Abstract The paper reviews Richard Shusterman’s research corpus in light of his autobiographical writings. The article is divided into three parts. The first one focuses on Richard’s autobiographical works which give us a sense of his self-identity. The second part traces Richard’s professional trajectory insofar as it reflects his evolving research agenda and links his academic peregrinations to his emergent selfhood. The third part takes up philosophical life as a research topic and pinpoints some unresolved issues that arise when we set out to interface our personal, public, and intellectual endeavors.
Abstract Richard Shusterman, a pragmatist philosopher, has developed somaesthetics as a field focused on the body (Greek soma ) as a site of aesthetic perception, practice, and improvement. This paper follows his theory of “somaesthetics,” exploring the concept of taste, gustatory sensibility, food appreciation, and the art of eating as an indispensable medium for soma-aesthetic perception and cognition and self-cultivation. The paper aims to question the philosophical tradition in the West since Plato, whose hierarchical view on the sense of taste holds that a discussion on eating, as bodily sensory delights, would weaken the authority of philosophy. In addition, in the light of Shusterman’s somaesthetics, the Chinese view on body theory and its non-dualistic position in terms of physical enjoyment and the reasoned pleasure of beauty of culinary taste will be discussed.
The article develops a new way of viewing the problem of evil through the pragmatist theory of inquiry. Recent discussions about existential problems of evil show that it arises from the dissonant or shocking experience of evil. Evil offers a dissonant experience, which leads to existential doubt. Evil challenges perspectives for viewing the world as an order of sufficient reasons and undermines world-view practices. Existential doubt is resolved by world-view inquiry and dialogue to assess the capabilities of world-views to come to terms with evil. The threatening nature of evil could however shock the suffering person into an experience of meaninglessness, or a retreat to the method of authority. Both involve the breakdown of inquiries for responding to the world.
In contemporary societies, 'growth' has become a keyword invoked whenever we speak of development or progress-economic, social, psychological, or technological. Yet this prominence is not accompanied by adequate reflection on the normative criteria that would allow us to distinguish between desirable and undesirable forms of growth. To begin to fill this gap, the paper turns to the philosophy of John Dewey, who conceives growth as a qualitative transformation of experience, oriented toward the intelligent and cooperative expansion of living conditions. Dewey's account thus challenges contemporary views, which are often reductive and allegedly value-neutral. After examining some dominant conceptions of growth, the paper reconstructs Dewey's account and, on its basis, identifies two normative criteria for individual and social growth.
Kate Phelan's reply to my "Conceptual Change and Future Paths for Pragmatism" channels elements of Rorty's pragmatism to defend the view that the pragmatist need not face the challenge of accounting for the prospective rationality of conceptual change. The Rorty-inspired case Phelan makes, however, only further reveals what is lacking in Rorty's approach. It limits us to an oversimplified view of inquiry: zetetic activity is only felicitous within settled vocabularies and infelicitous outside of them. What Rorty misses is that conceptual inquiry - arguments, disagreements, and inquiry concerning which concepts we should have and how we should make sense of them - is a crucial aspect of inquiry itself. Pragmatists are well-positioned to illuminate this higher-order dimension of our inquiring lives.
Abstract Richard Rorty reminded modern liberals that political progress is not inevitable. To accentuate political progress, modern liberals should talk about class stratification more than racial stigma. To facilitate such talk, academics should rarely theorize in public and leftist cultural warriors should denounce inequality and discrimination. Facilitating public talk, at the cost of what Americans have in common, exposes working class and racialized groups to the stratifying effects of the free-market. The opportunity cost, according to Rorty, is too high. Endorsing progress, class-consciousness, liberal study and cultural politics obligates modern liberals to limit particularist race-talk. Determining what Rorty could say about dismissing race in public conversation merits an analysis of his account of post-philosophical methods, progressive historiography and eliminative materialism. Elimination with intent can occur when scholars employ therapy by dissolution to concepts like truth, God or race. Then, philosophical canons can be educated and reeducated about what Rorty could say. After being subjected to therapy, Rorty’s version of contemporary American pragmatism can disclose the stakes of public conversations about redistributing resources. The stakes reveal a method for the maturation of public dialogue that needs to materialize race-talk.
