Abstract Isocolon is a special form of repetition, aligning sequences of words, phrases, or clauses through prosodic parallelism. It is the mainstay of poetry and ritualistic genres, a feature of oratory, ubiquitous in slogans, proverbs, and other widespread, culturally robust expressions, and a crucial instrument of conversational coordination. It very frequently collocates with other figures and has a special affinity for parison (syntactic parallelism). I develop isocolon as a paradigm case of endophoric (or ‘intrasemiotic’) iconicity. Similarity of form evokes similarity of meaning. I argue for a rhetorical homogeneity activated more broadly by schemes of repetition, and a particular role for parallelism in providing a setting to amplify the semiotic functioning of other figures. My case brings together the work of Kenneth Burke with empirical results in cognitive psychology and theoretical work in neuroscience. Experimental work revealing a ‘credibility bonus’ for aesthetic language demonstrates Burke’s notion of formal assent, and the theory of predictive coding explains his related notion of collaborative expectancy. Prior and current forms prime our receptivity for future forms.
Abstract I present a critique of a central claim of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, namely, that metaphor is a conceptual form of thought. Metaphor is deeply cognitive, I argue, but it is not based on concepts. Instead, metaphor rests on the conflation of things, thinking of one thing as another, a cognitive act which directly violates the aims of conceptual thought: 1) to categorize things or 2) to provide a rule for experience. Metaphor ignores categorical meaning, flagrantly so, and operates without any clear rules. For these reasons, metaphor has historically been rejected by cognitive theorists who privilege conceptual thought. Conceptual Metaphor Theory argues that metaphorical cognition is in fact conceptual, but this is a mistake, because metaphor is manifestly conflational and serves a very different cognitive purpose than conception. Its primary aim, I argue, is to specify experience, to characterize experience in a closer, finer sense – not more generally, as concepts do. I show that metaphor is a concrete, specifying operation that employs concrete elements of experience to characterize abstract experience in a more concrete way – precisely as the abstract is conflated with concrete elements. Such a view provides a much simpler, clearer understanding of metaphorical cognition and its essential aims.
Abstract Investigating the semantic specificity of inner speech means addressing one of the most elusive and underexplored sides of language studies: the irreducible mark of subjectivity, long marginalised in 19th- and 20th-century comparative and structuralist approaches as a non-formalisable residue of analysis (Bergounioux. 2010. Les trois sources de la théorie de l’endophasie: phonologie, psychologie et clinique. Histoire Épistémologie Langage 32(2). 9–22; De Palo. 2022. Le langage intérieur, le sujet et le paradoxes de la dimension métalinguistique. In S. Smadja & F. Dubor (eds.), Pratiques monologales , 39–61). Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this study integrates the Egger–Vygotsky hypothesis on the idiomatic and existential value of inner personal sense – distinguished here from more stable and socially shared meaning – with recent perspectives offered by embodied semantics and the Default Mode Network theory. Inner speech is interpreted here as an intrapsychic site of continuous individuation of sense: socially acquired meanings are not simply stored, but are resemanticised and reshaped through the subject’s experiential and autobiographical imprint. The first half of the paper revisits key analogies between the philosophical and psycholinguistic analyses of Egger (1881. La parole intérieure. Essai de psychologie descriptive . Paris: Germer-Baillière) and Vygotsky ([1934] 1986. Thought and language , edited and translated by Alex Kozulin, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), proposing a model of “ inner idiolect ”, marked by semantic condensation and creativity, where sense [ sens / smysl’ ] emerges as the fundamental unit of analysis: a semantic microcosm refracting consciousness, whose idiomatic density might be almost untranslatable into external speech. Reframed in cognitive and neuroscientific terms, this meaning/sense dialectic may be interpreted in relation to the neural overlaps between multimodal semantic hubs and DMN areas (Binder et al. 2009. Where is the semantic system? A critical review and meta-analysis of 120 functional neuroimaging studies. Cerebral Cortex 19(12). 2767–2796), suggesting a process of multimodal semantic integration as a plausible functional background for sense-making operations carried out by the brain in resting-state conditions and mediated by spontaneous states of inner speech.
