Non-harming (ahiṃsā) is central to Buddhism, which is widely associated with conflict prevention and the cultivation of peace. Buddhist traditions of statecraft nevertheless recognize that rulers are responsible for protecting their populations from internal disorder and external aggression. They do not therefore tend to support absolute pacifism or unilateral disarmament. Rather, they point towards a pragmatic middle path of harm minimization that includes maintaining credible military deterrence to prevent war and, as a last resort, defend the state. Nuclear weapons test this accommodation to its limits. Their deterrent effect depends upon the threat of catastrophic and largely indiscriminate retaliation, while their possession creates risks of accident, miscalculation, sabotage, unauthorized use and escalation. They are therefore difficult to reconcile with Buddhist commitments to compassion, restraint and non-harming, even when considered strategically necessary. This article argues that Buddhist ethics may nevertheless leave room for nuclear deterrence where states face serious or existential threats and lack credible alternatives. Such deterrence must be embedded within policies of diplomacy, military restraint, defense alliances, multilateral arms-control and development of discriminate defensive technologies that progressively reduce reliance on nuclear threats. Its acceptance is therefore provisional, and requires continual reassessment as security conditions change.
This Foreword introduces the special issue Religion, Peace and Nuclear Disarmament by situating its contributions within ethical and strategic challenges confronting contemporary international security. While debates on nuclear weapons are often framed in terms of deterrence, strategic stability, arms control, and international law, they also raise questions concerning moral responsibility, the legitimacy of violence, and the protection of human dignity. The articles collected in this issue demonstrate that religious traditions continue to offer valuable perspectives on these questions. Drawing upon Islamic jurisprudence, Hindu philosophy, Buddhist political thought, Catholic social teaching, and practical experiences of inter-faith dialogue, the contributions explore how diverse faith traditions engage with the ethics of warfare, nuclear deterrence, humanitarian principles, reconciliation, and peacebuilding. Although differing in their theological foundations and historical experiences, they converge on the importance of restraint, responsibility, and the pursuit of peace while acknowledging the complexity of contemporary security dilemmas. This Foreword argues that discussions on nuclear disarmament benefit from sustained dialogue between international law, strategic studies, ethics, and religious thought. Rather than presenting religion as a historical or cultural phenomenon, the special issue demonstrates its continuing relevance to contemporary scholarship on peace, humanitarian action, and the governance of the world’s most destructive weapons.
This article, written by the Archbishop of Santa Fe, John C. Wester, traces his involvement in the nuclear disarmament movement. It points to the destructive power of nuclear weapons and it outlines the moral, pastoral and spiritual reasons why they must be eliminated. The author promotes the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and encourages the reader to do the same. He underscores the importance of engaging people in a conversation that will lead to the conviction that nuclear arms must be eliminated. He looks to Pope Leo and to the Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, of which he is a founding member, to further this goal.
While most of the world's major historical traumas related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) did not involve Muslims, it is becoming part of the present fear politics related to Islam and jihad. WMDs therefore have become one of today's sub-discussions of Islam and the laws of armed conflict discourse. My commentary critically examines how Islamic scholars today treat WMDs in context of fiqh al-jih & amacr;d (laws of war). I begin by exploring how primary sources and classical scholarship heritage treat war and how it is regulated because Islamic sciences (including fiqh) are built on over a thousand years of intellectual tradition. I continue by discussing how international law and Islamic law impact each other in today's discourse, which will affect how various contemporary issues (including WMDs) are discussed. Finally, I critically analyze the various opinions of Islamic scholars concerning WMDs. As a reflection, I find that these opinions are legacies of the Islamic intellectual tradition as colored by present-day Islam and international-law dialectics under the shadow of an unjust global order.
