Some evidence suggests that faces are perceived holistically, but subjective experience and research on the neural organization of the visual system indicate that facial parts can also be analyzed individually. Thus, advances in theories of face perception are met with two major challenges: How can hierarchical face representations be used to integrate holistic and analytic encoding within the same framework? And how can the stages of face processing be integrated with higher level cognitive processes, such as memory and decision making? We propose a novel computational framework termed the "Modular Serial-Parallel Network" (MSPN), which synthesizes several perceptual and cognitive approaches including memory representations, signal detection theory, rule-based decision making, mental architectures (serial and parallel processing), random walks, and process interactivity. MSPN provides a computational modeling account of four stages in face perception-(a) representational, (b) decisional, (c) logical-rule implementation, and (d) modular stochastic accrual of information-and can account for both choice probabilities and response-time predictions. We used MSPN to explore and validate theories across multiple paradigms including the composite face task, the part-to-whole task, and a new study of the other-race effect. The application of MSPN suggests that face processing varies based on the task and that holistic processing does not necessarily imply complete pooling into a single face object, but MSPN can reveal the precise nature of processing that gives rise to holistic effects in different paradigms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Risk aversion for moderate-likelihood gains is perhaps the best-known stylized fact from decision research. Though studies documenting it have focused on decisions involving money, such behavior is presumed to prevail very generally, across diverse domains. We investigate the validity of this generalization by contrasting two types of decisions. In unimodal choices, outcomes are "apples-to-apples." Consider choosing between sure and uncertain monetary payoffs, or between sure receipt of a product and a chance at several units of it. In crossmodal choices, outcomes are "apples-to-oranges." Consider choosing between sure receipt of one product and uncertain receipt of a disparate product. We observe two patterns by which risk matters less crossmodally, contrary to straightforward generalizations. First, relative to unimodal preferences involving actuarially fair risky options, corresponding crossmodal preferences exhibit less risk aversion. Second, crossmodal preferences vary less across risk levels: As the likelihood and subjective value of a risky option's outcomes become increasingly unfavorable (favorable), people do not exhibit as much additional distaste (appetite) for it. These patterns of insensitivity engender an interaction: relative to unimodal settings, crossmodal settings yield less aversion to unfavorable and fair risk but more aversion to favorable risk. To explain this interaction, we present the translate-and-accommodate model, in which unimodal preferences follow standard accounts, but crossmodal preferences reflect processes of (a) deterministic translation and (b) risk accommodation. The translate-and-accommodate model also explains the uncertainty effect and related patterns of seemingly bizarre, dominated choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
The fleeing famine hypothesis (FFH) posits that a genetically and evolutionarily based predisposition for food restriction and hyperactivity is activated among susceptible humans and nonhumans upon experiencing a prolonged energy deficit. Such circumstances manifest in the counterintuitive responses to starvation that are characteristic of anorexia nervosa: continued dietary restriction, denial of declining physical state, and, in at least a subset of those with anorexia nervosa, increased motor activity. We consider the nine predictions derived by Guisinger (2003) in her original formulation of the FFH and evaluate the evidence regarding each, including, of course, evidence that has accumulated subsequent to the 2003 statement of the model. We further expand upon Guisinger's original hypothesis by addressing apparent contradictions, outlining important directions for future research, and discussing the clinical implications of the FFH. We conclude that the relevant literature is unsurprisingly imperfect but that, with a number of reconsiderations, the FFH has substantial explanatory scope. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Stimulus-response and action-effect links are discussed in several paradigms in different fields of psychology and treated as separate conceptual entities. We criticize this separation. Ideomotor approaches like the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001) provide measures to unite and harmonize these research fields. In particular, the concept of event files, internal representations, that code stimulus, response, and effect features can connect still separate fields on human action in cognitive psychology. This is even more obvious, as the original ideomotor theory never separated perception and action the way it is done in contemporary research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
We review 58 experiments about "intuitive statistics" in mammals and birds, which investigate the animals' ability to make productive decisions when actions have probabilistic outcomes. We show that a stimulus-response associative model closely mirrors the animals' choices. The model reproduces qualitatively all results, and it accounts for an average 88% of the variance in 10 quantitative fits to data from 37 experiments with birds and mammals. The unexplained variance does not indicate processes more sophisticated than stimulus-response learning, as it either lies within measurement error or derives from animals making more mistakes than the stimulus-response model. These results confirm that associative learning models are a powerful tool in animal cognition research, often capable of unmatched quantitative accuracy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Discrimination is the behavior through which bias is expressed and enacted, but social psychology has focused much more on prejudice than on discrimination. This may be due, in part, to the broad conceptualization of discrimination, in which heterogeneous behaviors with different causes are considered together. To map the landscape of discrimination and provide a foundation for developing theoretical and predictive models of discrimination, the present work develops a taxonomy of discriminatory behavior. After establishing the conceptual framework on which to build a taxonomy, we denote 11 distinct clusters of discrimination. Drawing from theory and empirical evidence, we then consider the psychological variables that are most likely to predict such behavior. This taxonomy makes unique predictions and advances the study of discrimination toward more predictive models of behavior. This will enable a more precise understanding of the causes of discrimination, thereby laying the foundation necessary to reduce it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