Spatiotemporal metaphors strongly affect our language about time. Time can be construed as an object that moves through space ( time flies ) or as a landscape through which we move ( we are heading towards the weekend ). Evidence of how speakers construe time can be found by observing their gestures. This study explores spatial constructions of time in co-speech gestures during programming lectures in Swedish upper-secondary classrooms. Data were collected from teachers’ co-speech gestures while lecturing on programming, a context rich in temporal and sequential references. The results show that the teachers gesture in three directions, each with a specific function. Gestures along the vertical axis are used to talk about writing code as events on a vertical timeline. The programming convention where code lines are ordered top-down, indicating events in a particular order, is suggested as an explanation. Gestures along the sagittal axis are used when the teachers take an internal perspective. Gestures along the lateral axis are used when discussing events. This is a first exploration of how time concepts are construed in Swedish programming classrooms. The research provides a foundation for more extensive studies on the role of co-speech gestures in conceptualising time, particularly in educational settings involving technological interfaces.
The decline in deep, longform reading is increasingly recognized as an emerging social problem. This exploratory study investigates the possible conditions influencing flow during extended academic reading sessions, in particular the role of digital devices in these processes. We observed university students in two reading settings: one with digital tools present and the other with only printed texts available. Drawing on perspectives from embodied and distributed cognition, our findings suggest that, in contrast to established theories of flow in reading, readers are not consistently immersed in the reading task throughout a reading session but instead fluctuate between various reading modes: they seem to battle with an uneasy ‘settling in-phase’, only later to emerge as focused on the text, even as bodily positions are changed. Towards the end of a reading session, bodily restlessness increases once more. Observations from case studies also showed that participants’ embodied engagement with the reading devices differ, as revealed during self-initiated interruptions: when reading in print, the reader would to a greater extent remain “on task” and continue reading during such interruptions. When reading digitally, the reader more often left the reading device idle on the desk. Our study contributes to the literature by suggesting that settling in requires time and effort, possibly especially in the presence of digital devices, and highlights the importance of addressing this process through more systematic training and focused attention. The settling-in phase is significant for how the reading unfolds. Further aspects of readers’ bodily enactment with texts seem to differ between paper and screens. Finally, our results suggest the need for future research to systematically examine bodily shifts and reading trajectories of extended reading in natural settings.
This study explored whether co-speech gestures and linguistic markers help distinguish between the literal and figurative meanings of taste and smell , building on prior findings related to the verb touch . To determine whether patterns found for touch generalize to additional verbs, we aimed to (1) compare gestures associated with taste and smell , (2) examine the motivation behind frequent gestures associated with taste and smell , and (3) describe the relation between spoken words and the meanings of taste and smell . Gesture analysis showed that while gestures help differentiate the meanings of touch , they do not exhibit distinct patterns between literal and figurative meanings of taste and smell . Linguistic analysis showed that only object quantifiers were frequent when conveying literal meanings of taste and smell . Although negation and verb modifiers were key in distinguishing the meanings of touch , they were not commonly used with either taste or smell .
This study presents an example of an integrative, usage-based approach to capturing different levels of representation in co-speech gestures. We propose an annotation procedure that is demonstrated here using an extract from a multimodal corpus of Czech conversations. The 10-min extract captures 3 speakers interacting during a business meeting. The core idea behind our approach is that different aspects of the form-meaning mapping should be treated as dimensions that may interact with each other – these dimensions may include the degree of perceived iconicity based on rating, the type of form-meaning association, or the character of the form-meaning mapping (focusing on cognitive processes of which the gesture may be seen as a manifestation). Such an approach aligns with a current shift in cognitively oriented gesture studies (and beyond) away from categorical and discrete views of multimodal representation, toward more gradual and dynamic accounts.
