Accepting the Theaetetus definition of knowledge as fully justified true belief, Russell offered cases designed to reveal that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. A belief mustn't be obtained via good reasoning from a false premise-even if the false premise is justified. Gettier cases raised suspicion that a fourth condition beyond justification is required. No adequate fourth condition has been found.This paper offers a neo-Russellian solution. The premises used in good reasoning must themselves carry over, so that what is justified is a conjunction of the premises together with the outcome of the reasoning. For example, justification that p does not entail justification of the disjunction p or q. It justifies the conjunction: p and (p or q). If p is false, the conjunction does not satisfy the truth-condition of the Theaetetus definition. This solution relies on Russell's insights to determine which premises relevantly carry over, and to expose the mirage that presents justification as if it distributes over conjunction.
Dorothy Wrinch (1894-1976) is now best known as a mathematical biologist, but she began her career as a set-theorist with strong (and general) philosophical interests. During the period 1916-21 she worked very closely with Russell-perhaps more closely and over a greater range of philosophical topics than anyone else during those years. In this paper I want to examine some of the philosophical issues that come to light in their correspondence, in particular those that relate to the change in Russell's philosophy that took place at this time. In a second paper, I will publish all that is known to survive of their correspondence together with some background biographical information.
After an introductory discussion of Russell's place in Russian intellectual culture, both before and after the Bolshevik Revolution, this article analyzes two distinct matters connected with Bertrand Russell's 1920 visit to Soviet Russia. First, it corrects Russell's claim of meeting the poet Alexander Blok in Petrograd, demonstrating instead that his interlocutor was Andrei Bely, another prominent literary figure of the Russian Silver Age (1890-1917). Second, the article explores how Russell was received by the Petrograd intelligentsia and contrasts their responses with official Soviet reactions. Through this comparison, the paper highlights the divergence between the (non-Bolshevik) intellectual and the governmental perspectives on Russell's visit.
Bertrand Russell argued that William James's pragmatic account of truth implies that truth is not objective and that James's abandonment of objective truth makes it inevitable that violence will be used to settle disagreements, including political disagreements. On my view, there is an inconsistency in James's account of truth that yields two different readings of that account, one on which the truth of the belief that p does require, and another on which it does not require, that it actually be the case that p . I argue that Russell's criticism of James fails if it is directed against the first reading of James's account of truth, because on that first reading, there is such a thing as objective truth. However, Russell's criticism fairs better against the second reading of James's account—that is, it fairs better once its conclusion is weakened, from the claim that James's account makes it inevitable that violence will result from disagreements, to the claim that when violence is in fact used to end a disagreement and succeeds in doing so, the victor is the one who has the true belief.
Bertrand Russell wrote widely on international relations, especially on preventing war and creating a sustainable peace. However, it is an open question whether his works should be taken seriously by professionals in the field. This paper says "yes" and argues that Russell made two important contributions to international relations theory. First, he uniquely combines different levels of inquiry, connecting insights into the structure of international politics with detailed analyses of human agents. Second, he does not just analyze international relations; he also advances normative goals-something international relations theory is often reluctant to do. The two contributions are connected: Russell's normative goals are nurtured by how he combines his insights into both individuals and the structure of international relations. As a result, his particular understanding of international politics creates a unique vision for how we can improve the field-and the real world.
Of Bertrand Russell's three score books, his History of Western Philosophy is perhaps the best known. A publishing sensation from the moment of its publication in America in October 1945 and in Britain a year later, the book remains in print 80 years on. Curiously, however, the History has received inadequate scholarly attention. In particular, what has not been seriously examined are the reasons for this remarkable and unexpected success-why this immensely long book, which few contemporaries and even fewer modern students have bothered to read cover to cover, came to sell tens of thousands of copies in paper-rationed Britain and America. This paper seeks to answer that question by examining in Part i (Vol. 44, no. 1) the book's genesis, sources, composition, purposes (both avowed and latent), and in Part ii its critical reception in both Britain and the US, and continued reputation among scholars and laymen alike. A tract for its desperately troubled times, it spoke to a world fearful of totalitarianism, starving for liberal rebirth, and yearning for reasons to believe in progress, optimism, and reason, A History of Western Philosophy, for all its flaws and inadequacies, provided a source of solace, understanding, and hope to its readers then and now.