Abstract My purpose in this paper is to assess the value and relevance of Robert Brandom’s criticism of Richard Rorty in Pragmatism and Idealism (2022) and to offer a Rortyan counterargument against it. After an analysis of Rorty’s narrative of emancipation (and the responses offered by Brandom and John McDowell), the paper describes Brandom’s central concept of recollection ( Erinerrung ), with special emphasis on the conclusion of Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust (2019), before turning to issues present in Brandom’s account. Finally, I conclude that Brandom’s attack on Rorty's position fails, leaving Rorty on equal grounds with Brandom’s hero Hegel, together on the edge of post-modernity.
This paper illuminates Richard Rorty's call for a "poeticization" of democratic culture and argues that we should heed it. His pragmatism is redescribed as philosophical poeticism-a view of selves, ideas, vocabularies, theories, institutions and all such human-made artefacts as, precisely, made and thus re-makable-and this stance is positioned as profoundly advantageous to democratic sustainability. Rorty's account is restated as saying that the development from representationalism towards a poeticist epistemic outlook emerged as a broad, cumulative probabilistic effect of cultures being increasingly suffused by art and literary writing in the broadest sense of these terms. This shifts what kind of dispositions and skills democratic cultures should cultivate in their citizens towards those most closely associated with the arts and humanities, positioning these practices as critical infrastructure rather than cultural amenity, if the aim is to sustain democracy as a way of life.
This paper investigates one crucial difference between Richard Rorty's philosophy of language and W.V. Quine's. In particular, it emphasizes how the conflictual topics of empiricism, scientism and physicalist reductionism are crystallized around the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, and how common interlocutors such as Donald Davidson and Bj & oslash;rn Ramberg have contributed to bringing Rorty and Quine somewhat closer on that point. Over the course of this inquiry, an examination of semantic holism (using the insights of Davidson's post-Quinean theory of radical interpretation) is offered along the way. At last, this paper evaluates whether Rorty and Quine's disagreement remain largely irreconcilable, and the extent to which these two philosophers can be considered to be standing together under the same, neopragmatic banner.
Abstract As an extension (Part II) of a previous article written and published in 2016 (Part I) by the author, four more areas of the ideas of John Dewey and Edward Hall will be discussed with the intention of deepening and fine-tuning the theory and practice of intercultural communication as a discipline. These four areas are the following: 1) more on the relationship between definitions and inquiry; (2) further discussion on Dewey’s and Hall’s views on patterns, habits and rules; (3) more support for Hall’s emphasis on nonverbal communication from mother/infant research; and (4) Dewey’s and Bentley’s distinction between interaction and transaction and how this can further help us to understand Hall’s mystifying definition/equation: Culture is communication.
This article responds to the six essays critically commenting on my article, “Pragmatism as a Mediator – Seeking an Illusory Harmony?”.
The contemporary debate on abortion is entrenched in an unproductive theoretical deadlock. Traditional moral arguments between pro-life and pro-choice perspectives have failed to translate into practical solutions that address the real conditions shaping reproductive choices. In this article, instead of perpetuating abstract moral debates, I propose a shift toward reproductive pragmatism, a methodological approach that prioritizes practical coalition-building over ideological purity. I develop a metaethical framework that evaluates moral perspectives by their capacity to support inclusive, goal-oriented coalitions under conditions of pluralism. To do this, I first outline the current impasse in abortion discourse, emphasizing the limitations of rights-based and personhood-centered arguments. I then explore how moral contestation has constrained meaningful political progress. I then introduce reproductive pragmatism, drawing from environmental rm'pagmatiss "nvgcoerence hypothesis" to demonstrate how shared policy solutions can emerge despite moral disagreements. To concretize the convergence h'ypothesiss applicability, I present a case study of a'Florids 2024 abortion amendment, illustrating how political realignments are creating opportunities for cross-partisan coalition-building. I conclude with a call for, and exploration of obstacles to, grassroots reproductive pragmatism, suggesting that pragmatic philosophers and activists can foster direct community solutions to material concerns rather than relying on legislative battles alone.
This paper identifies technological practice-practice which is social yet nonpropositional-as a central feature of pragmatist accounts of normativity. Following past efforts to bridge the opposing attitudes and methodologies of John Dewey and Ludwig Wittgenstein through their shared use of language-as-tool metaphors, I argue that resources from the philosophy of technology can be drawn upon to examine these metaphors in a new light. I demonstrate that both Dewey and Wittgenstein mobilize complementary tools-as-language metaphors, which extend meaning holism to the non-linguistic material objects of our social practices. The resulting position reconceptualizes and problematizes past debates within pragmatist scholarship by articulating a communicative-theoretic pragmatism which locates and tracks the norms implicit in our use of tools, instruments, and artifacts.
