I critically examine Stojnić and Lepore’s key claim from their book Inflammatory Language that articulations are particularly important to the analysis of slurs. I agree with Stojnić and Lepore that we should endorse the significance of articulations for our linguistic intuitions, especially when it comes to the causal and social powers of language; I argue that for locating this approach to the articulations of slurs in a broader context of fiction and taboos. However, while I accept Stojnić and Lepore’s evidence for theorizing some slurs through associations at the level of articulations, I argue for continuing to account for slurs in part through prohibitions and through associations at the level of words and concepts.
This paper critically examines Unnsteinsson’s Collapse Argument, which contends that “Easy” views of saying something or expressing a proposition collapse into the Gricean view (Unnsteinsson 2022: Ch. 4). Easy views maintain that saying/expressing is simply a matter of uttering a sentence with its meaning, without requiring Gricean communicative intentions. Unnsteinsson argues that Easy views must appeal to such intentions to explain what makes saying/expression intentional and rational and that this collapses them into the Gricean view. I show that this argument fails for several reasons. First, the intentions that the Easy views must posit to explain what makes saying/expressing rational are not equivalent to the Gricean communicative intentions. Second, the constitutive question of what makes an act into a saying/ expressing and the rationalizing question of what makes it rational are distinct. Thus, even if Easy theorists would have to appeal to something like Gricean communicative intentions in answering the latter question, this wouldn’t cause their answer to the former question to collapse into the Gricean answer.
In their Inflammatory Language, Stojnić and Lepore present four major criticisms of content-based views of pejorative language: 1) the Projection Argument; 2) the Hyperprojection Argument; 3) the Specificity Argument; and 4) the Reclamation Argument. This paper argues that a content-based view can adequately respond to each of these criticisms. The paper goes on to consider their positive view, the Articulation Account, and argues that it suffers from being both under-specified and overly ambitious. Even when the view is plausibly precisified as a functional role theory of articulations, a serious dilemma arises: focusing on the sound or shape of the articulation is problematic when considering counterexamples like the racist use of ‘Monday’ as code for the N-word, and focusing on the functional role of the articulation is problematic when considering how little functional similarity there is between the Mandarin demonstrative term (‘那个’) and the N-word. The paper also presents the applications of two external criticisms deriving from the Identity Thesis and the Framework Fallacy and concludes that the Articulation Account falls short of being a leading contender in the analytic space of views for pejorative language.
In this précis, we summarize the key themes and arguments of the Inflammatory Language: Its Linguistics and Philosophy.
I defend a lexical account of slurs against criticisms mounted by Stojnić and Lepore, and present positive reasons for preferring a lexical account over the articulation account they put forward. A lexical account, I argue, explains why articulations of a slur give offense: viz., they are recognized as articulations of a particular word. A lexical account also does better than the articulation account in explaining the naive acquisition and use of slurs, facts about mishearing and mispronouncing, the evolution of certain words into or away from status as slurs, and the fact that “reclaimed” slurring words still give offense when used as slurs.
Risky politically manipulative speech has unexpectedly been on the rise. This paper investigates the role that the phenomenon of linguistic plausible deniability plays in the increasing prevalence of politically manipulative speech through dogwhistles, racial figleaves, and generic stereotypes. The paper unfolds in three main stages. First, it suggests that these linguistic devices share the phenomenon of plausible deniability, which, by offering cover for their overtness, mitigates (some) risks of such political speech. Second, it argues that the plausible deniability of these linguistic devices makes them powerful tools for politically manipulative speech as it helps it to spread more efficiently and appear more acceptable. Finally, it elevates the ethical and political dimensions of language to a more central position within the philosophy of language by discussing two normative claims stemming from conceptual engineering: (i) we should combat such pernicious political manipulation, and (ii) we should exploit the effects of plausible deniability for beneficial purposes.
In this article, I give a short précis of my recently published book, The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant’s Critical System, and I also respond to the arguments of my critics, Andrija Šoć, Monika Jovanović, Ted Kinnaman, and Luigi Filieri. In response to Šoć, I take the opportunity to clarify the difference between the realism I argue is in the representations of reflective judgment (“moral image realism”) and the realism in our assent to moral Glaube (“rational necessitation realism”). In response to Jovanović, I endorse her claim that my approach to Kant’s aesthetics relates to contemporary notions of aesthetic cognitivism and further elaborate on how Kant’s text can support this view. In response to Kinnaman, I remind the reader that my book sufficiently acknowledges that a contingent fit between nature and our cognitive faculties must be at the core of the reflective judgment’s principle of purposiveness. I also emphasize that my notion of reflective judgment’s “schema analogues,” although subjective because they respond to the need of reason, are also at the same time objective and in some respect about the world. In response to Filieri, I contend that, for Kant, our representations of the progress of human history presuppose both autonomous human agency and something that surpasses it yet cooperates with its final aims. Thus, the progress of human history is both about “the aim of freedom” and “the aim of nature.”