Ferdinand de Saussure’s lasting impact on modern linguistics has been extensively explored, particularly his structural semiotic model, a model where arbitrary signs gain meaning through relational differences within a socially constructed system. However, the connection between this model and recent approaches to figurative meaning remains underexplored. The present study addresses this gap by examining Zoltán Kövecses’s Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory (ECMT) through a Saussurean lens. The argument is that ECMT treats figurative meaning as motivated by bodily experience, yet not predetermined, remaining open to contextual and culturally shaped variation – thus retaining a role for a Saussurean notion of arbitrariness, but at the level of selection and interpretation rather than at the level of conceptual grounding. ECMT further reinterprets the langue-parole distinction in cognitive terms: rather than treating langue as an abstract linguistic system, it emphasises the existence of entrenched conceptual patterns that function as shared resources for meaning construction. Parole is recast as a dynamic, online semiotic process, whereby speakers construct mental spaces in real time, selectively activating and integrating these shared patterns to make sense of situated experience. Through repeated use in discourse, some locally constructed metaphors may stabilise and become entrenched, feeding back into the shared cultural conceptual repertoire.
The question of what meaning music conveys is an ancient and unresolved issue. Central to discussions have been the relation between meaning in language and meaning in music: In spite of obvious differences, the challenge remains of providing an account that could place the two areas as elements of the same overall picture. This paper suggests an approach based on advances in functional-cognitive linguistics on the one hand and cognitive semiotics on the other. From functional-cognitive linguistics it draws on two key elements: (1) a division between three sites of meaning, rather than a monolithic approach, recognizing that meaning in actual usage events, in individual brains, and in society cannot be reduced to one thing. (2) A division in actual usage events between ‘input’ and ‘meaning construction’, stressing the constitutive role of the recipient in understanding the nature of meaning. From cognitive semiotics it draws on the concept of the semiotic hierarchy. The key point is the understanding of the nature of meaning as a broader and more fundamental property than found in the linguistic tradition.
The following article aims to synthesize, review, and extend the existing framework of the multilevel approach to metaphor. The synthesis provides insight into how various levels of the human conceptual structure participate in the emergence of metaphoricity in gesture and visuals. The critical part of the paper evaluates contentious areas of the framework, focusing in particular on the question of reconciling the fuzzy, gradable character of the human conceptual system with much needed analytical rigor in analyzing metaphor, and proposes some tentative ways of overcoming these methodological and conceptual tensions. In the final part of the article, two additional levels of the conceptual structure are proposed, the level of mimetic schemas and constructions, providing more granularity for the future analysis within the multilevel approach.
Abstract Experimental studies of animal episodic memory test the behavioural expression of a what-where-when ‘memory content’. This is to say, autobiographical memory in some species (mainly birds, rodents, and great apes) has been understood on the basis of how the subject’s actions demonstrate their long-term awareness of already enacted and yet-to-be enacted scenarios. However, such behavioural focus has come at the expense of discussing the interdependent role of two equally important episodic hallmarks: ‘memory structure’ (mental representations), and ‘memory flexibility’ (adaptive choice-making). This paper provides a semiotic characterization of those less discussed hallmarks, in terms of the Peircean concept of virtual habit or the mental enactment of non-present episodes. It is argued that the behavioural expression of a ‘memory content’ (as object in a process of semiosis) cannot be accounted for without understanding the phenomenological or experiential support of memory structure (as a representamen), and the teleological or purposeful self-control of memory flexibility (as interpretant). Based on this, a new cognitive model of animal episodic memory is proposed, consisting of interrelated modalities called Virtualiter, Habitualiter, and Actualiter. Capitalizing on multispecies evidence, possible applications and new directions of the model are suggested.
Abstract This article seeks to outline the effective integration of semiotic methods, particularly the Peircean approach, with research on human creative cognition. The aim is to elucidate the involvement of the mind and neurological mechanisms in the process of semiosis. By examining how the mind externalizes thoughts and ideas, the article offers a fresh perspective on how external models and representations serve as essential anchors of meaning. Furthermore, this integrated approach provides a deeper understanding of how meaning is constructed and communicated, highlighting the importance of considering both internal cognitive processes and external manifestations in the study of semiotics.
