gou and Mopti, Mali, since the conflict outbreak in 2012. Employing a case study method, the research uses field observations and in-depth interviews with various stakeholders, including residents, displaced individuals, local authorities, former hostages, herders, farmers, traders, officials, and members of non-governmental organizations. The examination of the S & eacute;gou and Mopti cases underscores how armed conflicts have disrupted local production processes and curtailed population consumption patterns. Notably, weekly fairsthat arepivotal for economic exchanges have been either prevented or abandoned by the populations. Additionally, farms face restrictions by enforced cultivation prohibition ortheintentional burning of crops upon maturity. These findings contribute valuable insights into the nuanced effects of armed conflicts, cautioning against oversimplified generalizations derived from more aggregate analyses. The study sheds light on the intricacies of the local responses to conflict-induced economic challenges, offering a deeper understanding of the complexities involved This article is based on WIDER Working Paper 2024/53. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. Available at: https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2024/515-8
Why do states agree to offset provisions when they purchase weapons, and what are the consequences of different types of offsets? This article takes a network approach to understanding the causes and consequences of offsets in the arms trade. It argues that offset clauses create network ties that affect a state’s position and power in the global arms production network. This depends on the type of offset it pursues—only a small subset of states with advanced technological manufacturing capabilities can maintain a central and powerful position by leveraging direct offsets. Other states must pursue indirect offsets, which have the opposite effect and keep these states locked into peripheral positions of limited power. Through case studies of offset use in India and Malaysia, this article shows how difficult it is to achieve network interdependence (India), and the difficulties of using indirect offsets to achieve political goals (Malaysia).
The objective of this article is to provide a rough estimate of inefficiencies in German major weapons procurement. It is possible to derive estimates of procurement inefficiencies for 2022 programs—arising from a failure to exploit economies of scale, the complexity of co-production projects, cost overruns and time delays, and low weapon utilization rates. As the necessary data is only partly available to the public, these estimates rely on several assumptions and so are presented as ranges. This article identifies two main causes of symptoms of inefficiency in German major weapons procurement: (a) technological requirements beyond the reach of arms producers at the time decisions on procurements were made, and (b) protectionism, i.e. the favoring of national arms producers. Overall, it is estimated that German taxpayers could have been spared a least a third of total procurement costs had these inefficiencies been avoided.
This article examines the impact of protests and demonstrations on the terrorist attacks within a country. While some studies in the relevant literature have explored the relationship between these variables, this research is unique in its empirical approach using panel data, with a specific focus on the intensity of protests and their effect on terror attacks. This article’s proposed mechanism underscores the significance of political stability as a deterrent against terrorism—a stability that can be undermined by ongoing protests. Using a sample of 26 countries for the period 2002–2018, the empirical findings strongly support the hypothesis that persistent protests are connected to an increased likelihood of terror attacks—a relationship robust even when control variables are considered. The estimation results also reveal that an augmented military strength has a negative impact on the occurrence of terror incidents. Furthermore, the durability of a political regime is linked to a decrease in the number of terror incidents. Additionally, the results indicate that the level of democracy contributes to the occurrence of terror incidents.
While existing literature has considered the relationship between oil and conflict, most of the studies have failed to consider mechanisms that might mediate the effect of the fluctuating market price of oil on conflict. We theorize that the military capacity of the state is a key mediating mechanism for understanding the relationship between shifting oil market prices and conflict intensity. We argue that states which rely upon oil sales to fund a large portion of government spending will have a more difficult time maintaining conflict-reducing state capacity during times in which oil prices are below previously prevailing averages for extended lengths of time. Using country-year data in 67 conflict states from 1989–2019, we find that low average oil prices are associated with lower military spending which in turn is associated with higher rates of battle fatalities in existing civil conflicts.
One important criticism of models of military spending and growth is that they focus on the direct impact, ignoring critical indirect impacts through, for example, income distribution. This article introduces a post-Keynesian model incorporating military spending that allows workers and capitalists to have different marginal propensities to consume. The model suggests first that civilian spending is more likely to increase the productive capacity of the economy due to higher human capital and, second, that military spending and civilian spending will have different effects on the profit share and the wage share.
In the present security environment, the capabilities of the European defense industry and the impact of restructuring over the years have become issues of concern. Researchers have found considerable consolidation when looking at the overall industry, but have failed to consider that this might understate the loss of national capabilities in subsectors. This article investigates the effect that restructuring has had on twenty subsectors of the defense industry in thirty one European countries from 1960 to 2022. It finds that since the 1960s, the number of major European defense firms has contracted by between 29% and 80% across subsectors, implying the loss of a range of capabilities. It suggests that while Europeanization is inevitable, it is likely be accompanied by further diminishing capabilities at the national level.
The future European defense firm will be radically different, being determined by future threats, novel technology, and yet to come European defense policy. The immediate threat arises from the war in Ukraine, but longer-term European defense policy based on the Strategic Compass will provide the framework for the future European defense firm. Past developments offer some indication of the future and it is predicted that the defense firm has a future and will survive. The past trend of smaller numbers of larger defense firms will continue with firms being even more technologically-intensive—reflecting Augustine weapons systems, which are characterized by continuously rising unit costs and smaller volumes. There will be more mergers between European defense firms and more joint European projects developing and producing combat air and naval systems, tanks, and cyber systems.