When objects move on circular trajectories that could be described as orbiting, are they represented independently, as when translating linearly, or as parts of a composite system, akin to elements visibly affixed to a rotating structure? This fundamental question matters because representing a satellite as part of a rotating system implies that perception constructs composite representations, including internal references to anchor the system to the external present. We tested this composite representation hypothesis using a tracking task, predicting greater difficulty for rotational compared to translational motion along similar trajectories. Composite representations require additional computational steps to integrate internal and external references, unnecessary steps for independent tracking through translation. Two identical disks were placed on opposite corners of an invisible square, with another pair arranged similarly on a larger concentric square. Participants tracked one designated disk from each pair as they rotated or translated. Performance was significantly worse for rotation. A second experiment showed that visible lines connecting paired disks impaired translational tracking, demonstrating that composite representations can be induced both by visible connections and by the yoking inherent to rotation. Three additional experiments replicated these findings and revealed increased error rates on trials which demanded greater reexpression of relational variables. A sixth experiment extended the reasoning to the freezing illusion, introducing a novel method to quantify illusion strength. Rotation produced a stronger illusion than matched translation. Our findings indicate that principles of object-centered representation apply broadly in visual perception, including axes and relational variables not physically present in the stimulus. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
The study of bilingualism has increasingly embraced modeling approaches that account for individual differences, reflecting a broader shift toward capturing the complexity of the bilingual experience. However, this shift demands greater consensus on the use of valid and reliable measures, adequately diverse samples, and theory-driven analytical strategies. Without such standards, modeling risks generating theoretically incoherent yet statistically well-fitting models that lack interpretability. In the present article, we conduct a theory-driven examination of recently published data to model bilingualism effects for executive functions. The results revealed that when appropriate theoretical, methodological, and measurement standards were applied, significant, albeit small, effects of bilingualism on executive function emerged, even in a largely homogeneous sample. These findings underscore the need to strengthen research on bilingual individual differences to better understand potential multivariate effects throughout the lifespan and their implications for cognition, aging, and society. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Human communication is generally overt: We address each other with verbal cues, use eye contact, and point for each other, all to be understood and avoid misunderstandings. What are the cognitive underpinnings and evolutionary roots of overt communication? For decades, the Gricean interpretation of overt communication was taken for granted, despite two widely recognized problems: a developmental paradox in language acquisition and a methodological barrier to identifying the presence of its signature features in nonhuman animals. We introduce a further challenge: the "signaler assumption problem." This concerns the mechanism of how signalers are supposed to establish "common ground." We avoid these problems by replacing the Gricean approach with an evolutionarily grounded version of script theory, originally developed to model procedural knowledge. Our updated version of script theory posits that individuals recognize recurring situations as belonging to basic event schemata that form larger sets of patterned social interactions. In social interactions, individuals follow a finite number of scripts and understand others as following the same scripts. If the scripts of different individuals align during a social interaction, common ground is established. It is this common ground rather than mutual higher order mentalizing that renders a predominantly overt communication system possible. We review the theoretical and empirical literature and argue that the perception of social events as hierarchically structured scripts fostered the evolution of overt communication. Script theory offers an empirically more plausible and more parsimonious evolutionary explanation of the emergence of human linguistic communication than Gricean assumptions of complex mentalizing abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Despite extensive research on the psychology of power, relatively little theorizing has addressed the psychological experience of the other prevalent base of social hierarchy: status. Furthermore, the field lacks a unified theoretical framework that accounts for the psychological experience of both status and power. To address these gaps, we introduce the social relations-approach theory of social hierarchy. Our theory identifies social relations and approach orientation as the two fundamental dimensions that shape how individuals psychologically experience social hierarchy. We propose that status and power have divergent effects along the social relations dimension but similar effects along the approach dimension. Along the social relations dimension, status heightens a sense of symmetric interdependence across status levels. In contrast, power enhances asymmetric interdependence, with high power experiencing a sense of independence and