This commentary presents a series of field-based experiences of inter-faith and ecumenical dialogue in Israel and the West Bank following the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023. After a short introduction about two documents of the Second Vatican Council (the encyclical Pacem in Terris - which focuses on disarmament and peace - and the declaration Nostra Aetate - which focuses on the relationship between the Catholic Church and non-Christian religions), this manuscript relates various encounters in Israel and the West Bank. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam meet in places where the faithful of the three great monotheistic religions gather to pray or practice charity. Sometimes interreligious dialogue is not sought but simply exists as a contact of proximity and arouses curiosity or interest in different rites. Inter-faith dialogue is embedded in daily life in those territories and helps to build a more tolerant and respectful society through charitable initiatives. The comment concludes that such practices, often held outside of academic or institutional frameworks, represent significant signs of hope and resilience within a deeply contested religious and political environment. After more than 60 years, the teachings of the Second Vatican Council on matters of disarmament and peace are still current.
For populations living under persistent nuclear threat, such as South Korea, denuclearization represents a direct pathway to peace. Yet the conditions under which South Koreans support denuclearization negotiations with North Korea remain underexplored. This study examines South Korean public attitudes toward denuclearization agreements using a pre-registered survey experiment with 2,400 nationally matched respondents. Participants evaluated a hypothetical agreement in which North Korea commits to dismantling its nuclear program in exchange for one of five concessions: regime security guarantees, sanctions relief, financial assistance, withdrawal of US troops and extended deterrence, or South Korea’s permanent commitment to nonproliferation. Support is highest for low-cost concessions and significantly lower when agreements impose substantial economic burdens or security trade-offs. Across all scenarios, trust in North Korea’s compliance remains uniformly low. These findings reveal the fragility of domestic support for denuclearization and highlight the importance of cost sensitivity, while pointing to persistent distrust as a key constraint on public support.
This supplementary issue of the reassesses the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime at a time of profound geopolitical transformation. While the Cold War and its aftermath saw significant progress-anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.S.-Russian arms control-recent decades have witnessed the gradual erosion of these frameworks amid intensifying rivalry, stagnating disarmament, and weakening legal arrangements. Against this backdrop, the issue examines both the enduring significance and structural limitations of the NPT, alongside the evolving role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has introduced new normative dynamics while deepening divisions among states. Contributions address key themes, including tensions between law and power, the prospects and constraints of the NPT review process, and the fundamentally political nature of arms control.The issue also explores emerging challenges in verification, enforcement, and institutional design in a potential nuclear-zero regime. It emphasizes the need for adaptive governance, sustained political commitment, and a reconceptualization of security that integrates national, human, and ecological dimensions, while reaffirming human dignity and ethical principles as essential to achieving nuclear abolition.
If nuclear abolition was to be achieved, then a shift would be required from an international nuclear non-proliferation regime that limits the number of nuclear-armed states to a global zero regime that prevents the re-emergence of nuclear-armed states. What kind of system is required to prevent the re-emergence of nuclear weapons development in a world where no country possesses them? Is it the control system that has been globally pursued since the end of World War II ? This article examines a desirable form of a global zero system in a post-nuclear-weapon era. It reflects on the history of the international community's efforts to control nuclear energy. Specifically, it argues that creating an autonomous system based on intrinsic incentives - in which nations voluntarily deem nuclear weapons unnecessary - is more crucial than an extrinsic incentive-based heteronomous system that relies on control for prevention. It also highlights the necessity of taking regional or local measures rooted in culture and customs, instead of general or universal ones, to make this autonomous system possible. The primary objective of this article is to deliberate on a system that would be necessary in a post-nuclear-weapons-abolished world, providing insights into the actions necessary to achieve nuclear abolition.
Achieving a world without nuclear weapons requires a transition from today’s nuclear non-proliferation regime to a durable nuclear-zero regime. Separating (i) legal and institutional functions of a legal framework from (ii) enabling conditions beyond treaty design, including cooperative geopolitics and conflict mitigation, this article critically evaluates to what extent the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) provides, or could evolve to provide, legal and institutional functions required for a future durable global nuclear-zero regime, constructively identifying issues to be addressed going forward. It finds that, while the TPNW powerfully codifies the delegitimization and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, important legal and institutional design gaps remain. On the legal aspect, the treaty does not prohibit production of fissile material, is silent on delivery systems, and affirms an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear activities without reservation. Institutionally, its verification provisions are underspecified (both for nuclear-armed states and for non-nuclear-weapon states), no enforcement architecture is provided, and withdrawal rules may be too permissive and, in some scenarios, destabilizing. The article concludes with an agenda for treaty operation and reform to bridge the gap between normative movement and required legal and institutional functions.
