Merger control in the UK and EU is increasingly framed as a means of promoting competitiveness and economic growth, extending beyond its traditional focus on preventing harm to competition and consumer welfare. This article examines whether, and to what extent, merger control is institutionally well suited to advancing three macroeconomic objectives now emphasized by policymakers: managing inflationary pressures and expectations, attracting investment, and fostering innovation through dynamic competition assessment. Drawing on economic theory, institutional design, and recent case law, it argues that while political discourse, policy, and soft law developments increasingly position merger control as a growth-supporting instrument, its institutional architecture may limit its capacity to deliver these outcomes directly. In practice, attempts to mobilize merger control in pursuit of these aims reveal trade-offs between predictability, flexibility, and the assessment of inherently uncertain dynamic effects. The article concludes that merger control’s most durable contribution to economic growth remains indirect, through maintaining competitive market structures that support growth over time.
This article examines how the EU Merger Regulation, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and the EU FDI screening framework are reshaping the governance of mergers and acquisitions in Europe. It argues that EU competition policy is becoming more politically embedded, as deal reviews increasingly reflect concerns around strategic autonomy, economic security, resilience, and industrial policy. This does not signal a move away from rigorous legal or economic analysis or towards more arbitrary decision-making, but rather the emergence of a more cumulative and layered regulatory framework. The article considers recent developments in merger control, the FSR, and FDI screening and argues that, for companies pursuing transactions in Europe, securing approval increasingly requires not only strong legal and economic arguments but also a broader public affairs and communications strategy that anticipates the concerns of regulators, policymakers, investors, customers, and the media and explains how the transaction contributes to Europe’s wider policy objectives.
Courts and enforcers have taken inconsistent and unprincipled approaches to the anterior question in a Bronner ‘essential facilities’ analysis: at what level of generality must essential infrastructure be characterized? This article argues that an overbroad characterization of infrastructure as being ‘essential’ risks leaving dominant undertakings with an open-ended duty to deal, undermining the normative justification for the Bronner doctrine, whilst an overly narrow characterization might supplant the text of Article 102 TFEU and produce an expansive safe harbour that weakens the utility of the prohibition on the abuse of dominance more broadly. This article traces the emergence of the ‘reservation binary’, the proposition that the Bronner conditions apply only where a dominant undertaking has exclusively reserved an infrastructure for the needs of its own business, from its origins in the regulated monopoly context to its more recent extension in the digital platforms context in Google Shopping , Android Auto and Kent v. Apple . This article then considers issues in the application of the ‘reservation binary’ and ultimately suggests a mode of characterization that recognizes the underlying property rights at play.
In the last two years, there has been a substantial increase in the Competition and Markets Authority’s consideration and acceptance of the exiting firm scenario in its counterfactual assessments. This article explores these recent cases and any such learnings that can be taken from them, including whether a less restrictive CMA approach is here to stay.
This article examines the treatment of efficiencies against the backdrop of competition authorities’ growing interest in integrating industrial policy objectives into merger control. Although efficiencies are formally recognized under the UK and EU merger regimes, they have so far had limited influence on clearance decisions. The article considers whether, and how, economic tools can be used to account for efficiencies in merger assessments, focusing on three categories: economies of scale, innovation, and out-of-market efficiencies. In doing so, it draws on the economic literature and on merger cases from a range of jurisdictions.
