Abstract In this paper, we investigate three systems of quadratic trinomial functional equations, focusing on the existence and specific forms of finite-order transcendental entire solutions. Two systems, one formulated in C n \mathbb{C}^{n} with n ∈ N n\in\mathbb{N} and the other in C 2 \mathbb{C}^{2} , generalize and extend recent results from [Z. Tai, J. Long and X. Xiang, On entire solutions for several systems of quadratic trinomial Fermat type functional equations in C 2 \mathbb{C}^{2} , Rev. R. Acad. Cienc. Exactas Fís. Nat. Ser. A Mat. RACSAM 118 (2024), 4, Paper No. 156]. To illustrate the validity and applicability of our findings, we provide concrete examples.
Abstract The universal normative ideal of friendship is the ideal friendship. It is commonly thought that this ideal is what our actual friendships should be like, and so, it is thought that we ought, as friends, to act in a way that will make our friendships more like this ideal. In this paper, I show that this view relies on the false assumption that we should always aim to manifest, in each one of our friendships, all of the special values associated with friendship. While I remain neutral about whether a universal ideal of friendship exists, I argue that, if it does, it cannot be action-guiding for actual friends. I then briefly give an idea of what such an action-guiding ideal might look like, arguing for a contractualist account according to which friends form a shared ideal of their friendship together.
Abstract Indefinite singular (IS) noun phrases—such as “A virtuous person prioritizes self-improvement”—are a familiar but under-theorized feature of moral discourse. While widely used in definitions and generalizations about character, their semantic and normative significance has gone largely unexamined. This paper argues that IS moral generalizations serve a dual function in moral thought: a definitional role in articulating principles and a metalinguistic role in negotiating moral concepts. We propose that many IS moral generalizations operate not merely as descriptive statements but as normative proposals that shape how moral terms should be used. We distinguish these uses from standard characterizing generalizations and show that IS constructions allow for moral concepts—such as virtue, goodness, and rightness—to be dynamically defined, contested, and taught. This reveals a novel perspective on how language contributes to the evolution and application of moral norms.
Abstract A growingly popular development of physicalism, grounding physicalism, holds that phenomenal facts are grounded in physical facts. A main selling point of this view – largely due to Jonathan Schaffer – is its apparent ability to swiftly handle well-known anti-physicalist objections that infer an ontological gap from an explanatory gap. According to Schaffer, grounding physicalists can reject this inference by noting that it often fails in other cases of grounding. That is, they can observe that explanatory gaps are ubiquitous in grounding (i.e., grounding is generally opaque), such that the one between the phenomenal and the physical is merely a special instance of a broader unproblematic pattern. In this paper, I raise a novel challenge for Schaffer’s defense of grounding physicalism. I argue that the examples of opaque grounding to which he appeals are either of the wrong kinds or highly contested. As such, they provide little inductive support for grounding physicalism.
Abstract According to desire satisfactionism, it is good to get what you desire. If it is good to get what you desire, then it also seems good to desire what you will get. If you are about to be fired, then it would be really great if you could quickly develop a strong desire to get fired. This apparent counterintuitive entailment is a problem for desire satisfactionism. I will argue desire satisfactionists need not commit themselves to the goodness of desiring what you will get by appealing to the familiar concept of higher-order desires. The goodness of acquiring new desires should be understood relative to whether one desired such desires.
Abstract In a recent paper in this journal, Hrishikesh Joshi (building on Ava Thomas Wright) argues that unless experts are seen to address even poor objections to their views, laypeople and experts lose warrant to believe claims about topics in expert domains. Warrant for such beliefs rests on our capacity to trust the experts, but we lose our grounds for such trust in the face of objections we do not see properly addressed. In response, I argue that if the threat were as great as Joshi thinks, it could not be neutralized, because we’re no more able to assess the adequacy of responses to objections than we are to assess the quality of the objections themselves. Fortunately, I argue, the threat is not one we need a response to: our warrant in expert testimony is underwritten by a conditional closely analogous to Goldberg’s coverage-conditional.
Abstract We all have been deceived, whether by politicians, pundits or peers. Likely more often than we would wish to admit. But what is it to be deceived? As we argue, victims of deception settle on a false answer to a question. This settling proposal not only makes good on the intuitive idea that sceptical agents are harder to deceive than their non-sceptical peers, but also finds support in the infelicity of reporting an agent as both inquiring and deceived. Want to avoid being duped? Our proposal provides an answer: inquire further, don’t settle.
Abstract Halbach and Fujimoto have formulated an axiomatic theory of truth and determinateness, CD. They asked whether the theory can be augmented with a principle saying that all determinateness ascriptions are themselves determinate. We answer their question in the negative. In order to put the problem in a more abstract framework, we introduce the notion of `admissibility', and we obtain a general impossibility result for the class of admissible sentences. In particular, we show that under mild assumptions on the notion of admissibility, the principle that admissibility ascriptions are themselves admissible entails triviality over Strong Kleene logic, even without assuming the transparency of truth.
In the current investigation, we introduce a novel multimixed additive-quartic mapping as a system of mixed additive and quartic functional equations. Then we represent and characterize this system of functional equations as a single equation. We find some relations between this new definition and multi-additive and multi-quartic mappings by using linear and quartic conditions. Moreover, we show that each multimixed additive-quartic mapping can be reduced into either multi-additive or multi-quartic mapping. Furthermore, we prove the Hyers-Ulam stability of multimixed additive-quartic functional equations in the content of quasi-beta-2-Banach spaces. Eventually, we provide some known stability outcomes when the controller bound changes.
Abstract This paper develops a veridical-first screening-off problem for naïve realism using simple cases from touch. Unlike traditional, hallucination-based arguments, the problem arises entirely within ordinary tactile perception and realistic haptic simulation, and it turns on the multiple realisability of a single tactile experiential kind by distinct worldly conditions. A wooden ball, a metal ball, and a haptic device can all produce the same ‘smooth sphere’ experience. I argue that once we fix the shared pattern of local tactile interaction and the subject’s neural responses that realise this experiential kind, the particular external object that happens to produce it becomes explanatorily redundant with respect to phenomenal character. This challenges naïve realism’s claim that worldly objects play a non-derivative constitutive role in good-case experience. I close by considering four naïve realist responses and explaining why they do not resolve the tactile screening-off problem.
