This article examines hybrid operations below the threshold of war as coordinated actions that combine heterogeneous instruments to manipulate target systems and produce defined political, strategic, operational, or enabling effects. It distinguishes hybrid operations from broader concepts such as hybrid warfare, gray-zone conflict, irregular warfare, and malign influence. It introduces the related concept of hybrid campaigns as a sustained, adaptive, and integrated series of such operations conducted to achieve political or strategic ends. Using a structured comparison of selected cases—Russia’s campaign in Mali and the Sahel, Russia’s sanctions-evasion procurement networks, Iran’s Axis of Resistance, China’s critical-minerals leverage, and Belarus’s instrumentalization of migration—the article explores how diverse actors pursue influence, coercion, circumvention, dependency creation, and dilemma generation without crossing into open war. The cases show that hybrid campaigns are best understood not as lists of tools, but as forms of operational design targeting systems such as security sectors, supply chains, border regimes, deterrence architectures, and elite decision-making networks. The article identifies common features across cases: exploitation of seams, adaptation, manipulation of ambiguity, creation of costly response dilemmas, and a variable role for corruption, from background condition to operational instrument producing strategic effects.
Experts defining the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare (HW) often focus solely on the ROC’s propaganda against Ukraine. This leads to an incomplete account of how Russia weaponizes religion. Conceptually, HW refers not merely to disinformation but to a combination of conventional and unconventional warfighting methods. More importantly, empirical evidence indicates that elements of the ROC act not only as a disinformation machine but also as a troop recruitment platform, including in Africa. The recent expansion of the ROC into Africa is critical to Western security since, in some African states, the ROC is reportedly recruiting irregular soldiers to join the war against Ukraine. To offer an updated research and policy agenda, we examine the effectiveness of the ROC’s hybrid operations in the Sahel. This case has broader methodological relevance for studying the ROC’s activities across Africa. The aim is to lay the foundations for a critical academic discussion of the ROC’s HW activities in Africa and to derive best practices practitioners can use to evaluate HW effectiveness. By examining various open-source empirical data, we argue that it is analytically useful to define the ROC’s malign activities in the Sahel region as hybrid operations. These operations are thus far effective, producing strategic, operational, and tactical effects in support of Russia’s HW against the West. We conclude that a successful HW signature has seven basic elements: adaptability, ambiguity, asymmetry, deniability, irregularity, multimodality, and synchronicity. The West must support African states in defending against such hybrid operations.
Hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure pose significant coordination problems for the European Union, NATO, and their member states. This article examines which governance seams come into play in attacks on maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region and how the actors involved respond institutionally. The analytical basis for this article is provided by the hybrid threat model developed by Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, which systematizes actors, domains, tools, and escalation phases of hybrid activities. Methodologically, the study follows a case-study approach using congruence analysis, following Blatter and Haverland. The data are drawn from ten coded documentary and analytical sources, including EU Council recommendations, official government statements, NATO documents on underwater infrastructure, and UN Security Council records. The analysis supports all four theoretically derived assumptions: governance seams become salient at the intersections of civil and military responsibilities, national and supranational levels, political rhetoric and operational capacity, and public accountability and intelligence confidentiality. The documented institutional responses primarily address operational aspects without resolving the underlying structural problems. The results indicate that these governance seams are structural in nature and can mutually reinforce each other.
Vietnam is a developing country where human trafficking remains a serious problem, fueled by socio-economic disparities, gender discrimination, and a lack of awareness. Despite international efforts to combat this crime, effective victim protection remains a major challenge. This study examines how Vietnam fosters legal instruments to protect victims of human trafficking and identifies lessons relevant to countries facing similar challenges. It reviewed primary and secondary sources on national and international legislative and normative instruments supporting the protection of human trafficking victims, including the 2015 Vietnam Criminal Code, the 2011 Law on Human Trafficking Prevention and Combat, and international agreements such as the 2000 UN Palermo Protocol. The study also considered additional relevant legal developments, including the 2016 Law on Children, regional cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, and the 2017 amendment to the Criminal Code. The results indicate that Vietnam has established many important legal instruments for victim protection, but enforcement remains inconsistent due to limited inter-agency coordination, bureaucratic procedures, and a lack of victim-centered approaches. Additionally, victim support services are often underfunded, and rehabilitation programs lack long-term effectiveness. A legislative reform is necessary, including the introduction of more comprehensive victim services and victim-centered legal frameworks to combat human trafficking effectively. Furthermore, international cooperation and domestic reform are essential to sustaining such achievements in the long term.
The Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Center (WB3C) was inaugurated in 2024. In line with the Berlin Process’s initiatives to improve the regional countries’ capabilities in energy security, energy transition, and cybersecurity, the WB3C aims to meet regional needs for cyber protection and to foster a regional cybersecurity culture for energy infrastructure. The WB3C’s activities are expanding as the Western Balkans’ renewable energy potential attracts investments from a range of global players, including the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Türkiye. This article analyzes the potential of the WB3C as an emerging regional cyber governance framework for the energy sector. The qualitative analysis incorporates elements of both the capability approach and institutional analysis and design. The work underscores the importance of the region in cyber governance, where the role of the state is transferred to an infrastructure that transcends borders.