Of Bertrand Russell's three score books, his History of Western Philosophy is perhaps the best known. A publishing sensation from the moment of its publication in America in October 1945 and in Britain a year later, the book remains in print 80 years on. Curiously, however, the History has received inadequate scholarly attention. In particular, what has not been seriously examined are the reasons for this remarkable and unexpected success-why this immensely long book, which few contemporaries and even fewer modern students have bothered to read cover to cover, came to sell tens of thousands of copies in paper -rationed Britain and America. This paper seeks to answer that question by examining in Part I the book's genesis, sources, composition, purposes (both avowed and latent), and in Part II its critical reception in both Britain and the us, and continued reputation among scholars and laymen alike. A tract for its desperately troubled times, it spoke to a world fearful of totalitarianism, starving for liberal rebirth, and yearning for reasons to believe in progress, optimism, and reason, A History of Western Philosophy , for all its flaws and inadequacies, provided a source of solace, understanding, and hope to its readers then and now.
In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's MayJune 1913 critique of Russell's multiple -relation theory of judgment was the decisive factor in Russell's abandoning his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. Secondarily, Russell's progress was halted by other problems in the analysis of molecular propositional thought, which became evident as he was working through the analysis of atomic propositional thought in Part II of Theory of Knowledge . I call my reading of Wittgenstein's critique and Russell's paralysis the "Logical Interpretation". In developing and defending this interpretation, I will thus try to explain both Wittgenstein's intentions with respect to his criticisms, along with their impacts on Russell.
Review of Principia Mathematica Giuseppe Peano and Giovanni B. Ratti (bio) Introduced, translated and edited by GIOVANNI B. RATTI As all historians of logic know, Russell met Peano for the first time at the 1900 International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. He was so impressed by the way Peano and his school clearly articulated their ideas and held the upper hand in every debate that he famously recalled this revelation in two different places, namely in My Philosophical Development and the Autobiography.1 Along these lines, Hans Freudenthal once wrote [End Page 87] of the Paris congress that "In the field of the philosophy of sciences the Italian phalanx was supreme: Peano, Burali-Forti, Padoa, Pieri absolutely dominated the discussion. For Russell, who read a paper that was philosophical in the worst sense, Paris was the road to Damascus."2 From that moment on, Russell began to develop his own conception of analytic philosophy. After the Paris Congress, Russell claims, he mastered Peano's logical-mathematical notations in a few months and, equipped with such powerful technical tools, began his remarkable journey into the foundations of mathematics at an incredible pace.3 The "epiphany" of Russell's first meeting with Peano is a milestone in the history of mathematical logic and is often recalled in the history of philosophy. However, subsequent relations between the two are usually neglected. In the general literature, it is sometimes implied that Russell adopted the new symbolism he so urgently needed for his logical project from Peano and then went his own way without any further contact with the Italian mathematician. This impression has probably been created by the fact that Peano's "decline" coincided with Russell's rise in the field of mathematical logic. The Paris Congress can be seen as a "passing of the baton", so to speak.4 This metaphorical reading is nevertheless somewhat misleading as far as historical facts are concerned. Peano and Russell met several more times and exchanged letters over a number of years.5 It is not always easy to reconstruct [End Page 88] this correspondence, still less the entire philosophical relationship between the two men, as some important pieces of evidence are missing. Evidence that the relationship between the two was particularly intense in the period between the Paris Congress (1900) and the publication of Russell's Principles of Mathematics (1903) can be traced relatively easily. Russell was keen to contribute (including financially) to Peano's publishing efforts and sent two essays, in which he mainly extended Peano's system to the logic of relations, to Peano's Rivista di matematica (Revue de mathématiques).6 Letters