Abstract Recent cognitive science research suggests that occasional “blindness” to choice manipulations indicates a lack of awareness in choice making. This claim is based on participants’ tendency not to detect choice manipulations and the similarity between their justifications for choices they made and those they were tricked into believing they made. Using a cognitive-semiotic framework, we argue that such conclusions underestimate the embodied, intersubjective nature of human meaning-making. We support this by investigating choice awareness beyond language to include non-verbal behavior. Forty-one participants were asked to choose from pairs of photographs of human faces the one they found most attractive and then to justify their choices, without knowing that for some of the trials they were asked to justify a choice that they had not made. Verbal responses were categorized as (i) non-manipulated, (ii) detected manipulated, and (iii) undetected manipulated trials. Bodily expressions, assessed using five different Categories of Bodily Expression (CBE): Adaptors, Torso, Head, Face and Hand expressions, revealed differences in: (a) duration, (b) rates of occurrence and (c) variety of the CBEs across trials. Thus, even when manipulations were not verbally detected, participants took longer to assess choices, showed increased bodily expressions, and engaged more body parts in undetected manipulations compared to non-manipulated choice trials. This suggests a degree of awareness to the choice manipulation, even if pre-reflective, manifested in participants’ bodily expressions.
Abstract This reflection on Göran Sonesson’s writings and theoretical engagement in art is also a survey of a set of semiotic concepts related to this area. As a semiotician Sonesson wrote about varying sub-genres like fine art, photography, film and architecture. The reflection is also a personal recollection – as a colleague, friend and participant in the Lund circle of semiotics – of ideas and discussions highlighting the relation between semiotics, art theory and artistic practice. This reflection captures a couple of notions of importance in Sonesson’s contributions to semiotic theory relating to pictoriality, art and culture, such as “secondary iconicity”, “projected Ego, Alter and Alius”, “sedimentation of impressions”, “picture subject and picture object”, etc. The reflection ends in stating the importance of the specifically Lifeworld-based semiotic contribution by Sonesson to art theory, a contribution perhaps yet to be fully appreciated, and how this contribution also corresponds with how practicing artists reach out to, but also goes beyond, the art world itself.
Abstract This paper will evaluate the quantitative content analysis of visual rhetoric which has been put forward by George Rossolatos in the context of audio-visuality and marketing research. Rossolatos bases his taxonomy of visual rhetorical figures on Groupe µ’s adaptation of classical rhetoric in Rhétorique génerale (1970). With the aim of creating a systematic model for marketing analysis, he and his collaborators have coded and classified an extensive number of audiovisual commercials from the top international strata of economically valuable brands. For comparison, I have during a period of four years given undergraduates the task of collecting and categorizing a minimum of ten audio-visual commercials, each of which should exemplify one of the figures referred to by Rossolatos. The outcomes of the task indicate that a random explorative study with a minimum of operationalization and training of coders is enough for obtaining results akin to those reported by Rossolatos. This may be regarded as a positive outcome from a pedagogical point of view, but it may also raise the suspicion that Rossolatos’s criteria are merely intuitive. If the incidence of visual rhetorical figures is to be studied as an independent content variable of audio-visual enunciations, the values/figures should be described with greater caution.
Abstract Visual thinking is a systematic way to produce knowledge in design by means of mental imagery, spatial reasoning, and the use of an array of visual representations. Pictorial representations such as sketches are crucial for the activity of designing at the early stage of the creative process. Designers see more information in sketches than was actually drawn. The ability to see more information than is sketched out can be seen as an enhanced visual capacity of human agency. Enhanced agency is the prosthetic incorporation of artifacts to improve the original agentive capacities. The incorporation of artifacts to draw raises some fundamental questions: Is the pencil an extension of the mind? Can we think with our hands? What agentive capacities are increased with the use of the pencil? What is the representational status of sketching? The chapter is structured around these key questions to suggest some answers inspired by the work of Göran Sonesson. Using the notion of enhanced agency and the layered model of agency, I explore the way in which the pencil improves the visual thinking of design. In doing so I found that it is important to maintain the principle of asymmetry in cognitive systems to reconsider relational ontology in favor of ecological relationships.