The 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has proven remarkably resilient across its long history, reflecting broad agreement among states that the further spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risks of nuclear war and global instability. Today, pressures on the treaty are rising due to rapid changes in the global security environment, reversals on nuclear arms control, ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and successive failures of the two prior review conferences to reach consensus on a final document. Adding to these pressures, the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995 created unrealistic expectations for progress towards disarmament and a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, issues that roil the treaty’s internal political process. Given the circumstances, prospects for a consensus outcome at the 2026 review conference are poor. As in prior reviews, it can be expected that the parties will make best efforts to consolidate areas of agreement and manage substantive differences across a range of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peace uses issues. Poor prospects notwithstanding, with the intervention of treaty leaders, the parties may yet find it possible to ensure the 2026 conference at a minimum serves to stabilize the treaty and reaffirm international norms of nuclear restraint amidst today’s global turbulence.
Frustration over the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) led to the creation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). On the other hand, there is criticism that the TPNW has fostered confrontation and division between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. In order to achieve nuclear abolition, it is necessary to ensure non-proliferation. The emergence of the TPNW, which does not have its own safeguards regime, has called into question the nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. This paper discusses the nature of the international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT in the present and near future, keeping in mind the existence of TPNW.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify how international law on nuclear disarmament has developed and what effect it has produced in the last 80 years. Furthermore, it examines the interrelationship between nuclear weapons as a means of the rule of power and international law on nuclear disarmament as a means of the rule of law. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the bilateral treaties between the United States and Soviet Union/Russia on strategic nuclear forces, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and other treaties are precisely analyzed and evaluated. The rise, progress and regress of international law on nuclear disarmament are also analyzed. Finally, the paper argues that in order to strengthen the international law on nuclear disarmament, the shift of the international system from the rule of power to the rule of law is necessary.
In the context of the breakdown of nuclear arms control, the crisis of world order and the background of ecological disruption, this commentary discusses key aspects of a possible world order that can achieve and sustain the abolition of nuclear weapons. It argues that such a new world order it must be fit for purpose in the Anthropocene epoch, in which human activity is the most decisive force shaping the natural world. To explain this proposition, the essay explores ideas about security, arms control, the demise of the current world order and the ecological crisis, and connects them to some fundamentals of political philosophy. This commentary proposes that international relations must be conceptualized in relation to nature and cooperation. In a world challenged by ecological crisis and technological achievements that pose an existential threat, basing national policy on the competitive acquisition of power is both outmoded and counterproductive. It damages both the shared global interest and the interests of each country’s citizens. The essay concludes that this standpoint is in the direct line of descent of classic liberalism. It proposes that a multiplex approach to reaching agreements may be the most fruitful way to transition to a new world order.
This article explores how technical "requirements" in nuclear weapons policy are constructed, politicized and mobilized to serve institutional interests, focusing on the US government's 2015 decision to increase the tritium requirement for its nuclear arsenal. Assumed to be a response to technical and strategic needs, the requirement is better understood as a vehicle for reviving a troubled uranium enrichment program - the AC100 centrifuge. The US Energy Department leveraged the opaque and authoritative language of technical necessity to secure funding for the centrifuge and protect institutional prerogatives. This case illustrates how nuclear policy is shaped by bureaucratic and economic interests and the politics of technical expertise. It challenges the assumption that nuclear force structure is determined primarily by security needs. Instead, it argues that national security "requirements" are often contingent, constructed and subject to institutional manipulation.
