Automated weapon systems (AWS), which are fervently used in contemporary armed conflicts, have seen contentious opinions with regard to their usage and violation of international law. The aggravated usage of artificial intelligence AWS by the states and their undeviating contravention of the diverse facets of international criminal law and international humanitarian law has posed several challenges. Despite being ‘automated’, a number of parties, such as the corporate companies, states and the foot troops in operation who set the trigger or used it in another way, have an irreversible role in the inquest. At this outset, it may be identified as sui generis consequence, where the relation of the foundational criminal law components, mens rea and actus reus, is arduous to establish. This poses the colossal challenge of ‘responsibility imbalance’. Despite the active role played by the stakeholders, as mentioned above, AWS has been under the veil of ‘beyond human control’ and has ceased to promulgate any accountability. In recent times, with the expansion of interdependencies on such AWS and the complexities that it poses, it is an obscure task to specifically adjudge responsibility on any human(s), state or corporate(s) due to the multifaceted intricacies of the weapons that require trigger, decision, and aiding in distinct stages. While Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute makes it evident that the International Criminal Court shall have jurisdiction only over natural persons, corporate liability with regard to international crimes through AWS may be established by other facets of international law. This article shall attempt to study this ‘responsibility imbalance”’ from the narrow lens of individual criminal liability, corporate liability and superior responsibility.
The current legitimacy crisis of international humanitarian law (IHL), exacerbated by conflicts like the Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Gaza and Israel–Iran–United States wars, necessitates more than a mere defence of scholarly existence; it requires a foundational restatement of its universality. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the principles of IHL have existed since the ancient era, transcending time, space, cultures and more, indicating the universality of its premises. Despite violations from time to time, the principles have withstood their academic and policy value across regions and regimes. Using the instances from ancient Indian texts, the article traces the similarity of principles of IHL with the mythological and historical principles of warfare, to state that the norms are not rendered obsolete due to violations. Rather, it is time for legal academia to further reinvoke, reiterate and reinforce principles of IHL in the times of blatant violations to ensure that the norms are not obscured by violations. The parties refusing to abide by the principles remain violators, aberrations in the system and ought to be held accountable for their acts. Their acts must not be held powerful enough to overcome the value of the principles that have been recognized and followed since time immemorial. While modern IHL is often taught as a Western construct originating from Henry Dunant and the Battle of Solferino, this article argues that such a narrative overlooks the time-transcending ethical concerns found in ancient civilizations. By analysing ancient Indian texts, this article adopts a comparative legal history methodology. The objective is not to create a competitive East versus West narrative but to demonstrate the non-derogability of IHL principles across time and space, thereby decolonizing the teaching of international law.
‘Legal creativity’ is a popular buzzword used to describe one of the core skills successful lawyers are expected to command. Accordingly, it is a common understanding that legal education should train students to become creative lawyers. Interestingly, however, there is not much discussion about how this learning outcome can be achieved. Even more startling, the notion of ‘legal creativity’ as such is hardly ever explained in detail. This article originally aimed to fill the existing gap(s) by exploring what legal creativity means and how legal creativity can and should be taught. The research underpinning this article led to the surprising discovery that the notion of legal creativity is nothing but a triviality and—as far as legal reasoning is concerned—even an oxymoron. Legal education can therefore ignore the notion of legal creativity and focus on what is really important, that is, critical thinking, problem-solving and advocacy skills.
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digitalization in India, leading to the widespread adoption of technology across various domains including education and legal services. The new norms of this digital education have transformed traditional learning methods, posing challenges for practical legal training in clinical legal education. University-based law clinics, which play a crucial role in training future lawyers and ensuring legal aid delivery, have struggled to adapt to online models while maintaining their client-centred approach. This shift from traditional practice to virtual mode provided an opportunity to improve access to justice and modernize legal education, yet it also exposed significant gaps in accessibility, implementation and effectiveness. While virtual legal education, online legal aid services and digital legal clinics were introduced to bridge the justice gap, many of these platforms remain underutilized, inefficient or inaccessible to marginalized communities. This article explores how the technological push accelerated by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic can be leveraged to enhance virtual legal services, improve access to justice and create a more effective digital legal aid framework. It examines the current benefits and challenges of integrating technology into legal services. Finally, drawing from suitable global practices and successful initiatives in other domains, it recommends possible policy measures for its effective implementation.
The causal linkage between climate change, natural disasters and displacement has been strongly evidenced by data published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, International Organisation on Migration and the UNHCR. Climate change, while often not the direct driver of displacement and migration, can worsen existing vulnerabilities, in turn exacerbating the issue. It is precisely this facet that makes it difficult to identify such cases, especially given the lack of focused studies in this regard in South Asia. The authors in this piece explore the governance of such climate change–induced and natural disaster–induced displacement in South Asia. The region consists of some of the most vulnerable areas to climate change, with deltaic regions and shorelines already witnessing reduced land area, driving displacement, both internal and cross-border. In spite of that, in South Asia, there exists a legal and policy gap in regard to addressing the protective concerns of such a vulnerable population. Most of the countries in the region have adopted ad hoc administrative approaches to deal with the issue, which has been criticized for the lack of uniformity in application or disregard for international norms and soft law frameworks that govern this sector. On the other hand, a promising new regional cooperation has emerged in the form of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and addressing climate change has featured heavily on its agenda already. Leaning on state-led regional initiatives like the Nansen Initiative, BIMSTEC could potentially develop a home-grown collaborative venture geared towards consultative processes and incorporating soft law normative obligations, significantly contributing to protection measures in this regard. The authors argue that, in light of such unstructured approaches by South Asian states, leveraging BIMSTEC to yield such approaches may contribute heavily to collaboratively curating climate change and disaster displacement governance regimes.
