In this study, we aim to analyze the notions of "pragmatic" and "commatic" we encounter in what we highlight to be a process of canonization of style appropriate to each content and theological level since Porphyry. This research is divided into three parts: primarily, we investigate the sense in which the Neoplatonists use the adjective "commatic", which includes on the one hand (i) defining what the Neoplatonists mean by "unity of meaning", and on the other hand distinguishing between a "woven" and continuous style and a "disjointed" and broken style, collecting the stylistic criticisms made by the Neoplatonists of the ancient texts; then (2) we seek to establish the areas of application of the "commatic" style in Neoplatonic discourse, distinguishing on the one hand inspired and ethical discourse, and on the other hand clear and sharp dialectical discourse, bordering on that which eludes philosophical demonstration, namely, the alpha sigma alpha phi epsilon iota alpha; finally (3), we aim to study the "pragmatic" style associated with each theological content in order to highlight its corresponding style and vocabulary. The present research stems from the need to show how behind the lexical and structural choices of the Neoplatonic writings there is a precise theory of style, produced by a process of aesthetic canonization that emerges clearly as early as Porphyry's rhetorical fragments and from Neoplatonic exegetical activity on rhetorical works, as well as from an innumerable amount of references to a rhetorical tradition on the period and its parts, the commata and cola, which the Neoplatonists, as this study aims to show, master and apply on their own structuring and formalization of theological content.
The purpose of this paper is i) to focus on the last section of the In Parmenidem, analyzing Proclus' reflection on the relationship between the First God and what he calls the "axioms of contradiction", accompanied by an attempt to harmonize in a subordinate sense the Aristotelian perspective with the Platonic one; 2) to analyze the reception of this idea in Nicholas of Cusa, the first Latin author to be systematically influenced by the In Parmenidem. It will be possible to show how Cusanus develops a perspective that, on the one hand, finds its explicit antecedent in Proclus and, on the other, how he radicalizes Proclus' perspective, developing theoretical tensions that we can find unsystematically in Proclus' own thought. Proclus is aware that the Principle of all reality and of science itself must be conceived as in itself unknowable. At the same time, he seeks to save the ability of human knowledge to describe reality. Starting from an idea of the relationship between God and the laws of contradiction close to that of Proclus, Cusanus develops an epistemology that, on the one hand, recognizes the principle of contradiction as the ultimate principle of reason and, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion of a separation between thought and reality outside thought.
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the position and role of Plato's Charmides by analysing its second part. In this section, Critias tries to explain s8phrosun & ecirc; as a form of knowledge that is self-referential in the sense that it is a type of knowledge of all other forms of knowledge without being knowledge of the objects of those other forms. Plato remains doubtful about the feasibility and usefulness of such a concept, as he believes that all types of knowledge must be about something else, separate from the forms of knowledge themselves. He also thinks that such formal knowledge, if it indeed exists, is of little interest. This paper also aims to demonstrate that the Charmides belongs to a group of dialogues in which Plato discusses other people's proposals, similar to what happens in the Theaetetus. In the case of the Charmides, this is very likely the project that we will later see developed in Aristotle's PosteriorAnalytics.
This article suggests a novel approach to the study of the argumentative structure of Proclus' Elements of Theology (ET). Instead of studying it through the prism of the Elements of Euclid (EG), this novel approach proposes an evaluation of ET's argumentative structure based on Proclus' reflections about the genre of stoichei & ocirc;sis and the methods of dialectic and geometry. Thus, I argue that studies under the suggested form of evaluation should standardize the conceptual framework of their analyses about the features of ET's argumentative structure, explicating their relevance for the interpretation of the text's system of logical relations. Moreover, this article presents some examples of editorial enhancements made by editors of ET clarifying the argumentative structure of the text. With these examples, I will show how these enhancements help us clarify the argumentative structure of ET.
This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem . I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything.