Risky politically manipulative speech has unexpectedly been on the rise. This paper investigates the role that the phenomenon of linguistic plausible deniability plays in the increasing prevalence of politically manipulative speech through dogwhistles, racial figleaves, and generic ste-reotypes. The paper unfolds in three main stages. First, it suggests that these linguistic devices share the phenomenon of plausible deniability, which, by offering cover for their overtness, mitigates (some) risks of such political speech. Second, it argues that the plausible deniability of these linguistic devices makes them powerful tools for politically manipulative speech as it helps it to spread more efficiently and appear more accept-able. Finally, it elevates the ethical and political dimensions of language to a more central position within the philosophy of language by discussing two normative claims stemming from conceptual engineering: (i) we should combat such pernicious political manipulation, and (ii) we should exploit the effects of plausible deniability for beneficial purposes.
This paper critically examines Unnsteinsson's Collapse Argument, which contends that "Easy" views of saying something or expressing a proposition collapse into the Gricean view (Unnsteinsson 2022: Ch. 4). Easy views maintain that saying/expressing is simply a matter of uttering a sentence with its meaning, without requiring Gricean communicative intentions. Unnsteinsson argues that Easy views must appeal to such intentions to explain what makes saying/expression intentional and rational and that this collapses them into the Gricean view. I show that this argument fails for several reasons. First, the intentions that the Easy views must posit to explain what makes saying/expressing rational are not equivalent to the Gricean communicative intentions. Second, the constitutive question of what makes an act into a saying/ expressing and the rationalizing question of what makes it rational are distinct. Thus, even if Easy theorists would have to appeal to something like Gricean communicative intentions in answering the latter question, this wouldn't cause their answer to the former question to collapse into the Gricean answer.
If I am confused, and I think two people are one and the same, that may impair my ability to refer to either of them. This is combinatory confusion. What if I am confused, and think that one person is actually two people? This is separatory confusion, and it seems quite different. After all, even in my confusion, my thoughts and my referential devices seem to track back to a single individual. Unnsteinsson has recently argued that both types of confusion corrupt, i.e. they may prevent us from referring the right way. In this paper, I examine the four arguments he offers for this conclusion, and I argue that the intuitive view that separatory confusion does not corrupt can withstand his challenge.
This paper considers reverse Sobel sequences, NPI licensing, and related speaker judgments as they bear on von Fintel-style dynamic approaches to the semantics of subjunctive conditionals. We argue that neither reverse Sobel sequences nor von Fintel's explanation of NPI licensing speak in favor of von Fintel's semantics and that the alternative Lewisian approach, augmented by Moss-style pragmatic considerations, can accommodate and predict the relevant data at least as well as, and in some cases better than, von Fintel's view. Our arguments include counterexamples to von Fintel's semantics with respect to both its treatment of reverse Sobel sequences and NPI licensing.
In Inflammatory Language, Una Stojni & cacute; and Ernie Lepore argue that no extant theory of slurs can explain slurs' hyperprojectivity, empha-sizing their difficulties in accounting for acoustic and phonological re-semblance cases in which a word merely sounds like a slur. Further, all content theories confront the Specificity Problem, the charge that the content view's content, whatever it is, is too specific to encompass the full range of competent weapon uses of slurs. One half of this paper con-cerns hyperprojectivity. I argue that there is a gap in Inflammatory Lan-guage's overarching dialectic that results from excluding a range of theo-ries. Some theories of slurs are what I call single mechanism views: they aim to explain all the phenomena with a single explanatory mechanism. Multiple mechanism views exploit more than one. Within Inflammato-ry Language, multiple mechanism theories are bypassed. Yet multiple mechanism theories possess resources to explain slurs' hyperprojectivity. The other half of this paper addresses the Specificity Problem. I argue that a view I have developed in previous writings, Identity Expressiv-ism, does not succumb to the problem. I craft a version of the Specificity Problem tailor-made for the theory and rooted in Stojni & cacute; and Lepore case against other expressivist theories. Identity Expressivism is, I ar-gue, uncompromised by the Specificity Problem.
I critically examine Stojni & cacute; and Lepore's key claim from their book In-flammatory Language that articulations are particularly important to the analysis of slurs. I agree with Stojni & cacute; and Lepore that we should endorse the significance of articulations for our linguistic intuitions, es-pecially when it comes to the causal and social powers of language; I argue that for locating this approach to the articulations of slurs in a broader context of fiction and taboos. However, while I accept Stojni & cacute; and Lepore's evidence for theorizing some slurs through associations at the level of articulations, I argue for continuing to account for slurs in part through prohibitions and through associations at the level of words and concepts.
