This paper explores the role anxiety plays in Hume's philosophy. It begins by discussing anxiety as an emotion and connecting it to its object, namely problematic uncertainty. I then explore Hume's own view of anxiety, beginning with a discussion of T 2.39, "Of the direct passions," where he draws the connection between anxiety, a species of fear, and uncertainty. I then connect this with his remarks on doubt, before turning to Hume's treatment of the false religions of superstition and enthusiasm, and their connection with anxiety as a mood rather than an emotion.
For Hume, desire and pleasure (and aversion and pain) are closely linked. It might seem then that seeking out pain (non-instrumentally) is not possible for the Humean agent, and thus several prominent interpretations of his theory of motivation rule out masochistic desires. But by connecting these discussions of motivation with the debate over the status of perceptions in Hume's philosophy-are they mental objects or mental episodes of some kind?-I show that Humean masochism is possible. The key is recognizing that perceptions are best understood as perceivings, some of which "delineate out objects" and others of which are non-representational feelings-colourings of objects we are aware of through different perceptions. Masochism involves feeling non-representational pain but making it into the object of introspection, at which point it is possible to be pleased at and desire this mental state.
This article examines Hume's infamous racist footnote by placing it in the context of his reflections on contempt and classificatory issues surrounding questions of dehumanisation and monstrosity. The aim of this is to show that it is precisely because contempt motivated Hume's deprecating views about non-White people that he remained oblivious to the fact that the footnote was inconsistent with his broader philosophical commitments and explanatory strategies concerning the context-dependence of human life. More generally, this analysis reveals that contempt is a passion that tends to confirm itself by rendering the mind blind to the deficiencies of its own thinking. Diagnosing this problem in Hume does not serve as an excuse for his racism but aims to provide resources for identifying strategies to address contempt-driven prejudices in one's own thinking.
Hume is widely understood to believe that all virtues and vices are "durable principles of the mind," and that durable principles of the mind are character traits. Several scholars therefore read him as a virtue ethicist. I argue that we should reject all such interpretations. I argue that Hume allows that some virtues and vices are simply single perceptions, such as a motivationally strong desire to help a stranger or to murder someone. Therefore, I argue, we should not read him as a virtue ethicist. Hume is, however, a reductionist about character, who understands a character trait as simply a long-lasting but interrupted succession of perceptions. On my interpretation, a durable principle of the mind is an uninterrupted, relatively short-lived succession of different perceptions within an actor's mind, of a kind that mainly interests Hume because he thinks it enables observers to associate a person's action with her mind.