In this article, I start from pragmatist arguments to challenge the notion that the diagnostic categories of mental disorders, when considered as irrefutable truths, overlook the living conditions of the individuals, usually women, who suffer from Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). I argue that BPD is constituted at both the bodily and mental levels, but it is also strongly influenced by habits. Following James and Dewey, I demonstrate that individuals, whether they have a mental disorder or not, can progress towards a different way of emotionally relating to themselves and the world, moving away from mere reaction and emotional discharge, and instead, embracing their capacity for consciousness and agency from which they can express and transform their experiences.
This article proposes a theoretical alliance between Gilles Deleuze's philosophy and Charles Sanders Peirce's thought. Deleuze had access only to a "second-hand Peirce", mediated through G & eacute;rard Deledalle's anthologies. He never read Peirce's work directly. Thus the theoretical operation of staying at the intersection between Deleuze and Peirce cannot but take the form of an equivocation, and in particular of a hermeneutic equivocation. I will begin by proposing a method of "hermeneutic machination", inhabiting the crossroads between two radically heterogeneous traditions, in order to abductively show their consonances and continuities. The aim is to highlight a new possible image of thought that can face the problems of our time. The attempt is also to hold together Deleuze's and Peirce's cosmological aspirations, as well as a new image of thought that lives in the mutual relation between virtuality and actuality, i.e. between generality and individuation. Continuity and discontinuity are in this perspective a "conceptual perimeter" for an equivocation between Deleuze and Peirce, at the intersection of semiotics and immanence.
Wishful thinking is an ambiguous term which requires a new name that shows it is an unjustified belief that lacks epistemic support and is false hoping. I introduce Unjustified Wishfulness (UW) as the preferred nomenclature which emphasizes its lack of justification. UW is a universal desire in which humans believe what they wish and is pleasing, regardless of the evidence or good reasons. Rule utilitarianism is proposed to end or decrease UW in ethical decisions. I argue that it provides the best theory when it confers pragmatic moral rules when prudently followed, should curtail self-centered wishful thinking, and support the happiness of the greater number of people. Social-political implications are included. UW is also a moral character trait utilizing Aristotle’s virtue ethics. James’s ethical theory and pragmatic views on wishful thinking supports my position. Finally, the ground or basis of UW may be present in neuronal brain activity as extreme optimistic thinking, and possibly inherent in consciousness.
This article critically examines Hutter-Almerigi's defence of Rorty's strong subjectivity and the possibility of complete detachment from the normativity of public language. She presents two arguments: although public normativity is necessary for a new vocabulary to be recognised, it is unnecessary at the moment of its emergence; and a robust subjectivity and normative detachment advance Rorty's aim to arouse political action and redescribe liberal culture. I contend that normative detachment is unnecessary and impossible for language creation, for triangulation conserves and transforms language simultaneously and is a condition of private languages. I also question the direct political goals Hutter-Almerigi attributes to Rorty, proposing instead that his cultural politics seeks to indirectly cultivate a metaphysics-free sense of community through vocabulary redescription.
Richard Rorty's pragmatic liberalism seeks to combine individual freedom that encourages the flourishing of individualistic, Nietzschean "strong poets" with progressive, economically egalitarian social democracy. Critics, particularly on the Left, have questioned whether this combination is coherent and argue that Rorty's robust commitment to individual autonomy undermines his political progressivism. This article suggests that these critics are correct that Rorty's liberal theory contains a problematic tension and, further, that this tension could be ameliorated if Rorty had recognized the affinities his liberalism has with the pragmatic classical liberalism of FA Hayek.
In this paper, I explore and extend Susan Dieleman's suggestion that Rorty is a "feminist ally", arguing that the idea of allyship provides a fruitful and revealing way to understand the political substance and implications of his liberalism. I begin with attention to allyship itself, the core tenets of which are, I suggest, implicit in Rorty's oft-ignored commitment to hope as a normative philosophical and political ideal. To make further sense of Rorty's understanding of allyship - and the deference to the experiences of marginalised others that it implies - I reconsider his engagement with feminist philosophy. At the end of the paper, I locate my discussion in the context of recent scholarly conversations about the identity and implications of Rorty's vision of politics in a liberal community.