and notes were therefore frequently exchanged between Turin and England, although the evidence here is one-sided as Russell's letters to Peano are no longer available and are probably lost for good. As mentioned, this period ends with the appearance of Principles of Mathematics,7 which Peano hails as marking a new epoch in the philosophy of mathematics in a letter to Russell dated 27 March 1903 (ra1 710.054224). Peano reiterated this opinion in 1904 at the Academy of Sciences in Turin, saying that Russell's book was the best work on the subject. Another important exchange took place in 1906, when two letters from Peano dealt with the axiom of choice (which he himself discovered—and rejected—in 1890, fourteen years before Zermelo) and logical antinomies, respectively. Again, Russell's replies are not extant. In the same year, Peano, in what was probably his last original contribution to logic,8 published a paper dealing with logical antinomies in which he provided "perhaps the most penetrating commentaries on [Richard's] paradox",9 systematized Russell's paradox as a generalization of the Burali-Forti's paradox, and made a groundbreaking distinction between [End Page 89] linguistic and mathematical antinomies.10 Early in April 1908 Peano and Russell were both in Rome for the Fourth International Congress of Mathematicians, although there is no record of a meeting between them. However, Ernst Zermelo mentions in a letter to Georg Cantor written in late July that he had had friendly conversations with both men.11 The last known correspondence and...
"Philosopher's Gong" Tony Simpson (bio) and Andrew G. Bone Click for larger view View full resolution [End Page 112] Click for larger view View full resolution This silver relief medallion (diameter: 74 mm) was designed by eminent French sculptor and medallist Henri-Albert Lagriffoul (1907–1981), perhaps best known for his "Marianne" bust on centime coins of various denominations first struck in 1962. In sending Russell the copy now held by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Paul Dehaye of France's Administration des Monnaies et Médailles indicated that the cast was "one of the very first" (14 Dec. 1966, ra2 710). It seems incongruous that even such a neutral arm of the French state as its mint was party to this tribute commissioned by the amateur Medallion Club of France. After all, Russell would shortly be barred by President de Gaulle from convening his Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in France—the former colonial power in Indochina. In noting this prohibition, The Observer's "Pendennis" also commented sniffily that collectors could buy Lagriffoul's representation of "Britain's wisest fool" for c.30 shillings in bronze or c.£11 in silver ("Philosopher's Gong", 23 April 1967, p. 39). The obverse inscription commits the commonplace error of titling Russell not as a peer but as a younger son of a duke or marquess. The reverse translates from one of his 1918 prison letters: "I am free, and the world shall be [also]" (Auto. 2: 94). [End Page 113] Tony Simpson Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation tonysimpson@russfound.org Andrew G. Bone Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. bone@mcmaster.ca Tony Simpson tony simpson is director of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and editor of The Spokesman. Copyright © 2024 Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University
Whitehead and Russell: Odd Couple? Nikolay Milkov (bio) Christoph Kann and Dennis Sölch, eds. Whitehead und Russell: Perspektiven, Konvergenzen, Dissonanzen (Whitehead Studies, Vol. 8), Freiburg am Breisgau: Karl Alber, 2023. Pp. 332. isbn: 978-3-495-49026-6 (pb); 978-3-495-99583-9 (ebook), €74,00. This collection of ten chapters, published in 2023, is based on the fourth annual meeting of the German Whitehead Society1 held in January 2015 in Düsseldorf. The Society itself was set up in 2010 (unfortunately, there is no "German Bertrand Russell Society"). The anthology Whitehead und Russell (the anthology's editors make two thirds of the board of the Society) is the eighth of ten volumes already published in the Whitehead Studies series of Karl Alber Verlag—a publishing house of repute in Germanophone philosophy. As declared in the introduction, the anthology's objective is not to deliver a new inventory or new evaluation of the two philosophers and logicians. The fields in which Whitehead and Russell worked are too complex and too broad for this purpose. Instead, the book discusses selected themes, mainly of their theoretical philosophy (p. 22). Moreover, it does not follow chronological but systematic priorities—its objective is the "systematic reconstruction