Abstract This essay discusses the notion of ‘semiotic development in child development’ and highlights potential concerns for ‘psychologism’ when semiotics turns into cognitive semiotics. The notion of ‘semiotic development in child development’ indicates a transdisciplinary approach involving both semiotics, the general study of meaning and signs, and child psychology. This, however, invites the criticism of committing the fallacy of psychologism. Piaget was aware of this dilemma when developing his theory of the semiotic function as a united capacity in children’s cognitive development. Sonesson’s proposal of a general definition of signs in meaning-making is suggested to, at some points, meet the dilemma with psychologism in studies of children’s semiotic development. Starting from a phenomenological point of view in semiotics and integrating Piaget’s theory on cognitive development and meaning-making meet the study of subjectivity in intersubjectivity. On the one hand, the sign as a theoretical object is not reducible to any given psychological process or processes; on the other hand, sign meaning can only exist if there are beings (consciousnesses) capable of grasping and using signs.
Abstract Sighted children drawing an apple with a pin through it show the hidden parts of the pin. That is, not only is the pin shown running towards the apple and out the other side, it is also shown inside the apple, without a single break, and so the sketch depicts the occluded parts of the pin. Several investigators have offered theories of the observation. We report here on tangible raised-line drawings by young blind people who are novices at drawing. They also include occluded segments of the pin. To explain the drawings we use the John Willats region theory. In this account, enclosed regions represent the volumes of 3D objects. According to region theory, what is in the interior of an object should be shown in the drawing even if it cannot be seen or touched. As a result, since occluded parts of the pin are inside the apple, blind children, like sighted children, include them in their drawings. In region theory, for both the blind and the sighted, long lines on a 2D pictorial surface represent elongated objects in the scene and regions on the surface represent 3D objects and their contents. The basis of region theory may be that sensory information for pins and lines has high-frequency components, and for apples and regions has lower-frequency components.
Abstract Sonesson’s vision of the diversity of meaning-generation coincides well with the purview of the cultural semiotics of Jingshen, in which semiotic inquiry is envisioned to improve mental capacity, the expansion of mental/cognitive space, and ultimately the liberation of human thinking. When embracing new epistemologies for cognitive semiotics, semiotic inquiry can work well as a form of art of thinking that has the potential to maintain “cognitive homeostasis”, the tendency towards a relatively stable equilibrium that can be maintained in the holistic flux of mind, vitality, and creativity. A plausible path to this equilibrium is through a balance between the left and right hemispheres, between analytical thinking and synthetic thinking. In this sense, what we are facing is essentially a problem of “ecology of cognition” or “ecological cognition”, that is, viewing cognition from an ecological perspective or considering cognition as a form of ecological activity. The focus of cognitive semiotics nowadays must transcend not only words or other external symbols, but even the traditional sense of “humanity” needs to be reconsidered.
Abstract Alteroception is the virtual experience of another person’s bodily movement centered in the perspective of the other person. In face-to-face interactions, human beings tend to assume a special mode of alteroception by mutually but tacitly recognizing that ‘your right is on my left and your left is on my right’. Researchers of neonatal cognition and early childhood development describe this mode of alteroception as “reverse” or “inverted”. Inverse alteroception goes beyond mirror-image mimesis to chiastic (crisscrossing) mimesis in acts of intersubjective sense-making; but the cognitive and cultural affordances of this inverse reciprocal ability are largely untreated in the literature. I argue that this unique aspect of human phenomenology deserves closer attention since it enables a broader palette of diagrammatic contrasts that extend far beyond face-to-face interaction. In this paper, I apply insights from Peircean and Greimasian semiotics to argue that salient features of the human lifeworld originate from imaginative mappings of inverse alteroception onto other domains. From diagrams of gesture space and contemporary visual design to the structures of the Proscenium stage, from historic heraldry to Aristotle’s logical square of oppositions and beyond, many visual/spatial designs and their reciprocal interaction with human experience are linked to this ability – an ability that owes its origins, in turn, to the evolution of upright posture.