This article examines the durability and fragility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) through a critical approach to liberal institutionalism and international regime theory. While the NPT has effectively limited nuclear proliferation, it faces growing challenges to its legitimacy and implementation that threaten its long-term resilience. The analysis highlights seven structural challenges: the stagnation of the disarmament agenda, the erosion of verification mechanisms, the underdevelopment of the peaceful uses pillar, decision-making dynamics and institutional paralysis in the NPT review process, persistent legitimacy deficits, the dynamics of multipolarity, and normative fragmentation, especially in light of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Based on these observations, scenario-based projections are developed for the next ten and twenty years, ranging from incremental reform within the existing framework to deeper fragmentation, new proliferation pressures, or even the consolidation of a multipolar nuclear order. The conclusions suggest that the survival of the NPT will ultimately depend on restoring reciprocity between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, addressing concerns about legitimacy, and adapting the institutional design to the new structural realities of the international system.
Dr. George Perkovich, the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has long worked on nuclear issues and is currently leading a study on nuclear signaling in the twenty-first century. This interview examines Perkovich's assessment of the future of nuclear arms control and the challenges facing the global nuclear order amid growing geopolitical uncertainty. Perkovich emphasizes that arms control was historically designed to stabilize competition by reassuring adversaries that neither side seeks an offensive or defensive advantage in weapons capable of enabling a successful nuclear attack. He suggests that, while formal treaties face structural constraints within the United States, high-level political agreements between leaders may provide a more feasible path for arms control. Perkovich also cautions against nuclear acquisition by US allies warning that it underestimates the consequences of proliferation. Emphasizing that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons faces a generational challenge, he calls for renewed political leadership and dialogue to sustain the international nuclear order. The interview, conducted online on 19 February 2026, was accompanied by commentary on the implications of the US - Israel strikes on Iran for the nuclear order.
The year 2025 marked many well-known anniversaries of the nuclear age. Unbeknownst to many, it also marked the 70th anniversary of the 1955 Bandung Conference, when delegates and heads of state from twenty-nine Asian and African countries, representing more than half of the world’s population, convened in Bandung, Indonesia. This unprecedented gathering of newly independent states defied contemporary expectations by identifying the nuclear-armed Cold War as the greatest threat to their political, economic and cultural development, claiming the cause of nuclear disarmament as a matter of shared concern for all countries. This commentary recounts the significance of the Bandung meeting for subsequent developments in multilateral nuclear diplomacy, including the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, whose members proved central to securing the inclusion of Article VI disarmament commitments in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the negotiations that led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). As of November 2025, the TPNW has been signed by ninety-five countries and acceded to by another four countries, constituting a global majority whose stance reflects the long legacy of non-aligned nuclear multilateralism inaugurated at Bandung.
Deterrence by denial is a classic defense strategy in which the goal is to offset an adversary's capabilities in ways that deny them success in achieving their intended military or strategic effects. If their modes of attack are unlikely to succeed - but still risk drawing retaliation or escalation - they may be deterred from carrying out such attacks in the first place. Deterrence by denial is increasingly being pursued to help address biological weapons threats. While the concept guided many governments for decades in their biodefense efforts, more recently, game-changing advances in the tools that are used in this field showcase that we have entered a new era for how we can undermine the effects of biological weapons and thereby deter their development and use. This Special Issue on deterrence by denial for biological weapons threats explores the concept and the capabilities it requires, its pursuit by several governments, and potential implications for US-Japan defense cooperation, Japan's disarmament goals, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
As was experienced in the global pandemic of COVID-19, a microbial pandemic would become a worldwide disaster resulting several million deaths. Indeed, natural onset and endemic microbial diseases might be somewhat controlled and prevented by vaccination and use of efficacious antimicrobials as well as daily surveillance and monitoring of the numbers of patients with specific infections. Sudden use of artificial and novel microbiological hazards, however, would be hardly controlled and suppressed. Since production of microbiological weapons requires only a small-scaled facility and limited equipment, together with low-development costs, it would be difficult to detect their productions, storage, and transportation. If new artificial microbiological hazards were spread intentionally in a community without immunity by some malicious group, several millions of deaths would well occur without effective counter measures for prevention and suppression. Development and use of artificial microbial weapons, therefore, should be strictly prohibited under the international concordance, collaboration and initiative, as well as chemical and nuclear weapons.
