This article examines the phenomenon of constitutionalization in regional integration entities, arguing that the adoption of constitutional-like frameworks is a pivotal process for ensuring their sustainable development and effective operation. Through a comparative analysis of the European Union (EU), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the author conceptualizes constitutionalization not in its classical state-centered sense, but in the much broader sense as a spectrum of legal institutionalization and consolidation. This spectrum ranges from the supranational model, characterized by a hierarchical legal order and primacy of common law (EU), to the intergovernmental model, based on strict sovereignty preservation and consensus (ASEAN). The EAEU occupies a hybrid middle ground, strategically balancing economic integration with strong safeguards for national sovereignty. The paper concludes that constitutionalization, understood in this broad, non-traditional sense, is not a uniform process but must be adapted to each region’s unique political, historical, and economic context. It offers insights into how regional integration entities can selectively adopt advanced legal and institutional tools—such as dispute resolution mechanisms, qualified majority voting, and legal harmonization—to enhance functional efficacy and resilience, thereby contributing to their long-term sustainability and effective governance.
Since mid-1990s Russia had been Armenia’s ‘strategic ally’, although Yerevan was inclined to a foreign policy coined as ‘complementarity’. Meanwhile, Armenia backtracked from the Association Agreement (AA)/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU in September 2013 in favour of joining the Customs Union (CU)/Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); such a shift was justified by membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and entailed switching to a policy of ‘supplementarity’. Forging the relations with the EU through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2021, Yerevan’s relations with Moscow deteriorated after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war stopped through the Russian mediation. After Azerbaijan’s subsequent attack on Armenia proper in 2021 followed by the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in 2023 the Armenian government resorted to cumbersome tactical ‘hedging’. Whereas the concept of ‘hedging’ has been widely applied to small and middle powers, ontologically, this article will undertake the task of explaining the puzzle of Armenia’s foreign policy ‘twists’ focusing on the empirical developments as of 2018. Epistemologically, it will be inductive. Methodologically, it will employ process-tracing relying on primary (official discourse, visits, data, figures) and secondary sources to demonstrate the transition from the strategy of ‘bandwagoning’ to cumbersome tactical ‘hedging’. It is inferred that the latter is fraught with risks for Armenia given the persistent great-power competition between the U.S. and Russia, the stakes of middle powers Turkey and Iran in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, which have inflated the previously manageable in-betweenness/ entre-deux into unwieldy in-amongness/ entre-plusieurs.
This article examines how Kazakhstan strategically navigates the complex and evolving landscape of EU-China connectivity, with a specific focus on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Gateway (GG). Drawing on the theoretical framework of geoeconomic hedging, the paper argues that Kazakhstan’s strategic adaptability enables it to maximise national benefits while mitigating risks associated with an increasingly competitive Eurasian environment. Through a detailed empirical analysis, the paper identifies key infrastructure projects and investments from both the BRI and the GG that converge on Kazakh territory. It demonstrates that Kazakhstan actively leverages its geographical position and its multi-vector foreign policy to engage with both initiatives. Ultimately, it concludes that Kazakhstan effectively mediates and facilitates EU-China connectivity, serving as a critical interregional connector. This unique role allows Kazakhstan to convene the interests of Beijing and Brussels, offering a compelling case study for the future of Eurasian trade and transport architecture.
This paper examines how the energy transition may reproduce a “green resource curse” and how Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan attempt to escape it. While debates emphasize upstream ESG compliance or downstream clean-tech deployment, this paper argues the decisive arena is the midstream—smelting, refining, and separation—where value addition, quality, and supply security are set. Because midstream capacity is more concentrated than mining, mineral flows converge on bottlenecks, heightening geopolitical vulnerability and leaving resource-rich states to bear extraction costs while exporting low-value ores. Building on resource-curse political economy, the paper conceptualizes the green resource curse as a midstream capability gap that drives trade deficits, weak diversification, and new dependency under decarbonization. It then compares Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s strategies to climb the value chain through beneficiation, state-led coordination, and external partnerships. Kazakhstan’s rare earth push highlights the technical difficulty of high-purity separation, the temptation of rapid Chinese capital-technology integration, and market-access risks as U.S./EU rules of origin and sustainability standards tighten. Uzbekistan’s approach centers on institutional consolidation (UzTMK), a large investment pipeline, cleaner processing initiatives, and attempts to create domestic demand through EV and battery projects. The paper identifies four conditions for avoiding a green resource curse: (1) internalizing midstream know-how, (2) reducing processing carbon intensity to meet emerging trade regimes, (3) diversifying partners to preserve flexibility, and (4) long-term institutional learning and workforce development. It concludes that Central Asia’s outcomes will depend less on resource abundance than on converting strategy into midstream sovereignty.