low power experiencing a sense of dependence. Along the approach dimension, we propose that high power and high status each increase approach orientation but do so through different mechanisms shaped by the social relations dimension. We then offer novel propositions about how status and power differentially guide intrapsychic processes (group identification and attention to and action in pursuit of collective vs. personal goals) and interpersonal processes (trust and rank maintenance concerns). We also theorize how status and power operate in tandem (e.g., when one is high and one is low) and are moderated by properties of the hierarchy, the individual, the group, and national culture. Overall, our theory provides a parsimonious and generative understanding of the psychological experience of social hierarchy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Recent research has revealed similarities between visual mental imagery and visual perception. Visual imagery is supported by cortical feedback involving multiple visual areas, including the primary visual cortex, and functionally interacts with perception. This has led to the assumption that imagery is "perception in reverse," with feedback connections driving action potentials in early visual areas. However, evidence on feedback mechanisms is mixed, often exerting modulation (often as negative gain control) in sensory areas. Here, we examine and interpret the current understanding of feedback mechanisms related to visual imagery, integrating this with its functional effects and neural correlates. Finally, we put forward a new hypothesis, along with testable predictions, proposing that imagery reshapes spontaneous neural activity rather than producing spiking in early visual areas. This new framework explains many of the properties of visual imagery while providing a better general understanding of feedback and brain function. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Future-oriented mental time travel is a highly adaptive cognitive behavior that makes everyday life much more predictable, rewarding, and successful. It can protect people from potential harm and facilitate coping with social and professional challenges. However, it is not yet fully understood in which respect people who act proactively or with foresight differ from those who tend not to plan ahead and obviously prefer rather spontaneous solutions. In an attempt to explain such interindividual differences, the self-reinforcement hypothesis of future-oriented mental time travel, which is based on behaviorist learning theory, is presented. Possible neurophysiological substrates underlying this mechanism are discussed, and experimental proof of concept approaches are proposed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Decision problems are often characterized by the presence of many choice options described by several attributes, and people need to limit how much information they search for. We propose that humans search and thereby devote attention to relevant information in an efficient and goal-directed, but not necessarily optimal, manner. Thereto, a novel hierarchical Bayesian cognitive model of information search in multiattribute and multialternative decisions is presented and tested. In the model, the search process is governed by the desire to quickly identify the option that meets the choice goal best, which in turn depends on the importance and uncertainty of information and on the accumulated evidence. The theory accounts for many established empirical findings on the interplay of attention and decision making, including the positive correlation of gaze time and choice probability as well as the preference for sampling promising choice candidates. To rigorously test a series of top-down effects of attention, we present results of a new and preregistered eye-tracking experiment on multiattribute decisions, in which the influence of bottom-up attention on visual search is minimized. Our theory accounts for various interactions of attention and choice in this experiment, while variants of it and another extant theory, which assume different search rules, fail to capture these effects. Furthermore, the theory predicts additional choice dynamics such as the dependency of decision speed on the number and overall value of options. The proposed framework provides a general approach to understanding the intricate dynamics of search and valuation mechanisms in multiattribute decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Many paradigms in cognitive psychology have been designed to induce conflicts that must be resolved prior to response, and many of these paradigms have therefore also been used to examine cognitive control. It is still a matter of debate, however, whether the conflicts induced by different paradigms reflect the same cognitive (control) processes. In the present study, we first present a conceptual analysis of similarities and differences between two classic and widely used paradigms that induce conflicts: the Navon and Stroop paradigms. Based on this analysis, we predicted a small positive correlation to exist between the paradigms in congruency effects (the difference between trials with conflicting and congruent information). We tested this hypothesis using an individual differences approach. Contrary to expectation, the data obtained were much more likely under the null hypothesis. Given that the result was obtained in a large sample (N = 615), with reliable measures (>.7), across differently derived indexes of congruency (standardized effect sizes, plain difference scores, residuals from regression, and balanced integration scores), and with paradigms that gave rise to the expected congruency effects-which also varied considerably across individuals-this suggests that the congruency effects induced by the two paradigms reflect unrelated processes. Based on this, we argue that the congruency effects in Navon's and Stroop's paradigms can originate at different levels of processing. In particular, congruency effects in Navon's paradigm may arise at a perceptual level, and conflict at this level can apparently also be resolved in a modality-specific manner. This demonstrates that there is a limit on the degree of domain generality in cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