of the scientifically oriented metaphysics" of the two philosophers and logicians (p. 23). It is not difficult to notice, however, that the anthology is Whitehead oriented. Suffice it to say that in the list of abbreviations (p. 7ff.) twenty works of Whitehead are cited and not a single one of Russell. My general impression is that many of the authors of the volume have difficulty orienting themselves in [End Page 114] Russell's philosophy. They are often biased in favour of Whitehead at the expense of Russell. For example, one of the editors of the book, Christoph Kann, states in the introduction: the fact that "in the biggest part of their reception history Whitehead remained in the shadow of his longstanding friend and colleague [Russell, can be simply explained by . . .] the enormous commercial success, in particular, of Russell's works in popular philosophy" (p. 9). Furthermore, for Dr. Kann, "Russell, with his penchant for stylistic niceties and popularization, did not prove himself to be an epitome [Inbegriff ] of analytic philosophy—but rather as an occasionally unusual representative of this movement" (p. 11). In particular, Dr. Kann claims that Russell's "constructive analysis" (apparently, he means here Russell's use of the concept of "logical constructions") is not without alternatives in analytic philosophy. For example, there is also a "connective analysis" accurately described by Peter Strawson (p. 13). Of course there are alternatives to Russell's constructive analysis. However, Russell adhered to it only for a short period of time. Moreover, today, Strawson's connective analysis is anything but mainstream analytic philosophy. Finally, Russell's constructive analysis is not reductionist, as Dr. Kann maintains, but eliminativist.2 It is also difficult to understand why the author of the introduction sees George Stout as a Hegelian, along with John McTaggart, and so speaks of "Hegelians in Cambridge" at the fin de siècle (p. 15). In fact, there was only one Hegelian in Cambridge at that point in time and this was McTaggart. Stout was more of an "analytic psychologist" of Brentanoesque style. Next, Dr. Kann maintains that "Russell and Whitehead's orientation to English idealism went gradually down and was replaced by Russell's turn to the philosophy of common sense" (p. 17; my italics). As a matter of fact, Russell had great problems with Hegel's philosophy already when he read his Science of Logic for the first time in March 1897. Moreover, he radically—not gradually—broke with Hegelianism in April 1898.3 In the following years Russell did not orient himself to the English idealists at all—despite the fact that he often discussed the arguments of F. H. Bradley. Besides, Russell never adopted the philosophy of common sense. His friend G. E. Moore did this, but only after 1925. Furthermore, the author maintains that among the particulars in Russell's Principles of Mathematics (1903) are points of space and time and sense-data (p. 20). We all know, however, that Russell...
historical perspective to make sense of future conflicts and crises. This is not just abstract theory; a major international crisis is quite likely to occur in your lifetime. This course is guided by a concern for both theory and history. In the first half of the semester we survey the leading theories of the causes of war, using the “levels-of-analysis” framework to categorize these theories and organize our survey. We begin with the “system” level and focus on realist theories of conflict focusing on state power and interest, giving particular attention to balance of power theory and power transition theory. We also examine the “Prisoner’s dilemma” model, deterrence and spiral models, and the “bargaining model of war.” Each of these theories assumes that states’ foreign policies are rational responses to their external environments and designed to maximize the national interest. Other theories suggest that the causes of war derive from factors internal to the state, including the domestic political interests of decision-makers, the economic interests of private groups, public opinion, or organizational processes. We examine these “societal” and “governmental” level theories, along with “individual” level theories that emphasize the role of the belief systems, personalities, and idiosyncracies of political leaders. We illustrate each of the main theoretical arguments with examples from a wide range of historical cases. Among the questions the levels-of-analysis framework leads us to ask is whether the outbreak of wars is due more to states’ external competition for power and security or to their internal political dynamics or the psychological make-up of political leaders.