In this pr & eacute;cis, we summarize the key themes and arguments of the Inflammatory Language: Its Linguistics and Philosophy.
I defend a lexical account of slurs against criticisms mounted by Stojni & cacute; and Lepore, and present positive reasons for preferring a lexical account over the articulation account they put forward. A lexical account, I argue, explains why articulations of a slur give offense: viz., they are recognized as articulations of a particular word. A lexical account also does better than the articulation account in explaining the naive acquisition and use of slurs, facts about mishearing and mispronouncing, the evolution of certain words into or away from status as slurs, and the fact that "reclaimed" slurring words still give offense when used as slurs.
In their Inflammatory Language, Stojni & cacute; and Lepore present four major criticisms of content-based views of pejorative language: 1) the Projection Argument; 2) the Hyperprojection Argument; 3) the Specificity Argument; and 4) the Reclamation Argument. This paper argues that a content-based view can adequately respond to each of these criticisms. The paper goes on to consider their positive view, the Articulation Account, and argues that it suffers from being both under-specified and overly ambitious. Even when the view is plausibly precisified as a functional role theory of articulations, a serious dilemma arises: focusing on the sound or shape of the articulation is problematic when considering counterexamples like the racist use of 'Monday' as code for the N-word, and focusing on the functional role of the articulation is problematic when considering how little functional similarity there is between the Mandarin demonstrative term ('(sic)(sic))' and the N-word. The paper also presents the applications of two external criticisms deriving from the Identity Thesis and the Framework Fallacy and concludes that the Articulation Account falls short of being a leading contender in the analytic space of views for pejorative language.
This paper explores the role of disgust education in Kant, considering its aesthetic and moral implications. Kant distinguishes between physical education, shared with animals, and moral education, which is essential for living according to freedom. Disgust, according to Kant, functions as a defense mechanism against one's animality and impulses that hinder human elevation, representing resistance to bodily drives and moral vices. I propose a taxonomy of disgust, differentiating between physical disgust related to the senses and cultural, as well as moral disgust associated with repulsion towards vice and evil. In anthropological context, disgust is connected to notions of boredom, monotony, and sensory saturation-elements that impede moral vitality. Kant views aesthetic education as a means to perfect humanity, fostering a civilization that moves away from natural brutality. In conclusion, I argue that disgust, far from being an antisocial emotion, serves as a valuable pedagogical and cultural tool in the process of human civilization and refinement, by linking empirical feelings, aesthetics, and morality.
The aim of this article is twofold: First, it is argued that Tyler Burge's case for externalism in the philosophy of mind, which is based on Hilary Putnam's twin-earth thought experiment, fails. Second, it is shown that a convincing argument for externalism can be nonetheless construed by relying on Putnam's thought experiment.
This paper explores the metaphysical and normative dimensions of death within a biological naturalist framework. It defends the view that persons are contingently identical with their animal bodies and argues that life has only instrumental value-deriving its significance from the experiences, relationships, and projects it enables. On this view, death is not harmful in itself but is a misfortune insofar as it deprives individuals of these goods and interrupts their capacity to engage in meaningful pursuits. The analysis draws on two complementary frameworks: Nagel's deprivation account and the interruption thesis advanced by Furley and Nussbaum. To respond to key Epicurean objections-such as the symmetry argument and the temporality problem-the paper adopts a comparative and atemporal perspective on harm. It further refines the interruption thesis by distinguishing between egocentric and nonegocentric projects, clarifying why posthumous fulfillment of a person's aims does not mitigate the harm of death. By integrating these perspectives, the paper offers a unified account of death's badness: it is a dual harm involving both the loss of potential goods and the personal deprivation of actively shaping and completing one's own life projects.
This paper aims to define political life as transcendentally ideal and empirically real by proposing an unorthodox reading of Kant's aesthetics of the beautiful and the sublime in the light of Schmitt's concept of the political. Kant's aesthetics of the beautiful suggests that the first face of politics is an aesthetic idea giving political significance to sensible experience through symbolic representation by analogy. Meanwhile, Kant's aesthetics of the sublime indicates another face of politics as the sublime experience of inevitable enmity. The former permits politics to remain objectively undefined, thereby enabling limitless experiences of the political, while the latter points to the specifically political distinction between friends and enemies founded on Kant's aesthetics of the sublime. The paper argues that Kant's aesthetics suggests a twofold foundation for political life, presenting a political antinomy between politics as boundless experience and as antagonistic struggle.