The crucial role of positive affect (PA) dysregulations in affective psychopathology is now widely recognized. One clinically significant phenomenon in this context is the dampening of PA, which refers to (attempts to) downregulate or downplay PA states using a variety of mental strategies. Although the transdiagnostic relevance of dampening as a vulnerability and/or maintenance factor for psychopathology is well established, knowledge about motives for individuals to engage in this affect regulation strategy remains underdeveloped and insufficiently integrated. To further the current understanding of dampening, we analyze dampening through the lens of a contemporary goal-directed theory. From this perspective, dampening of PA can be understood as a strategy to reduce discrepancies between current PA and the goal to maintain low PA levels. This homeostasis goal is assumed to be at the service of several superordinate goals. Based on empirical and anecdotal evidence from clinical practice, four types of superordinate goals are identified: a hedonic goal, a self-motivating goal, a social goal, and a self-verification goal. Finally, the goal-directed theory provides guidance to systematically organize existing interventions to diminish PA dampening. The common objective in these interventions is to encourage people to reorient from the homeostasis goal toward an experience goal, which involves allowing oneself to experience PA. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Interdependent subsistence styles, such as rice farming, are thought to underlie the evolution of collectivistic cultures, which emphasize collective welfare over individual gains. Rice farming can produce mutual dependence within communities but also create conflicting interests, as people cooperate to provide valuable public goods. However, current theories of the origins of collectivism fail to address the interplay between mutual dependence and conflict. As a consequence of these limitations, the evolutionary dynamics of collectivism and its association with cooperation are still unclear. We advance a theoretical model to study the evolution of cultural traits that enhance people's valuations of collective welfare, one of the key features of collectivistic cultures. Our model investigates the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and cultural evolution in ecologies with distinct interdependence structures. We find evidence that higher degrees of mutual dependence facilitate the evolution and persistence of collectivism. However, the degree of conflicting interests also plays a crucial role in driving the diffusion and maintenance of collectivistic norms. In particular, the selective advantage of collectivism is strongest when people experience some degree of conflict of interests, an effect that is magnified by heightened mutual dependence. These results clarify how variation in interdependence could underlie the ecological origins of collectivism, lending support to and expanding the scope of current theories of the cultural evolution of cooperation. More broadly, the framework presented here elucidates how fitness interdependence can be influenced by different ecological factors, and, in turn, influence the evolution of social behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
The impressive abilities of language AI models are sparking new questions about how artificial and human minds focus. While both seem to selectively pay attention, the underlying mechanisms remain elusive. This research proposes a compelling analogy: the "priority map" concept from visual neuroscience. Priority maps in the brain dynamically guide attention by integrating what is eye-catching (bottom-up) with what is relevant to our goals (top-down). Intriguingly, language AI appears to operate on similar principles, using sophisticated methods to weigh input and task demands. Both systems employ parallel processing, refine information through layered structures, and even use a form of "inhibition" to manage resources efficiently. Despite vast differences in their makeup-brain cells versus computer code-this functional similarity suggests a shared strategy for dynamically prioritizing information. This insight not only illuminates how our own brains prioritize information but could also inspire the development of smarter, more adaptable AI in the future. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Adaptively variable behavior can be advantageous in various fields such as sports (unpredictability), art (creativity), science (innovation), and problem-solving (thinking outside the box). Although previous studies identified experimental conditions under which humans and non-human animals show increased variable decision making, we have only a limited understanding of its underlying cognitive mechanisms. Using a reinforcement learning model, we simulate three different theorized strategies in an adversarial reward learning environment that requires very high variability. These mechanisms are (1) relying on a stochastic generator, (2) increasing one’s learning rate, or (3) upvaluing unchosen actions. A systematic parameter search and a policy gradient meta-learning algorithm both show that agents can adaptively increase variability with each of those strategies. Next, we fitted our model on existing datasets with humans, pigeons, and rats as subjects in adversarial environments. While all three species can engage in highly variable behavior, we find that only humans upvalue unchosen actions as a strategy to achieve variability.
Psychological network theories provide an important alternative to traditional common cause theories, such as the g-theory of general intelligence and brain-based explanations of depression. Network theories, which are often formalized using the Ising model from statistical physics, have gained significant empirical support. However, the binary nature of nodes in Ising-type models presents a limitation, as many psychological datasets include responses with uncertain or neutral categories (e.g., "don't know" or "not relevant"). Ternary spin models, such as the Blume-Capel model, overcome this constraint by incorporating a third node state, zero, that can represent such responses, enabling more nuanced scale representations. The resulting models exhibit more complex dynamics and provide new insights into research across a range of psychological constructs. We illustrate our approach with examples from three key subdisciplines of psychology. First, we introduce a ternary spin model for attitudes, extending the Ising attitude model. Next, we propose a unified framework encompassing both bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Finally, we present a novel ternary network model for understanding knowledge acquisition.
