
The debate on the decolonization of international law scholarship is gaining increased traction in the academic community. The stories of colonial inequalities, domination, violence, patriarchy, racism and oppression have been conveniently eliminated in mainstream international law curricula as nugatory diegeses. There is undoubtedly an alternative subaltern history and theory of international law. If epistemology delves into the question of how knowledge is conceived, along with what and whose knowledge is valid, this article uses the TWAIL pedagogy to locate Arthas´āstra as a site for challenging and rewriting the occidental scholarship of international legal theory. The author expresses his limitations of not being formally trained in European legal theory but has used critical legal studies pedagogy to deconstruct the same. The author does not claim to lay down any definitive account of the structure of the international law curriculum but believes that the issues discussed in this article expose a larger problem of how the international law curriculum is designed in India.
The constitutional promise of access to justice in India operationalized primarily through the legal framework established under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Existing research work has focused largely on the expansion of legal aid services and access to legal aid services. The accountability and quality of legal representation comparatively remains under examined. This study addresses the gap through an empirical analysis of the four district legal services authorities in West Bengal, belonging to distinct zones, identified as representative for the pilot survey. Primary data were obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005, to examine the process of lawyer empanelment, case allocation mechanism, fee verification procedures and functioning of the Monitoring and Mentoring Committee. A critical analysis of mechanisms of complaint handling and accountability reveals a considerable variation in the administrative practices across the district. This research article proposes a model accountability framework, built on measurable quality indicators.
Automated weapon systems (AWS), which are fervently used in contemporary armed conflicts, have seen contentious opinions with regard to their usage and violation of international law. The aggravated usage of artificial intelligence AWS by the states and their undeviating contravention of the diverse facets of international criminal law and international humanitarian law has posed several challenges. Despite being ‘automated’, a number of parties, such as the corporate companies, states and the foot troops in operation who set the trigger or used it in another way, have an irreversible role in the inquest. At this outset, it may be identified as sui generis consequence, where the relation of the foundational criminal law components, mens rea and actus reus, is arduous to establish. This poses the colossal challenge of ‘responsibility imbalance’. Despite the active role played by the stakeholders, as mentioned above, AWS has been under the veil of ‘beyond human control’ and has ceased to promulgate any accountability. In recent times, with the expansion of interdependencies on such AWS and the complexities that it poses, it is an obscure task to specifically adjudge responsibility on any human(s), state or corporate(s) due to the multifaceted intricacies of the weapons that require trigger, decision, and aiding in distinct stages. While Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute makes it evident that the International Criminal Court shall have jurisdiction only over natural persons, corporate liability with regard to international crimes through AWS may be established by other facets of international law. This article shall attempt to study this ‘responsibility imbalance”’ from the narrow lens of individual criminal liability, corporate liability and superior responsibility.
The current legitimacy crisis of international humanitarian law (IHL), exacerbated by conflicts like the Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Gaza and Israel–Iran–United States wars, necessitates more than a mere defence of scholarly existence; it requires a foundational restatement of its universality. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the principles of IHL have existed since the ancient era, transcending time, space, cultures and more, indicating the universality of its premises. Despite violations from time to time, the principles have withstood their academic and policy value across regions and regimes. Using the instances from ancient Indian texts, the article traces the similarity of principles of IHL with the mythological and historical principles of warfare, to state that the norms are not rendered obsolete due to violations. Rather, it is time for legal academia to further reinvoke, reiterate and reinforce principles of IHL in the times of blatant violations to ensure that the norms are not obscured by violations. The parties refusing to abide by the principles remain violators, aberrations in the system and ought to be held accountable for their acts. Their acts must not be held powerful enough to overcome the value of the principles that have been recognized and followed since time immemorial. While modern IHL is often taught as a Western construct originating from Henry Dunant and the Battle of Solferino, this article argues that such a narrative overlooks the time-transcending ethical concerns found in ancient civilizations. By analysing ancient Indian texts, this article adopts a comparative legal history methodology. The objective is not to create a competitive East versus West narrative but to demonstrate the non-derogability of IHL principles across time and space, thereby decolonizing the teaching of international law.
‘Legal creativity’ is a popular buzzword used to describe one of the core skills successful lawyers are expected to command. Accordingly, it is a common understanding that legal education should train students to become creative lawyers. Interestingly, however, there is not much discussion about how this learning outcome can be achieved. Even more startling, the notion of ‘legal creativity’ as such is hardly ever explained in detail. This article originally aimed to fill the existing gap(s) by exploring what legal creativity means and how legal creativity can and should be taught. The research underpinning this article led to the surprising discovery that the notion of legal creativity is nothing but a triviality and—as far as legal reasoning is concerned—even an oxymoron. Legal education can therefore ignore the notion of legal creativity and focus on what is really important, that is, critical thinking, problem-solving and advocacy skills.